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vWellbeing is a word that has entered the vocabulary of almost everyone con-
cerned with current economic and social trends, with good reason. Many fami-
lies and communities struggle with issues of wellbeing (including various forms 
of depression, addiction and self-harm). Obtaining paid employment is no lon-
ger sufficient for a person to be confident of earning enough resources to sup-
port wellbeing; instead, the market economy is creating large numbers of jobs 
that pay less than the living wage, reinforced by new forms of work such as 
zero-hour contracts and the gig economy. Measures of objective and subjective 
wellbeing indicate that rising prosperity is not shared by everyone, and some 
groups of people are falling further behind.
Observations such as these have stimulated global attention to wellbeing. A 
major impulse was the 2009 Report by the Commission on the Measurement of 
Economic Performance and Social Progress, headed by Joseph Stiglitz, Amartya 
Sen and Jean-Paul Fitoussi. The report concluded as its main theme that “the 
time is ripe for our measurement system to shift emphasis from measuring eco-
nomic production to measuring people’s well-being”. This shift is taking place 
around the world, including in the United Kingdom, where the Measuring 
National Wellbeing Programme was initiated in November 2010 by the then 
Prime Minister, David Cameron.
International organisations are implementing programmes to measure and 
promote wellbeing. Important examples include the wellbeing conceptual 
framework of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), the quality of life framework of the European Union, the indicators 
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of global development maintained by the World Bank and the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development created by the United Nations.
Despite this renewed focus on wellbeing, the priority of regional and national 
decision-makers typically remains tied to economic growth. David Cameron, 
for example, emphasised this priority at the launch of the United Kingdom’s 
Measuring National Wellbeing Programme: “Now, let me be very, very clear,” he 
said, “growth is the essential foundation of all our aspirations.” Even as scientific 
evidence shows with increasing clarity that current patterns of economic pro-
duction are causing dangerous climate change, the political impetus for higher 
growth in gross domestic product remains unabated.
There have been counter voices. A courageous example was Tim Jackson’s 
report for the UK Sustainable Development Commission, published in March 
2009. Entitled Prosperity without Growth, it set out in a compelling manner how 
a genuine focus on wellbeing will require a different approach to economics.
This book responds to Jackson’s challenge. It does not claim to develop a new 
economics; rather it seeks to recover insights from the economics tradition on 
how persons can create wellbeing through personal effort and through collabo-
ration with others at different levels of choice- making. Thus, the reader will find 
the text is peppered with references to scholars recognised as giants in the field, 
from Adam Smith writing in the eighteenth century to recent recipients of the 
Nobel Prize in Economics. We draw on key elements in their work, supple-
mented by the published findings of other researchers, to create a synthesis that 
we call the wellbeing economics framework.
The framework is developed in this book as a series of 24 propositions, begin-
ning with the proposition that the primary purpose of economics is to contrib-
ute to enhanced wellbeing of persons. Subsequent analysis then explains how 
this purpose can be achieved. Public policy is important in this analysis, but it is 
not the sole, or even the first, focus of the book. Instead, the framework recog-
nises that wellbeing is supported by capabilities at several different levels of 
choice-making, with successive chapters focusing on persons, households and 
families, civil society, the market economy, local government, the Nation State 
and the global community.
We received considerable assistance as we prepared this book. Our thanks 
begin with colleagues, students, clients and partners of the Agribusiness and 
Economics Research Unit at Lincoln University and of the Inter-Disciplinary 
Ethics Applied Centre at the University of Leeds. The strong collegiality and 
engagement at both institutes contributed to the development of our ideas and 
analysis expressed in this book.
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This book builds on an earlier text on wellbeing economics, published for a 
general audience in New Zealand by Bridget Williams Books. The new book 
goes well beyond that text, but we remain grateful to Bridget Williams and to 
Tom Rennie for supporting our initial efforts to synthesise a wellbeing econom-
ics framework.
In April 2016, we were approached by Laura Pacey at Palgrave Macmillan. 
Laura introduced us to the Wellbeing in Politics and Policy series, edited by Ian 
Bache, Karen Scott and Paul Allin, and invited us to submit a formal proposal 
for the series. Our plans for this book were further developed after two insightful 
reviews by anonymous referees. We are grateful to Laura, to the two referees and 
to the three editors, for their support for this project.
Parts of the book were written while Paul Dalziel was a Visitor at the Leeds 
University Business School and at the Victoria University of Wellington School 
of Government. We are grateful to Giuseppe Fontana and to Girol Karacaoglu 
for their hospitality in arranging these visits. We also gratefully acknowledge 
insightful comments from participants in seminars Paul presented during both 
visits, as well as from participants in conference sessions hosted by the Regional 
Studies Association, the Australia and New Zealand Regional Science Association 
International and the New Zealand Association of Economists.
Paul Dalziel enjoyed an opportunity to talk about the book with Tim Jackson, 
during the latter’s visit to New Zealand as the 2016 Hillary Laureate. This pref-
ace has already acknowledged the importance of Jackson’s book Prosperity with-
out Growth for our research; all three authors are grateful to him for his 
encouragement of this project.
Early drafts of the manuscript for the book were read by Paul Allin, Allan 
Brent, Arthur Grimes and Karen Scott, each of whom provided written feed-
back. We are grateful to all four readers for their generosity, their clarity and 
their insightfulness, which greatly improved the final analysis and presentation. 
Of course, responsibility for the final text lies with us.
Finally, we thank the team at Palgrave Macmillan for translating our manu-
script into its published form. We particularly thank Laura Pacey and Clara 
Heathcock, who worked hard to produce the book to Palgrave Macmillan’s high 
standards.
Lincoln, New Zealand Paul Dalziel
Lincoln, New Zealand  Caroline Saunders
Leeds, UK  Joe Saunders
April 2018
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From Economic Growth to Wellbeing 
Economics
Abstract The primary purpose of economics is to contribute to enhanced well-
being of persons. Economists have often assumed this is best achieved through 
high economic growth. Nevertheless, experience shows that the pursuit of 
growth for its own sake can result in policies that harm the wellbeing of large 
numbers of people. Threats of global climate change, as well as other environ-
mental and social damage caused by current patterns of economic growth, 
intensify this concern. This first chapter argues for a new framework—wellbeing 
economics—to guide private and public sector efforts for expanding the capa-
bilities of persons to lead the kinds of lives they value and have reason to value. 
The wellbeing economics framework focuses on seven types of capital invest-
ment at seven levels of human choice. This typology provides the structure for 
the book’s remaining chapters.
Keywords Wellbeing • Austerity • Economic growth • Climate change • 
Capabilities
On 25 November 2010, then Prime Minister David Cameron launched the 
United Kingdom’s Measuring National Wellbeing Programme: “From April 
next year,” he said, “we’ll start measuring our progress as a country, not just by 
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how our economy is growing, but by how our lives are improving; not just by 
our standard of living, but by our quality of life” (Cameron 2010, par. 1; see 
Allin and Hand 2017, for an explanation of the programme and its background). 
That initiative reflected a wider global trend. Six years earlier, the Australian 
Treasury had published a wellbeing framework for analysis and policy advice 
(Treasury 2004; Gorecki and Kelly 2012). In 2008, French President Nicholas 
Sarkozy had set up the Commission on the Measurement of Economic 
Performance and Social Progress, headed by Joseph Stiglitz, Amartya Sen and 
Jean Paul Fitoussi. The unifying theme of its report was: “the time is ripe for our 
measurement system to shift emphasis from measuring economic production to 
measuring people’s well-being” (Stiglitz et al. 2009, p. 12). In 2010, Italy simi-
larly launched BES (benessere equo e sostenibile), involving multi- dimensional 
measures of equitable and sustainable wellbeing (CNEL and ISTAT 2010).
At the supranational level, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development has created a wellbeing framework with three pillars: quality of 
life, material living conditions and sustainability (OECD 2011, 2013, 2015, 
2017a). The statistical system of the European Union similarly offers a quality of 
life framework organised into eight themes of objective wellbeing indicators 
plus a ninth theme for subjective or self- evaluated measures (Eurostat 2015). 
The World Bank (2016) has compiled 1300 data series as indicators of global 
development and the quality of people’s lives in more than 200 countries. The 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development includes a vision of a world where 
physical, mental and social wellbeing are assured (United Nations 2015, par. 7).
These developments are consistent with a long tradition in economics that 
aims to promote the wellbeing of people. Consider, for example, the critique of 
mercantilism in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, the book that founded modern 
economics (Smith 1776, Volume 2, p. 179):
Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production; and the interest of the 
producer ought to be attended to, only so far as it may be necessary for promoting 
that of the consumer. The maxim is so perfectly self-evident, that it would be 
absurd to attempt to prove it. But in the mercantile system the interest of the con-
sumer is almost constantly sacrificed to that of the producer; and it seems to con-
sider production, and not consumption, as the ultimate end and object of all 
industry and commerce.
Another prominent example was the Cambridge professor, Alfred Marshall, 
who removed economics from the Moral Sciences and History Tripos to make it 
an independent discipline (Groenewegen 1995, Chap. 15). As quoted by Keynes 
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(1924, p.  319), Marshall chose economics as his lifetime study because he 
wanted to address systematic causes of poverty:
“From Metaphysics I went to Ethics, and thought that the justification of the exist-
ing condition of society was not easy. A friend, who had read a great deal of what 
are now called the Moral Sciences, constantly said: ‘Ah! if you understood Political 
Economy you would not say that.’ So I read Mill’s Political Economy and got 
much excited about it. I had doubts as to the propriety of inequalities of opportu-
nity, rather than of material comfort. Then, in my vacations I visited the poorest 
quarters of several cities and walked through one street after another, looking at the 
faces of the poorest people. Next, I resolved to make as thorough a study as I could 
of Political Economy.”
Other examples could be provided, but the point is made: economists have 
long understood that the primary purpose of the discipline is to contribute to 
enhanced wellbeing of persons.1 The wellbeing economics framework is founded 
on this understanding, expressed as the first of 24 propositions set out in this 
book to describe key points in the framework (the propositions can be read 
together in the first section of Chap. 9):
Proposition 1 The primary purpose of economics is to contribute to enhanced 
wellbeing of persons.
In the same year that the Measuring National Wellbeing Programme was 
launched, the British government imposed austerity measures that included cut-
backs in annual social welfare spending of £11 billion, reductions in other areas 
of government spending of £21 billion, an increase in value added tax and a 
two-year freeze in public sector pay for those earning more than £21,000 
per annum (HM Treasury 2010). These austerity measures were expanded in 
subsequent years. The 2014 Budget included a welfare cap to limit total welfare 
spending, for example, while the 2015 Budget announced further reductions in 
government spending of £30 billion over 2 years (HM Treasury 2014, 2015).
There was a sharp rise in the number of charity food banks after these poli-
cies, among other indicators of increased social distress (Jackson 2015; Loopstra 
et al. 2015; O’Hara 2015, Chap. 1; Purdam et al. 2015; Garthwaite 2016). This 
leads to an obvious question: if the primary purpose of economics is to contrib-
ute to enhanced wellbeing of persons, and if the government’s stated intention 
is to measure progress by how our lives are improving, how can policymakers 
justify austerity and other economic policies that result in such high levels of 
increased suffering?
 From Economic Growth to Wellbeing Economics 
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 Wellbeing and Economic Growth
Economists typically answer this question in three steps. First, it is argued that 
wellbeing is enhanced when individuals can satisfy more of their personal prefer-
ences, perhaps because they can afford a wider range of choices (Dolan and 
Peasgood 2008; Hausman and McPherson 2009). Hence, wellbeing is improved 
if a policy allows some people to increase preference satisfaction without anyone 
facing reduced choices (Pareto 1906; Hicks 1939). Such a policy is said to 
increase Pareto efficiency.
This seldom occurs in practice, since policies typically create losers as well as 
winners. The analysis may suggest, however, that the winners could fully com-
pensate the losers and still be better off. Even if the compensation is not paid in 
practice, such a policy is likely to be considered reasonable. This is because wins 
and losses experienced by an individual from all policy changes over a lifetime, 
if randomly distributed, might be expected to produce an overall gain when all 
policy changes meet this criterion (Hicks 1941).
The second step argues that economic growth is a dominant example of what 
provides the general population with a greater range of choices and allows more 
preferences to be satisfied. A famous observation by Nobel laureate Robert Lucas 
illustrates the significance attributed to growth as a source of wellbeing. After 
noting that there is a large spread between the growth rates of countries, Lucas 
(1988, p. 5) commented:
Is there some action a government of India could take that would lead the Indian 
economy to grow like Indonesia’s or Egypt’s? If so, what, exactly? If not, what is it 
about the ‘nature of India’ that makes it so? The consequences for human welfare 
involved in questions like these are simply staggering: Once one starts to think 
about them, it is hard to think about anything else.
Thus, although wellbeing may be the ultimate objective, policy priorities 
typically focus on achieving higher economic growth as the best means for 
expanding wellbeing in the long-term. Indeed, this was emphasised at the launch 
of the United Kingdom’s Measuring National Wellbeing Programme, when the 
Prime Minister addressed concerns that it sidelined economic growth (Cameron 
2010, par. 4, emphasis added):
Now, let me be very, very clear: growth is the essential foundation of all our aspira-
tions. Without a job that pays a decent wage, it is hard for people to look after their 
families in the way they want, whether that’s taking the children on holiday or 
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making your home a more comfortable place. Without money in your pocket it is 
difficult to do so many of the things we enjoy, from going out in the evening to 
shopping at the weekend. So, at this time I am absolutely clear that our most 
urgent priority is to get the economy moving, to create jobs, to spread opportunity 
for everyone.
The third step argues that economic growth requires specific policies to be 
implemented. The austerity measures, for example, were justified in precisely 
these terms (HM Treasury 2010, p. 1):
The most urgent task facing this country is to implement an accelerated plan to 
reduce the deficit. Reducing the deficit is a necessary precondition for sustained 
economic growth.
Economists devote considerable effort to exploring how to foster economic 
growth (Jones and Vollrath 2013). A major advance was Robert Solow’s (1956) 
neoclassical growth model, which demonstrated how countries tend to achieve 
higher levels of output per person if they have a higher rate of investment in 
physical capital such as factories, plant and machinery.2 Solow’s model also 
shows how output per person tends to grow more quickly with higher growth in 
labour productivity (that is, faster increases in the average value of output per 
hour of work, which indicates a country’s rate of technological progress).
Important extensions have been made to the neoclassical growth model. 
Mankiw et al. (1992) demonstrated that education levels of the workforce are an 
important factor influencing labour productivity, while Knowles and Owen 
(1995) demonstrated the importance of good health. More profoundly, Romer 
(1986, 1990) incorporated the idea that technological progress is influenced by 
the amount of effort devoted to producing new knowledge. His insight led to a 
new class of endogenous growth models, which will be discussed in this book’s 
Chap. 7.
Economists also explore the role of social institutions and norms in support-
ing economic growth (North 1987; Rodrik et al. 2004). In his Nobel Prize lec-
ture, Douglass North (1994) pointed out that the neoclassical growth model 
does not apply in countries lacking the necessary institutions for markets to 
operate. An important example is that effective legal protections for property 
rights are essential for strong economic growth (La Porta et al. 2008; Xu 2011). 
Some studies emphasise social values such as trust (Fukuyama 1995; Quddus 
et  al. 2000; McCloskey 2010), while others focus on good government and 
good governance (Krueger 1990; Kaufmann et  al. 1999; Hulme et  al. 2015) 
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including strict requirements for macroeconomic stability (Fischer 1991; Fatás 
and Mihov 2013).
This research has created a consensus among economists about what consti-
tutes good economic policy, represented for example by the contents of the 
Going for Growth report published annually by the OECD (2017b). Taking 
these arguments together, the promise is that orthodox economic policies will 
increase growth of per capita real gross domestic product (GDP), which will 
allow individuals to increase the range of their choices, which will promote well-
being. This is the vision behind statements such as the one cited above from 
David Cameron that growth is the essential foundation of all our aspirations.
Experience shows, however, that economic growth cannot always be relied 
upon to improve wellbeing. Referring to Cameron’s examples, it is possible to 
have economic growth without new jobs paying a decent wage, without people 
finding it easier to look after their families in the way they want and without 
opportunity for everyone. Indeed, a country can experience economic growth at 
the same time that large groups in the population find they are unable to main-
tain their material living standards.
 The Limits to Growth
The title of this section comes from a famous report prepared in the early 1970s 
by researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Building on a tradi-
tion going back at least to Ricardo (1817, Chap. 2), the report examined inter-
connections between accelerating industrialisation, rapid population growth, 
widespread malnutrition, depletion of non-renewable resources and a deterio-
rating environment (Meadows et al. 1972). Its analysis of prevailing trends led 
the research team to conclude that “the limits to growth on this planet will be 
reached sometime within the next one hundred years” (idem, p. 23).3
Modern studies continue to find evidence that persistent production growth 
is inconsistent with finite resources (Meadows et al. 2005; Hall and Day 2009; 
Rockström et  al. 2009a, b; Nørgård et  al. 2010; Bardi 2011; Turner 2012; 
Jackson and Webster 2016). Not only does increasing material consumption put 
pressure on the planet’s non-renewable resources, but also natural ecosystems 
have limited capacities to absorb higher pollution associated with economic 
growth, including accumulating greenhouse gas emissions. The Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change makes the following key observation (IPCC 2015, 
p. 4, emphasis added):
P. Dalziel et al.
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Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions have increased since the pre- industrial 
era, driven largely by economic and population growth, and are now higher than 
ever. This has led to atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane and 
nitrous oxide that are unprecedented in at least the last 800,000 years. Their 
effects, together with those of other anthropogenic drivers, have been detected 
throughout the climate system and are extremely likely to have been the domi-
nant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century.
The lesson from this research is that how economies grow is vital for wellbeing. 
Indeed, if current patterns of economic production continue, the planet’s surface 
is likely to be in the order of 3° C to 5° C warmer by 2050, creating considerable 
risks such as damage to unique ecosystems and more frequent extreme weather 
events (IPCC 2015, p. 18). Thus, the claim that “growth is the essential founda-
tion of all our aspirations” is false.
Tim Jackson (2009, 2017) argues that policy needs to consider prosperity 
without growth. He defines prosperity as an ability to flourish as human beings, 
which certainly involves material dimensions, but much more (Jackson 2017, 
p. 212):
To do well is in part about the ability to give and receive love, to enjoy the respect 
of our peers, to contribute usefully to society, to have a sense of belonging and trust 
in the community, to help create the social world and find a credible place in it. In 
short, an important component of prosperity is the ability to participate meaning-
fully in the life of society.
Jackson therefore advocates policies that target flourishing directly, rather 
than aiming for economic growth as an intermediate step. Since flourishing 
depends on our natural environment, this must include respect for the planet’s 
ecological limits. Current economic growth trajectories are imposing ecological 
costs on future generations that will threaten wellbeing on a global scale. Jackson 
therefore appeals for a new macroeconomics in which economic activity is con-
strained to stay within sustainable limits (idem, p. 160).4
These concerns are amplified by the way in which growth is currently mea-
sured; that is, as percentage increases in GDP. The rules for calculating GDP are 
set out in the United Nations System of National Accounts (United Nations 
2009), which sets boundaries on what categories of economic activity are 
included in the measure. Certain forms of unpaid work are excluded, such as 
care for children by parents within their own households. Also excluded is most 
environmental damage caused by economic production.
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An early critique of these rules was made by Marilyn Waring (1988).5 As a 
member of the New Zealand Parliament between 1975 and 1984, Waring saw 
the results of policy being based on claims such as “growth is the essential foun-
dation of all our aspirations”, when growth is defined narrowly by GDP. Policies 
focus on activities included within the GDP boundaries, and so other dimen-
sions of wellbeing, including the natural environment, are sacrificed in the pur-
suit of measured growth.
Herman Daly and John Cobb (1989) similarly argued that GDP cannot mea-
sure genuine economic progress. They created an index of sustainable economic 
welfare (ISEW) to include considerations such as distributional inequality, house-
hold production for own consumption and degraded natural environments. 
Daly and Cobb showed that the average growth in the ISEW for the United 
States is substantially below the growth rate of GDP (idem, p.  453). Similar 
conclusions have been reached for other countries using either the ISEW or vari-
ants such as the genuine progress indicator and the sustainable net benefit index.6
An important example of how a focus on GDP growth can overlook deterio-
rating trends in aspects of wellbeing, highlighted in Daly and Cobb’s original 
analysis, is widening income inequality. This remains an urgent concern three 
decades later, with numerous recent studies presenting evidence on rising 
inequality and associated losses of wellbeing (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009; 
Stiglitz 2012; Piketty 2013; Atkinson 2015; Marmot 2015). This phenomenon 
is not visible to policy advisors if the dominant measure of policy success is 
growth in GDP.
In short, it is not reasonable to presume that GDP growth, regardless of the 
nature of that growth, will increase wellbeing. Indeed, certain patterns of growth 
can cause harm to wellbeing, and so economics must recover a deeper under-
standing of how wellbeing is enhanced.7 A good starting point is the capabilities 
approach developed by Amartya Sen.
 Wellbeing and Capabilities
Consistent with the focus of economists on growth, Walt Rostow (1960) 
famously defined development as a process of countries moving through five 
stages of rising economic growth: (1) living in traditional society; (2) creating 
the pre-conditions for take-off; (3) achieving take-off; (4) driving to maturity; 
and (5) enjoying high mass consumption. Reacting to that theory, Amartya Sen 
offered an alternative understanding based on what people are able to do in their 
lives (Sen 1983, p. 754):
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Ultimately, the process of economic development has to be concerned with what 
people can or cannot do, e.g. whether they can live long, escape avoidable morbid-
ity, be well nourished, be able to read and write and communicate, take part in 
literary and scientific pursuits, and so forth.
Sen’s conceptualisation of development is known as the “capabilities approach” 
(Nussbaum 2000, 2011; Alkire 2002; Robeyns 2006; Schischka et al. 2008). 
The core idea is captured in the following short extract from Sen’s influential 
book, Development as Freedom (Sen 1999a, p. 18):
The analysis of development presented in this book treats the freedoms of individu-
als as the basic building blocks. Attention is thus paid particularly to the expansion 
of the ‘capabilities’ of persons to lead the kinds of lives they value – and have reason 
to value.
Note how Sen refers to persons, rather than people (which can indicate a mass 
of indistinguishable humans) or individuals (which can suggest an actor in isola-
tion from all others). We follow that usage throughout this book, to convey that 
persons are simultaneously social beings and unique personalities. The capabili-
ties approach is reflected in our second proposition.
Proposition 2 Wellbeing can be enhanced by expanding the capabilities of per-
sons to lead the kinds of lives they value, and have reason to value.
Presented originally in the context of development studies, this approach has 
been adopted in more general studies of wellbeing (Sen 1993; Clark 2005). Sen 
was a member of the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance 
and Social Progress (Stiglitz et al. 2009), where his research was highly influen-
tial. The capabilities approach was applied in the design of the Australian 
Treasury’s wellbeing framework (Henry 2006, pp. 6–7) and the design of the 
New Zealand Treasury’s higher living standards framework (Gleisner et al. 2011, 
pp. 11–13). Jackson (2009, pp. 43–47) recognises that Sen’s approach resonates 
with his own vision of prosperity, emphasising that development of human 
capabilities must also respect ecological limits.
A feature of Sen’s approach, reflected in his quote above, is that persons make 
their own judgements about what constitutes a valued kind of life, but judge-
ments must be supported by reason. Thus, Sen does not identify wellbeing with 
satisfying individual preferences, or with the unreflective preferences of groups 
of individuals. Instead, his formulation highlights the value of contested and 
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dynamic processes of communal reasoning, particularly in determining how 
public policy can contribute to enhanced wellbeing (see also Sen 1999b; White 
2017, pp. 124–125).
Proposition 2 invites policies that aim to expand capabilities, rather than to 
increase economic growth for its own sake. This mirrors Adam Smith’s point at 
the beginning of this chapter: it is not production that is important, but the 
wellbeing of consumers. The approach taken in this book is inspired by Solow’s 
(1956) neoclassical growth model, but expanded to address a wider range of 
capabilities and wellbeing outcomes. Solow demonstrated that investment in 
physical capital can increase a country’s material living standards. That result is 
consistent with Sen’s theory, since construction of new assets such as buildings, 
machinery and roads can be conceptualised as expanding the capabilities of per-
sons who use those assets.
Similarly, investment in other types of enduring assets—non-material as well 
as material—can improve wellbeing outcomes by expanding the capabilities of 
persons to lead valued lives. Each of these asset types can be described using 
“capital” as a metaphor (see, for example, Flora and Flora 2007; Arrow et al. 
2012; IIRC 2013; Gleeson-White 2014). The wellbeing economics framework 
focuses on seven types of capital stock, listed in Table  1.1. Details will be 
explained in later chapters of the book, but are introduced briefly here.
Mincer (1958), Shultz (1960, 1961) and Becker (1962, 1964) coined the 
term “human capital” to describe participation in formal education, which has 
similar characteristics to investment in physical capital by requiring the sacrifice 
of current consumption to increase future income. Cultural capital refers to a 
Table 1.1 Types of capital in the wellbeing economics framework
Capital Examples of the Associated Capital Investment
Human Developing personal skills through participation in education, through 
experience and through better health.
Cultural Inheriting, practicing, transforming and passing on values from 
generation to generation.
Social Strengthening diverse networks, voluntary organisations and bonds of 
trust within and between communities.
Economic Constructing and owning enduring human-made physical and financial 
assets.
Natural Conserving wilderness and managed natural areas to maintain or 
improve the environment’s ecosystem services.
Knowledge Researching and developing advances in technology and other 
intellectual property products.
Diplomatic Cultivating institutions and norms that foster international 
collaboration for the common good.
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community’s values and practices that are transformed and passed down from 
generation to generation (Bourdieu 1983; Throsby 1999). Social capital 
describes diverse networks, voluntary organisations and bonds of trust that exist 
within and between communities (Coleman 1986; Putnam 1995).
Economic capital encompasses the stock of physical capital and its ownership 
in the form of stocks, shares, debentures and other forms of financial capital 
(OECD 2015, pp. 129–137). Natural capital recognises that ecological environ-
ments are the setting for much human activity, which needs ongoing investment 
to be maintained (Helm 2015). Knowledge capital refers to technological dis-
coveries and other forms of intellectual property, some of which may be recorded 
as assets in balance sheets (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998; Guthrie et al. 2012). 
Diplomatic capital is a term used in this book to describe organisations and 
norms needed for international collaboration to promote the global common 
good.
For each capital type in Table 1.1, the stock of capital provides flows of ser-
vices important for wellbeing. Human capital provides the person who possesses 
it with skills that can be displayed in employment or other contributions to 
wellbeing. Cultural capital and social capital help give meaning to life and make 
social transactions easier. Economic capital increases labour productivity and 
offers financial returns to savers. Natural capital provides ecosystem services that 
are often irreplaceable for wellbeing. Drawing on knowledge capital allows peo-
ple to do more with less, and the use of diplomatic capital helps the global com-
munity address some of the most pressing issues facing humanity.
A second dimension of the wellbeing economics framework recognises that 
choices affecting wellbeing are made at different levels of social interaction. 
Figure 1.1 provides a structure for considering these different scales. It shows 
levels of human choice that involve larger and larger numbers of people as the 
choices move outwards from the individual to the global community.
The diagram begins in the innermost oval with persons making choices about 
activities that contribute to the kind of life they value and have reason to value. 
Persons come together to form households and families, which gives rise to a 
second level of choices. Outside the home, people form community organisa-
tions to advance cultural, sporting, political, economic and other purposes; 
these organisations make up civil society. As market participants, people make 
choices as producers and as consumers of goods and services.
A household’s place of residence typically has local government providing 
public services for the diverse individuals and communities living in that local-
ity. The Nation State exercises authority on behalf of, but also over, citizens, 
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producing potential tensions in how choices at the national policy level support 
or interfere with choices at other levels. Finally, some of the biggest issues affect-
ing wellbeing (such as the threats of global climate change) require negotiated 
choices among international partners, including governmental and non-govern-
mental organisations, acting globally.
A key task of wellbeing economics is to integrate the different levels of human 
choice represented in Fig. 1.1 with the different types of capital investment listed 
in Table 1.1. Investment in human capital, for example, may be made by an indi-
vidual person, whereas growth in diplomatic capital requires global collaboration. 
The two dimensions of the framework are therefore brought together in the final 
proposition of this chapter.
Proposition 3 The capabilities of persons can be expanded by different types of 
capital investment at different levels of human choices.
 Conclusion
Despite greater attention to measuring wellbeing, it is still common for the cur-
rent wellbeing of some citizens to be sacrificed by policies intended to promote 
GDP growth. This practice ignores wider social issues important for wellbeing 
and is inconsistent with environmental limits to economic growth. Consequently, 
Global
Community
Nation
State
Local
Government
Market
Participation
Civil
Society
Households
and FamiliesPersons
Fig. 1.1 Levels of human choice in the wellbeing economics framework
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this book sets out to recover from the economics tradition what it calls the well-
being economics framework.
The three propositions in this chapter are foundational for the framework. 
The primary purpose of economics is to contribute to enhanced wellbeing of 
persons (Proposition 1). This can be achieved by expanding the capabilities of 
persons to lead the kinds of lives they value and have reason to value (Proposition 
2). This can be done through different types of capital investment at different 
levels of human choice (Proposition 3). Thus, wellbeing is affected not only by 
growth in all the different types of capital available in a country, but also by the 
ability of different groups in the population to access services provided by the 
country’s capital stocks. This book returns repeatedly to these two issues.
Inspired by Amartya Sen’s research on capabilities, the book is structured 
around two dimensions of economic activity: the different levels of human 
choice set out in Fig. 1.1; and the different types of capital investment set out in 
Table 1.1. Each of the following seven chapters focuses on one level of human 
choice and on one type of capital investment, guided by natural associations 
between these classifications.
Decisions about the number of years devoted to investing in human capital, 
for example, can be sensibly discussed in the context of persons making time-use 
choices; this is done in Chap. 2. Transmission of cultural capital across genera-
tions fits comfortably with choices made by persons living in families and house-
holds; this is addressed in Chap. 3. Social capital and the institutions of civil 
society are almost synonymous; see Chap. 4. A large literature on economic 
capital investment in the context of market participation is summarised in 
Chap. 5.
The book then turns to political institutions in the public sphere. Local gov-
ernment is typically required to maintain and enhance a locality’s natural capital, 
considered in Chap. 6. There is considerable research on the role of a Nation 
State to support the development of intellectual property, which is explored in 
Chap. 7. Diplomatic capital is essential for cultivating collaboration by intergov-
ernmental and non-governmental organisations in the global community; this 
topic is approached in Chap. 8.
In each case, the chapter draws insights from the economics literature to 
analyse how wellbeing can be enhanced, not just by public policy, but at all 
levels of human choice. Chapter 9 then integrates these different elements to 
introduce a wellbeing fabric for policy analysis. It demonstrates how wellbeing 
economics can contribute to expanding human capabilities for living the kinds 
of lives we value and have reason to value.
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Notes
1. This tradition continues: welfare economics is an established field, for example, and 
students majoring in economics are routinely required to demonstrate they can use 
mathematics to prove the Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics (Blaug 
2007, p. 198).
2. Trevor Swan (1956) independently published a model of economic growth with 
similar results to Solow’s more influential version.
3. There was an immediate reaction from economists, including from Solow (1974a, 
b) who argued this can be avoided by investment in physical capital to replace the 
depleted natural resources. Hartwick (1977) calculated the exact rate of physical 
capital investment that would allow sustainable growth. That response continues to 
be developed in research programmes on genuine savings and comprehensive 
wealth (World Bank 2011; Arrow et al. 2012; Hanley et al. 2015).
4. Macroeconomics deals with country-level outcomes such as economic growth. 
An interesting example of research on macroeconomics that respects ecological 
limits is Fontana and Sawyer (2016). An influential analysis of planetary bound-
aries can be found in Rockström et al. (2009a, b).
5. Recent reviews are provided by Bjørnholt and McKay (2014) and by Saunders and 
Dalziel (2017). Coyle (2014) presents a sympathetic account of GDP.
6. Lawn (2003) offers an overview of these measures.
7. This is recognised by others, of course. In the United Kingdom, mention should be 
made of initiatives such as the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Wellbeing 
Economics formed in March 2009 and legislation such as the Well-being of Future 
Generations (Wales) Act 2015.
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Persons and Human Capital
Abstract The wellbeing economics framework begins with individual persons 
seeking to create the kinds of lives they value, and have reason to value. These 
persons are able to make time-use choices they reason will promote wellbeing, 
influenced by cultural values, personal abilities and social capabilities. The atten-
tion to choices about time-use is because persons have equal time to allocate 
each day, and because time-use choices influence monetary values recorded in 
market transactions. Persons can expand capabilities through formal education 
and through relevant experience, which are time-use choices that economists 
describe as investment in human capital. Progress in wellbeing can be monitored 
using measures of subjective and objective wellbeing, exemplified in the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Better Life 
Initiative.
Keywords Human capital • Wellbeing measures • Time-use choices • Skills • 
Sustainability
Our analysis begins with an individual person striving to live a valued kind of 
life. This person is presumed able to exercise relational autonomy, meaning that 
at key moments in life, we humans expect to be able to make reasoned choices 
within the context of our own cultural and social environments. This chapter 
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pays attention to time-use choices, for two reasons. First, all persons have the 
same amount of time to spend each day, so that this fundamental equality is a 
useful starting point for inquiries into persistent inequalities in personal wellbe-
ing over a lifetime. Second, time-use choices influence economic values recorded 
in the market economy. The first two sections of this chapter explore these 
aspects of time-use choices.
The chapter then introduces the first of the seven capitals in our wellbeing 
economics framework. Individuals can improve capabilities for wellbeing 
through formal education, relevant experience and better health. These are time-
use choices that economists have long described as investment in human capital. 
The final section before the chapter’s brief conclusion explains how a mixture of 
subjective and objective wellbeing measures can be used to monitor changes in 
wellbeing levels of a community or country.
 Living Life
Among the many ways for promoting wellbeing, this book focuses on private 
and public initiatives to expand the capabilities of persons for leading lives they 
value, and have reason to value. On a day-to-day basis, human lives are con-
structed by persons, living in communities, making choices about how to spend 
their time (see also Kahneman et  al. 2006, p. 1910). Our approach to these 
choices is expressed in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 Persons can make time-use choices they reason will promote 
wellbeing, influenced by their cultural values, personal abilities and social 
capabilities.
This introduces concepts prominent throughout this book. First, the focus is 
on choices about time-use. As Waring (1996, p. 88) observes, “time is the one 
unit of exchange we all have in equal amounts, the one investment we all have 
to make” (see also Gershuny 2000; Stiglitz et al. 2009, pp. 126–128 and the 
Canadian Index of Wellbeing 2012, pp. 49–53). All humans in this respect have 
the same entitlement each day. Hence, persistent inequality in wellbeing can be 
explored by researching constraints on the range of time-use choices available to 
different segments of the population, as well as the different consequences of 
different time-use choices made by persons.
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Further, time-use choices made at key moments in life can have profound 
impacts on wellbeing that are qualitatively greater than other types of choices. 
Examples include the number of years spent in formal education, patterns of 
behaviour within a household, volunteered commitments to community groups, 
participation in hours of market employment, and involvement in recreational 
and cultural activities, all of which have stronger and more enduring impacts on 
personal wellbeing than, say, choices between different brands of consumption 
goods.
Second, Proposition 4 states that persons can make choices they reason will 
promote wellbeing. There are important exceptions (young children lack this 
capacity, for example, as can people suffering certain illnesses), but at moments 
of big decisions in a lifetime, persons can expect they will be able to exercise 
personal agency, in the sense of using their “capacity to deliberate and to act on 
the basis of reason” (Mackenzie 2007, p. 105). At these moments, choice-mak-
ing is not a matter of simply applying pre- determined preferences or tastes, but 
involves reasoned deliberation within a person’s cultural and social contexts. 
This understanding of human agency has been termed relational autonomy 
(Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000; Stoljar 2015), with the resulting conceptualisa-
tion of wellbeing sometimes termed relational wellbeing (White 2015, 2017).
The claims in Proposition 4 are not strong or normative. The proposition does 
not say, for example, that promotion of wellbeing is the only motivation affecting 
time-use choices, nor does it say that all choices are, or should be, motivated in this 
way. There is no presumption that a person’s reasoning is correct, immune from 
external criticism or unable to be influenced by policy nudges that recognise the 
limits of human cognitive capacities (Thaler and Sunstein 2008; Halpern 2015).
The proposition does not expect universal agreement on what constitutes 
wellbeing; indeed, this is not possible since wellbeing is influenced by the choice-
maker’s own cultural values. The values are “cultural” because they are developed 
within specific cultural settings and because social values are continuously being 
transformed as part of the wider community’s cultural vitality (see Chap. 3).
Finally, Proposition 4 recognises that time-use choices are influenced by per-
sonal abilities and by social capabilities. To illustrate the difference, consider a 
boy and a girl with the same aptitude for learning. If custom or law permits boys 
to advance to higher education, but not girls, then the two children have equal 
personal abilities but unequal social capabilities for developing skills.1 Similarly, 
a woman and a man may have equal personal abilities for paid employment in 
an occupation, but if women are routinely paid less than men in that occupa-
tion, then the social capabilities of the two persons are again unequal.2
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Another important example concerns persons who are living with physical 
impairments compared to social peers. A physical impairment may affect per-
sonal abilities, but this is accentuated if accompanied by a loss of social capabil-
ity (creating social disability; see, e.g., Oliver 1996) when public policy fails to 
account for the abilities of this population.
Proposition 1 states that economics is to contribute to enhanced wellbeing. 
The language is deliberate. Since persons are able to make reasoned time-use 
choices, policy advisors must engage with what persons are already doing to 
enhance the wellbeing of themselves, their families, their households and their 
communities, before designing policies that might build on those efforts to 
allow greater wellbeing to be achieved.
 Time-Use Choices and Market Values
To introduce links between time-use choices and market values, consider the 
time-use choice made by some persons to participate in sport. Sport England 
(2013) estimates that in the year ending 14 October 2012, 7.4 million adults in 
England engaged in at least 30 minutes of moderate intensity sport three times 
a week. Another 8.1 million did so weekly, and a further 5.5 million did so 
monthly. This was a substantial investment of time, amounting to more than 
820.8 million hours in total over the year.
This is a practical example of persons making time-use choices as part of a 
kind of life they value. These choices are clearly influenced by cultural values, 
personal abilities and social capabilities, dependent on sporting associations 
catering for diverse interests and skills. The participants can reasonably expect 
this time-use choice to promote wellbeing, since the benefits of physical activity 
for good physical and mental health are well documented (see, e.g., Government 
Office for Science 2008; World Health Organization 2010; Institute of Medicine 
2013).
This activity also requires significant amount of market transactions, includ-
ing purchases of specialist goods and services such as sports clothing, sports 
equipment, club membership fees, facility fees, medical expenses and travel 
costs. Sport England (2013) reports that spending for active participation in 
sport contributed an estimated £11.8 billion to the English economy in 2010, 
which was 1.1 per cent of the country’s gross value added that year.3
A great deal of attention is paid to the value of market purchases such as 
these, but note that the market value exists only because people have made 
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time-use choices (in this case, to participate in sport). Without the time-use 
choices, there would be no demand to purchase sports equipment or to pay club 
membership fees, and hence no opportunity for the suppliers of sports goods 
and services to create market value.
The time allocated to sport has a cost, since it represents time that cannot be 
spent in other valued activities (see Gratton and Taylor 2000, pp. 50–51). The 
sacrifice is called the opportunity cost of time (Shaw 1992). Becker (1965) dem-
onstrated how to measure this cost, by estimating the income that might have 
been earned if the time had been spent in market employment. The idea is that 
paid work is an alternative time-use choice. Thus, if the 820.8 million hours of 
participation in active sport had been spent in employment at the statutory 
adult minimum wage (which was £6.08 in October 2011), this would have cre-
ated an income of £5.0 billion. That sacrificed income is a measure of the oppor-
tunity cost of participation in active sport.4
These ideas mean economists can estimate how much value participants 
obtain from active sports. It is reasonable to presume that participation creates 
value that outweighs all associated costs; otherwise, a person would choose an 
alternative activity that is more highly valued (Samuelson 1938, 1948). Thus, 
the personal value of active sport participation in England must have been at 
least £17 billion in 2011–2012 to cover £12 billion spent in the market econ-
omy on goods and services for sport participation and £5 billion to compensate 
for the opportunity cost of the participants’ time.
The spending on market goods and services creates another connection 
between time-use choices and market values, since the income needed to finance 
these purchases comes through market employment.5 Hence, a time-use choice 
to participate in sport is connected to a person’s time-use choice to participate in 
paid work. This leads to the obvious point that the wage or salary that a person 
is capable of earning through an hour of paid employment is a crucial element 
of wellbeing, as will be analysed further in Chap. 5.
Figure 2.1 generalises from this example to highlight connections among 
wellbeing values, market values and time-use choices. The column on the right 
depicts the time allocated to earning market income to pay for the market goods 
and services needed for the valued activities (shown as the horizontal arrow to 
the lighter-shaded area of the left column). The darker shaded area of the left 
column shows time allocated to the valued activities themselves, using the pur-
chased goods and services (shown as the vertical arrow). The personal wellbeing 
created from these choices is the value created by the person’s time engaged in 
the valued activities (presumed to be greater than his or her opportunity cost of 
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time) plus the value of the person’s time spent earning the income need to pur-
chase the relevant goods and services.
In summary, personal wellbeing and market values are both built on time-use 
choices. These choices take place within social and cultural contexts and are 
therefore influenced by personal abilities and social capabilities. Given 
Propositions 1 and 2, the analysis must explain how individual and collaborative 
actions can expand capabilities. Proposition 3 draws attention to capital invest-
ment and so the following section introduces the first of the seven capitals con-
sidered in this book—human capital.
 Human Capital
The term human capital to describe expanded capabilities through formal edu-
cation, or through relevant experience, has been prominent in economics since 
its introduction by Mincer (1958), Shultz (1960, 1961) and Becker (1962, 
1964); see, for example, reviews by Harmon et  al. (2003), Sianesi and Van 
Reenen (2003) and Tobias and Li (2004). Education generates a range of per-
sonal and social benefits, including a reasonable expectation that greater skills 
will increase a person’s labour productivity. An employee with more education, 
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or with greater experience, can produce a greater value of output per hour of 
work compared to employees with basic skills only. This is analogous to how a 
greater amount of physical capital (a tractor rather than a spade, for example) 
can increase productivity. Because skills are embodied in persons—in contrast 
to the spade or tractor—this concept is called human capital.
Like physical capital, human capital requires sacrifices of current consump-
tion in return for the prospect of future rewards. Consider a student choosing 
from two options: (1) enrolling for a further year of education; and (2) leaving 
formal education to accept paid employment. Option 1 means sacrificing 
income that could be earned in option 2, but new skills learned in the first 
option will result in higher income in future employment. Economic reasoning 
therefore advises the student to remain in education for as long as expected 
increases in future income are sufficiently high to compensate for sacrificed cur-
rent income.
The purpose of education and experience is to develop skills. The Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) describes skills as “the 
global currency of the 21st century”, warning that “without proper investment 
in skills, people languish on the margins of society, technological progress does 
not translate into economic growth, and countries can no longer compete in an 
increasingly knowledge-based global society” (OECD 2012, p. 3). In a wellbe-
ing economics framework, this idea applies to skills that contribute to any aspect 
of wellbeing (such as cultural vitality, as well as economic wellbeing).
Since skills are embodied in persons, education begins with the individual 
learner (Cornelius-White 2007), who must be provided with opportunities to 
discover personal abilities, an idea going back at least to Rousseau (1762). The 
important role of self-discovery through education has been incorporated in 
economic models of human capital investment; see, for example, Altonji (1993), 
Weiler (1994) and Arcidiacono (2004). As Manski (1989) argues, an implica-
tion is that failure in education is not always a poor outcome, since it may be a 
necessary part of  discovering genuine interests and abilities. Indeed, a society 
that encourages creativity and innovation should support learners to try new 
activities and explore potential skills.
Education then allows learners to discipline their discovered abilities through 
study and practice, which may be certified through qualifications trusted by 
potential employers or clients (Spence 1973; Riley 2001). These disciplined 
abilities may then be displayed as personal skills when the learner uses them to 
contribute to wellbeing, perhaps through employment, but also in any dimen-
sion of human flourishing (see Fig. 2.2).
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Recall from Fig. 2.1 that adult lives are constructed around time spent in mar-
ket work and time spent in other chosen activities. Both types of time-use choice 
can be expanded when a person has higher levels of relevant skills. Beginning 
with time spent in employment, there is strong evidence that education offers 
high market returns. Harmon et al. (2003) reviewed more than a thousand stud-
ies of the financial rewards to persons undertaking a further year of schooling. 
They found consistent reports of a return of around 6.5 per cent, which is well 
above the recommended return of 3.5 per cent for public sector investment proj-
ects in the United Kingdom (HM Treasury 2011, p.  26). Consequently, it is 
almost universal for government policy to aim for greater levels of human capital 
investment across the whole population (Buchanan et al. 2017).
As well as opening up the possibility of higher market incomes, higher skills 
across a range of recreational and cultural activities can expand the capabilities 
of persons to create lives they have reason to value. An education system with an 
exclusive focus on market-oriented skills would therefore result in impoverished 
lives if students do not have opportunities to discover, discipline and display 
other important life-skills (see, e.g., Connell 2000).
The discussion of this section is summarised in Proposition 5.
Displayed
Abilities
Discovered
Abilities
Disciplined
Abilities
Personal
Skills
Fig. 2.2 Personal skills as the integration of discovered, disciplined and displayed abilities. 
(Source: Adapted from Dalziel (2015, 2017))
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Proposition 5 Investment in human capital through education can provide 
persons, in all their diversity, with opportunities to discover, discipline and dis-
play skills that contribute to wellbeing.
 Monitoring Wellbeing
Proposition 1 states that the primary purpose of economics is to contribute to 
enhanced wellbeing of persons. This section therefore examines how trends in 
personal wellbeing can be monitored, beginning with self- evaluations by per-
sons of their own sense of wellbeing. Indicators based on self-assessments are 
termed measures of subjective wellbeing (Veenhoven 1996; Frey and Stutzer 
2002; Peasgood 2008; Blanchflower and Oswald 2011). Indicators of this type 
are constructed from population surveys that ask participants to assess their 
wellbeing on a numerical scale, perhaps from zero to ten.
The question can be posed in different ways to focus on diverse aspects of 
subjective wellbeing, as shown in Table 2.1 (Dolan et al. 2011; see also Cabinet 
Office 2016, Fig. 17, p. 10). The first way invites participants to rate their cur-
rent state of mind, both positively (their level of happiness) and negatively (their 
level of anxiety). These are typically asked as separate questions and result in 
experience measures of subjective wellbeing. The second type of question asks 
people to rate their life satisfaction, producing evaluation measures. The third 
approach requests participants to rate the extent to which they feel that what 
they do is worthwhile, resulting in a eudemonic measure of subjective wellbeing 
(see also Bruni 2010). The word comes from Aristotle’s vision of eudemonia as 
living well, consistent with the objective of “human flourishing” emphasised by 
Tim Jackson (2017) and others. It is the measure emphasised in Sen’s capabili-
ties approach and reflected in our Proposition 2.
Survey questions such as those in Table 2.1 can be used to identify groups 
with lower self-assessed wellbeing than the general population (Krueger and 
Schkade 2008). An authoritative review by Dolan et al. (2008), for example, 
suggests that poor health, marital separation, unemployment and lack of social 
contact are strongly associated with low levels of subjective wellbeing (see also 
Helliwell and Putnam 2002). That review cautioned against drawing firm con-
clusions about causes of wellbeing until more data are available, and there are 
other concerns about whether self-assessed measures are sufficient for monitor-
ing wellbeing. Amartya Sen (1987, p. 8), for example, has offered the following 
hypothetical case to illustrate a deeper problem:
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Consider a very deprived person who is poor, exploited, overworked and ill, but 
who has been made satisfied with his lot by social conditioning (through, say, reli-
gion, political propaganda, or cultural pressure). Can we possibly believe that he is 
doing well just because he is happy and satisfied?
Consider also the limitations on social opportunities of women compared to 
men in most societies (Boserup 1970; Nussbaum and Glover 1995; Nussbaum 
2001; Mackenzie 2007; Khader 2011). Betty Friedan, for example, analysed the 
post-war ideology that pressured women in the United States, and elsewhere, to 
accept “their own nature, which can find fulfilment only in sexual passivity, male 
domination, and nurturing maternal love” so that “lives were confined, by 
necessity, to cooking, cleaning, washing, bearing children” (Friedan 1963, 
p. 38).6 The feminine mystique was widely accepted following World War II, 
but reason meant it had to be rejected: “Self-esteem in woman, as well as in man, 
can only be based on real capacity, competence, and achievement” (idem, 
p. 273).
The phenomenon of individual expectations adjusting to social experience is 
termed adaptive preferences (Nussbaum 2001). It is not unusual; indeed, Wilson 
and Gilbert (2003, p. 401) comment that “people are consummate sense makers 
who transform novel, emotion-producing events into ones that seem ordinary 
and mundane, through the processes of assimilation, accommodation, and 
explanation”. Examples include Easterlin’s (2001, p. 481) conclusion that over a 
person’s life cycle, income growth does not cause reported happiness to rise 
“because it generates equivalent growth in material aspirations, and the negative 
effect of the latter on subjective well-being undercuts the positive effect of the 
former”.7 Graham (2008, p.  79) observes a similar effect in the relationship 
between health and happiness: “people no doubt adapt to better health condi-
tions and, in turn, expect them”.
Table 2.1 Examples of survey questions to elicit three different types of subjective assess-
ments of wellbeing
Assessment Type Example of Survey Question
Experience Overall, on a rising scale from 0 to 10, how happy did you feel 
yesterday?
Overall, on a rising scale from 0 to 10, how anxious did you feel 
yesterday?
Evaluation Overall, on a rising scale from 0 to 10, how satisfied are you with 
your life nowadays?
Eudemonic Overall, on a rising scale from 0 to 10, to what extent do you feel 
that the things you do in your life are worthwhile?
Source: Adapted from Dolan et al. (2011, Table 1, p. 14)
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Aspirations may also rest on ill-informed or limited knowledge (Somin 2004; 
Schnellenbach 2008). This is a wider policy issue than the measure of subjective 
wellbeing, but its relevance can be illustrated with the finding from the British 
Household Panel Survey that the level of  environmental awareness affects a per-
son’s subjective wellbeing (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Gowdy 2007). Thus, wide-
spread underestimation of realistic climate change threats could result in inflated 
measures of subjective wellbeing compared to a situation where all survey par-
ticipants understood the scientific consensus presented in authoritative docu-
ments such as IPCC (2015).
Consequently, indicators of subjective wellbeing are not sufficient for moni-
toring purposes. Recall from Proposition 2 that wellbeing can be enhanced by 
expanding the capabilities of persons to lead the kinds of lives they value and 
have reason to value. Thus, relevant influences on personal wellbeing (such as 
quality of available housing, levels of material living standards and state of the 
natural environment) can be identified and then monitored (Tomlinson and 
Kelly 2013; Scott 2015). Because they rely on externally observable data, these 
indicators are termed measures of objective wellbeing.
There is an important debate in the literature about how the influences on 
wellbeing should be identified (Nussbaum 2003; Sen 2004). Sen argues that the 
process should be undertaken by members of each community exercising their 
own agency, since outsiders should not presume to impose their own choices on 
a community (Sen 1999, p. 11):
…with adequate social opportunities, individuals can effectively shape their own 
destiny and help each other. They need not be seen primarily as passive recipients 
of the benefits of cunning development programs. There is indeed a strong ratio-
nale for recognising the positive role of free and sustainable agency.
Nussbaum (2003) observes that adequate social opportunities are not univer-
sally available, and so Sen’s opening proviso is not always realised. Nussbaum 
argues that a list of “central human capabilities” can be designed to reflect the 
fundamental dignity of the human person, while being sensitive to cultural dif-
ference and open to change. It can record essential entitlements for social justice, 
overlapping with the human rights literature (see also Nussbaum 1997). 
Nussbaum proposes an initial set of central capabilities, organised under ten 
themes (Nussbaum 2003, pp. 41–42; 2011, pp. 33–34):
 1. Life
 2. Bodily health
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 3. Bodily integrity
 4. Senses, imagination and thought
 5. Emotions
 6. Practical reason
 7. Affiliation
 8. Other species
 9. Play
 10. Control over one’s environment
Measures of subjective and objective wellbeing can be combined in a suite of 
indicators. An exemplar is the  OECD’s Better Life Initiative (OECD 2011, 
2013, 2015; 2017), which has created the conceptual framework reproduced in 
Fig. 2.3.
The OECD framework has three domains. The first, material conditions, covers 
three headings: income and wealth; jobs and earning; and housing. Gross domestic 
product (GDP) is recognised as contributing to these material conditions, but is 
INDIVIDUAL WELL-BEING
Population averages and differences across groups
Quality of Life
• Health status
• Work-life balance
• Education and skills
• Social connections
• Civic engagement and
governance
• Environmental quality
• Personal security
• Subjective well-being
Material Conditions
• Income and wealth
• Jobs and earnings
• Housing
Requires preserving different types of capital
Natural capital
Economic capital
Human capital
Social capital
SUSTAINABILITY OF WELL-BEING OVER TIME
GDP 
Regrettables 
Fig. 2.3 The OECD wellbeing conceptual framework. (Source: OECD (2013, Fig. 1.2, p. 21))
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also associated with certain “regrettables” (such as damage to the natural environ-
ment) that detract from wellbeing.8
The second domain, quality of life, records other relevant measures. It includes 
seven groups of objective wellbeing indicators: health status; work-life balance; 
education and skills; social connections; civic engagement and governance; envi-
ronmental quality; and personal security. An eighth set incorporates indicators 
of subjective wellbeing into the framework.
The third domain is sustainability. It draws attention to the preservation of 
four different types of capital stock: natural capital; human capital; economic 
capital and social capital. This recognises that wellbeing is likely to fall if the 
services provided by these assets decline over time, which is consistent with the 
capitals approach taken in this book.9
In this context of services provided by different types of capital stock, there is 
an important debate in the literature about strong sustainability versus weak 
sustainability (see, e.g., Hediger 2006). The issue is whether the economic sys-
tem can be described as sustainable if the stock of one capital type is declining 
over time (especially reduced natural capital as a result of resource extraction or 
environmental degradation) but stocks of other capital types (such as economic 
or human capital) are increasing.
Proponents of weak sustainability argue that it is possible for investment in 
economic and human capital to compensate for degraded natural capital. 
Consequently, economists are attempting to measure comprehensive wealth for 
countries, defined as the aggregated value of all capital stocks measured at prices 
reflecting the marginal contribution of each capital type to wellbeing (see, e.g., 
World Bank 2011; Arrow et al. 2012; Hanley et al. 2015). The system is said to 
be sustainable if comprehensive wealth on a per capita basis does not decline 
over time, even if natural capital deteriorates.
Proponents of strong sustainability argue instead that at least some aspects 
of natural capital are not substitutable by other types of capital, especially 
once degradation moves beyond certain limits. This is the approach taken by 
Jackson (2017) discussed in Chap. 1. It also underlies the finding of the Stern 
Review in the United Kingdom that “climate change will have serious impacts 
on world output, on human life and on the environment” (Stern 2007, p. 
xvi). In this approach, the system is not sustainable unless key aspects of 
natural capital are preserved. Chapter 6 will return to this debate, but this 
section finishes by recording the feasibility of monitoring personal wellbeing 
trends.
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Proposition 6 Personal wellbeing can be monitored using a set of indicators 
that include measures of subjective and objective wellbeing, supplemented by 
measured trends in different types of capital.
 Conclusion
This chapter has introduced individual persons seeking to create lives they value, 
and have reason to value. These persons are able to make time- use choices they 
reason will promote wellbeing, influenced by their own cultural values, personal 
abilities and social capabilities. These time-use choices influence monetary val-
ues recorded in market transactions.
Because the choices are influenced by social capabilities, the wellbeing eco-
nomics framework explores how capabilities can be expanded. An important 
example is education that helps learners in all their diversity to discover, disci-
pline and display their full range of abilities. This is termed investment in human 
capital. The final section of the chapter finished with the OECD’s wellbeing 
conceptual framework, presented as an exemplar of how to monitor trends 
across a range of personal wellbeing indicators.
The following chapter turns to how collaborative actions among different 
persons can enhance wellbeing, focusing in the first instance on the choices 
made by persons living in households and families.
Notes
1. Duflo (2012) summarises evidence for the benefits of a policy commitment to 
equality in the education of children, both for its own sake and as a contribution to 
stronger economic development. See also Nussbaum (2000).
2. In the United States, an Equal Pay Act prohibiting this form of discrimination was 
passed only in 1963, and not until 1970 in the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, 
female-male wage gaps remain in these and other countries (National Equal Pay 
Task Force 2013; Rubery and Grimshaw 2015; European Union 2014).
3. Gross value added is the difference between the value of a sector’s output and the 
value of goods and services purchased from other sectors as inputs into production. 
It is the core measure used in calculating a country’s GDP. Of course, if the partici-
pants’ income had not been spent on these goods and services, it could have been 
spent elsewhere; hence, this analysis is not claiming that the economy would have 
been smaller without this participation in sport.
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4. Only people aged 21 and over are entitled to the statutory adult minimum wage, 
but this overestimate is more than offset by: not considering that most adults can 
earn more than the living wage; using the minimum 30 minutes as the time spent 
in each session of sport; and not including the opportunity cost of volunteered 
hours in the sector.
5. The analysis is made more complicated, but not fundamentally changed, if it incor-
porates the possibility of some earned income being saved for investment in finan-
cial assets that then generate future income for the saver.
6. Folbre and Hartmann (1988) and Folbre and Nelson (2000) analysed similar gen-
der dualisms in the economics literature.
7. Easterlin’s theory is not universally accepted; see Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) and 
the review by Clark et al. (2008). Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) hypothesise that 
expectations adapting to social relativities is a major mechanism through which 
greater inequality in a society diminishes wellbeing, by making people anxious 
about not being able to achieve, or maintain, a kind of life that is judged reasonable 
by their peers.
8. This feature of the figure has been removed in later publications; see, for example, 
OECD (2015, Fig. 1.1, p. 23).
9. This book’s wellbeing economics framework expands the list of capital to include 
cultural capital, knowledge capital and diplomatic capital. These additional capitals 
are not currently as easily measured as the four highlighted by the OECD, but later 
chapters argue that their services are essential for wellbeing.
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Households, Families and Cultural Capital
Abstract This chapter focuses on wellbeing within households and families, 
paying careful attention to child development. This is important from the per-
spective of the child, of the child’s parents, of wider society and globally. 
Investment in cultural capital enhances wellbeing by creating opportunities for 
persons to express, develop, transform and pass on to the next generation their 
cultural inheritance. Men and women can have equal capabilities for wellbeing; 
yet studies show that significant sacrifices of time and financial costs for parents 
are carried disproportionately by women, who are also more vulnerable to inti-
mate violence. After accounting for housing costs, nearly one in three children 
in the United Kingdom are growing up in households with income below 60 per 
cent of the country’s median equivalised income. Thus, the chapter reveals seri-
ous problems that can be overlooked when policy advice focuses on economic 
growth rather than on wellbeing.
Keywords Cultural capital • Child care • Motherhood penalty • Intimate vio-
lence • Child poverty
A feature of human experience is that throughout childhood almost everyone 
grows up in family households of one form or another. Upon becoming adults, 
a large majority spend significant amounts of time in committed relationships 
that involve the care and development of children. Figure 3.1 presents data 
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on the living arrangements of 62 million adults and children normally resident 
in the United Kingdom on 27 March 2011. Only 5 per cent of the population 
(3.1 million people) were living in a one-person household, having never mar-
ried. Another 5 million were living alone, but had been married. The remaining 
54 million were in multi-person households, with the largest categories being 
couples with children (41 per cent of the population) and couples without chil-
dren (22 per cent). Data such as these suggest that forming households and 
families is an important aspect of leading valued lives.
This chapter begins with definitions of households and families. This is fol-
lowed by a discussion of the second type of capital in our wellbeing economics 
framework: cultural capital, which is deeply connected with household and fam-
ily life. The chapter then examines gender divisions of labour within households 
and their implications for the wellbeing experiences of men and women, par-
ticularly when they are parents. This leads to an analysis of child poverty (includ-
ing the role played by housing costs), using the wellbeing lens to focus on the 
capabilities of parents to co-create with their children lives that they all have 
reason to value. The chapter finishes with a brief conclusion.
3.1 m
5.0 m
13.5 m
25.5 m
7.4 m
7.6 m
 One-person, never married  One-person, has married
 Couple without children  Couple with children
 Single parent with children  Non-nuclear households
Fig. 3.1 Number of people usually resident in the United Kingdom by household type, 27 
March 2011. (Source: ONS (2015, Tables 53a and 57a))
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 Households and Families
The Office for National Statistics (ONS) defines a household as “one person liv-
ing alone, or a group of people (not necessarily related) living at the same address 
who share cooking facilities and share a living room, sitting room or dining area” 
(ONS 2016a, p.  2). This definition is adopted throughout this chapter. The 
Household Labour Force survey estimates there were 27.1 million UK house-
holds in 2016 (idem, p. 10).
The ONS then defines a family as “a married, civil partnered or cohabiting 
couple with or without children, or a lone parent, with at least one child, who 
live at the same address” (idem, p. 2). This is a restricted definition, conceptual-
ising a family as a special type of household. Children, however, have vital expe-
riences of family that go well beyond one household, one family (Morrow 1998; 
Dunn and Deater-Deckard 2001; Haugen 2010; Bjarnason et al. 2012; Davies 
2015). Indeed, “even children within a single household can live in different 
‘families’ and experience different levels of complexity and change” (Sligo et al. 
2017, p. 53).
To illustrate, a child’s biological parents may have separated, with one or both 
parents living with a partner who brings new family relationships into the child’s 
life. Some children have bedrooms they call their own in two or more house-
holds. Families stretch back in time through remembered ancestors, while 
among those still living, grandparents, aunts, uncles, siblings and cousins may 
contribute to a child’s upbringing, including on special family occasions or dur-
ing holidays. Wellbeing economics is particularly concerned with child develop-
ment, and so this chapter conceptualises a child’s family as including all those 
who share responsibility for the child’s care and development within the child’s 
household or households.
The focus on child development can be justified for at least four reasons. 
First, there is substantial evidence that a child’s wellbeing is badly affected by 
poverty (Griggs and Walker 2008; McCall 2016), and that lifelong wellbeing is 
strongly influenced by family circumstances during infancy and childhood 
(Blanden et al. 2008). Gaviria (2002, p. 331) expresses this succinctly: “If one 
were to summarize the main message of the massive scientific literature dealing 
with family influences, a single line would suffice: it pays to choose one’s par-
ents.” A representative example is the analysis of young men in the United States 
by Keane and Wolpin (1997), which highlighted how differences in personal 
abilities by the age of 16  years are a dominating influence on lifetime 
inequalities.1
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Second, close conjugal relationships and a good family life are important for 
the wellbeing of parents (Bok 2010, p. 17). As summarised in a recent authorita-
tive review, “parenthood and parenting experiences have significant effects on 
well-being over the life course, potentially contributing to cumulative advantage 
for some and to disadvantage for others” (Umberson et al. 2010, p. 625). The 
success children enjoy in their own adult lives can affect the ongoing wellbeing 
of their parents (Greenfield and Marks 2006).
Third, the wider community has an interest in children, if only to avoid 
future costs associated with poor child development (Bramley and Watkins 
2008; Hirsch 2008, 2013). A 40-year study of 1037 children born in New 
Zealand (see Poulton et al. 2015) found that nearly 80 per cent of the burden to 
central government finances attributable to survey participants by the age of 38 
was due to just 20 per cent of those participants (Caspi et al. 2016). This burden 
involved disproportionate use of costly services in healthcare, criminal justice 
and social welfare. Members of the high-cost group could be predicted reason-
ably well by four indicators of disadvantage during their first decade: lower fam-
ily household socioeconomic status; greater experience of childhood 
maltreatment; poorer scores on tests of childhood IQ; and lower scores on mea-
sures of childhood self-control.
Finally, the global community has recognised the importance of protecting 
children’s innate rights to health, education, protection and equal opportunity 
(Lake 2014, p. 1). The Convention on the Rights of the Child, for example, was 
adopted by the United Nations in 1989. There were 194 state signatories 
25 years later, making it the most widely ratified human rights treaty in history 
(Sandberg 2014, p. 60). The signatories record their conviction “that the family, 
as the fundamental group of society and the natural environment for the growth 
and well-being of all its members and particularly children, should be afforded 
the necessary protection and assistance so that it can fully assume its responsi-
bilities within the community” (Convention on the Rights of the Child 1990, 
Preamble).
 Cultural Capital
The Convention on the Rights of the Child refers at several points to a child’s 
culture. Article 29 states that a child’s education shall be directed, among other 
things, to the development of respect for their own cultural identity, language 
and values. Article 30 states that a child belonging to an ethnic, religious or 
P. Dalziel et al.
 49
linguistic minority, or who is indigenous, shall not be denied the right, in com-
munity with other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to pro-
fess and practise their own religion or to use their own language. Article 31 
recognises the right of the child to participate freely and fully in cultural and 
artistic life.
In the early 1960s, Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron (1964) sought 
to understand why school children from wealthy households achieved better 
educational results in the French education system than those from households 
with fewer economic resources. Drawing on that research, Bourdieu (1973, 
1983) later introduced the concept of cultural capital, intended as a deliberate 
counter to “human capital” theory. He argued that the latter’s emphasis on dif-
ferences in innate aptitude ignores that children arrive at their first day of school 
with different levels of “cultural capital previously invested by the family” 
(Bourdieu 1983, p. 244).2
The key idea is that a young person inherits from previous generations diverse 
cultural values and accepted norms for practising those values. Culture in this 
context can be defined as “the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual 
and emotional features of society or a social group” that “encompasses, in addi-
tion to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, tradi-
tions and beliefs” (UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity 2001, 
Preamble).3 Cultural values and accepted norms are not set in stone; each gen-
eration transforms aspects of its cultural heritage to reflect, or perhaps to create, 
new social conditions. This understanding is reflected in Proposition 7.
Proposition 7 Investment in cultural capital can enhance the wellbeing of 
households and families by expanding opportunities to express, develop, trans-
form and pass on to the next generation their cultural inheritance.
Describing cultural heritage using the metaphor of capital can be applied at 
two levels (Bourdieu 1983; Throsby 1995). Primarily, persons develop embod-
ied cultural capital through investing their time in acquiring cultural values 
and norms. A young person may learn skills for a particular sport, or how to 
play a particular musical instrument, or how to appreciate the beauty of a 
wilderness area, or how the family engages in certain spiritual or religious 
practices and so on. This also refers to learning cultural norms concerning 
daily activities such as eating a meal or greeting a stranger. Investment in 
embodied cultural capital begins at birth and depends not only on the young 
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person’s time, but also on the time available for this task in the family (Bourdieu 
1983, p. 253).
Young persons are not passive in this process; adolescence, in particular, can 
be a turbulent time as the next generation of emerging adults constructs cultural 
fits with their own developing self-identities and world views (Hammack and 
Toolis 2015; Trommsdorff 2015).
On the secondary level, the metaphor is used to describe how communities 
invest in conserving and creating cultural capital assets such as historical sites, 
environmental parks, heritage buildings, sport venues, museums and archives, 
art works, written literature and traditions of artistic performance. This too can 
be a turbulent process, particularly when artistic works challenge previously 
accepted values and norms.
Cultural capital assets may be irreplaceable in some cases, but their contribu-
tion to wellbeing depends on the ongoing cultural services they provide to peo-
ple living valued cultural lives. Thus, a social group’s cultural vitality depends 
primarily on the embodied cultural capital being expressed in the group’s house-
holds and families (Bourdieu 1983, pp. 246–247).
Interaction between the two levels of cultural capital can be measured using 
indicators such as the number of visitors to heritage sites, the value of tickets 
sold for arts events, hours of participation in sport activities and the number of 
visits to museums and libraries. The Culture and Sport Evidence Programme 
(CASE) in the United Kingdom labels this as engagement (Cooper 2012). 
Echoing a major theme of this section, CASE (2010, Fig. 1, p. 16) has docu-
mented how engagement during childhood strongly influences engagement as 
an adult.
The programme also collates evidence on the economic value of engagement 
(CASE 2010, pp. 33–41; Marsh and Bertranou 2012; Fujiwara et  al., 2014, 
provide further evidence). Although insightful for tracking trends, it is impor-
tant to recognise that the value to a social group of its lived culture cannot be 
captured by economic measures (Walmsley 2012; Taylor 2016). Klamer (2002, 
p. 467), for example, argues that “cultural capital appears to generate the most 
important values of all, values that can give meaning to our life”, while others 
have emphasised the cultural value that is enjoyed in “the lived experience of 
everyday life” (Highmore 2002; Back 2015; Ebrey 2016; Miles 2016).
Cultural capital is also associated with some of the worst crimes recorded 
against humanity, reflected in the horrors behind words such as genocide, the 
Holocaust, ethnic cleansing, terrorism, racial hatred, colonial dispossession, 
female genital mutilation and homophobic violence. The UNESCO Universal 
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Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2001, Article 2) affirms that “in our increas-
ingly diverse societies, it is essential to ensure harmonious interaction among 
people and groups with plural, varied and dynamic cultural identities as well as 
their willingness to live together”, but adds in Article 4 that cultural diversity 
cannot be invoked to infringe upon human rights. Consistent with that princi-
ple, Mackenzie (2007) has argued persuasively, among others, that “if the cul-
tural or religious practices of particular communities can only be sustained by 
perpetuating women’s subordination and stunting their capacities for autono-
mous agency, then liberals and democratic theorists cannot consistently accom-
modate the demands made by such communities” (idem, p. 105).
 Cultural Capital and Gender
The previous section described how developing cultural capital in children 
requires investment of time. Bourdieu identified this as the major reason why 
children growing up in families with more economic resources arrive at school 
with higher levels of cultural capital; wealthier families have greater amounts of 
usable time, “particularly in the form of the mother’s free time” (Bourdieu 1983, 
p. 253). The description of a mother’s time as “free” obviously reflects Bourdieu’s 
own cultural norms. As Reay (1998, p. 94) has noted, “once mothers’ time is 
harnessed to the acquisition of cultural capital, it is no longer free time.” Time 
caring for children sacrifices opportunities for other time-choices, including 
earning income from paid employment.
There is no dispute that sacrifices associated with the arrival of a child into a 
household can be significant for both parents at the time (Genesoni and 
Tallandini 2009; Dew and Wilcox 2011, p. 1). Musick et al. (2016, p. 1070) 
report that “a substantial body of work shows lower levels of subjective well-
being among parents compared to men and women without children” (see, e.g., 
Hansen 2012, and Deaton and Stone 2014).
It is not the presence of children per se producing this outcome (Pollmann-
Schult 2014). An analysis of American Time Use Survey data by Connelly and 
Kimmel (2015, p. 1) found that “mothers and fathers engaged in child caregiv-
ing enjoy their time spent in child caregiving; fathers as much, or even more so, 
than mothers as evidenced by their average values for happiness, meaningful-
ness, tiredness, and stress and an aggregated statistic, the unpleasantness index”. 
Instead, both studies suggest that lower parental wellbeing is due to the sacrifices 
imposed by high financial and time costs of parenthood (see also Fawcett 1988).
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The sacrifices are disproportionately made by women. This begins with 
women carrying a greater responsibility for childcare than men (Pettit and Hook 
2009; Hook 2010). This can be illustrated using time-use surveys (Gershuny 
2011). The two most recent surveys in the United Kingdom took place in 2000 
and 2015 (ONS 2003; Gershuny and Sullivan 2017). Figure 3.2 presents the 
average daily minutes recorded for parents spending time in the active care of 
children, distinguishing by the age band of the youngest child. Active care 
includes items such as feeding a child, but excludes time when the parent is 
primarily engaged in another activity while also being present as the responsible 
person on call if the child needs attention (ONS 2016b, p. 4).
In both survey years, and for both age bands of the youngest child, female 
parents spent more than twice as much time engaged in active child care as male 
parents. Over the 15 years between the two surveys, the gender gap narrowed for 
households where the youngest child was of preschool age, but increased for the 
older age group.
Further, objective wellbeing indicators show lower wages and lifetime losses 
of personal wealth for women with children, compared to men with children or 
to women without children. The gap is so clear that it is commonly termed the 
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motherhood penalty (Gangl and Ziefle 2009; Gash 2009; Budig et  al. 2012; 
Harkness 2016; Lersch et al. 2017), which may be driven by cultural values.
Gary Becker, for example, applied economic analysis to family issues in his 
Treatise on the Family, first published in 1981. In his Nobel Prize lecture, he 
expressed one of his key research questions in the following terms: “Why in 
almost all societies have married women specialized in bearing and rearing chil-
dren” (Becker 1992, p. 47). His answer focused on biological differences and on 
cultural values reflected in labour market discrimination. His analysis suggested 
how economic forces, unchecked by public policy, are able to amplify small 
biological and cultural differences between men and women into a sharp divi-
sion of childcare between mothers and fathers (Becker 1991, pp.  30–79; see 
more recently Ermisch 2003, pp. 6–7, and Browning et al. 2014, pp. 67–69).
Budig et al. (2012) have researched the influence of cultural attitudes on the 
impact of work and family policies in 22 industrialised countries. They mea-
sured cultural attitudes using survey questions on how strongly respondents 
agreed with the following statements: family life suffers if woman works full-
time; preschool children suffer if mother works; and a man’s job is to earn 
money, while a woman’s job is to look after home and family. They found sig-
nificant differences in outcomes where cultural attitudes supported the male 
breadwinner/female caregiver model  compared to support for maternal employ-
ment, concluding that “culture amplifies the relationships between parental 
leave and maternal earnings, and of childcare policies with maternal earnings” 
(idem, p. 185).
Given these findings, the critique of Mackenzie (2007) cited at the end of the 
previous section applies. It is not legitimate to sustain social institutions and 
practices that perpetuate large penalties for women who become mothers, com-
pared to men who become fathers. Instead, reason suggests the following propo-
sition (see also Nussbaum and Glover 1995; Sen 1995; Nussbaum 2000).
Proposition 8 Men and women can have equal capabilities for wellbeing.
The United Kingdom is a long way from equal capabilities between men and 
women. Personal security, for example, is recognised as essential for wellbeing. 
Nussbaum’s (2003) list of central human capabilities includes Bodily Integrity, 
for example, and the OECD’s (2017) wellbeing conceptual framework has 
Personal Security as one of its quality of life indicators for individual wellbeing. 
Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states everyone has the 
right to life, liberty and security of person. In that context, consider the preva-
lence of intimate violence in England and Wales, represented in Fig. 3.3.
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The data come from the UK Crime Survey, which defines intimate violence 
as family abuse, partner abuse, sexual assault or stalking (ONS 2017, p. 74). The 
Survey offers self-reported data for each of these items, reproduced in Fig. 3.3. 
Women are much more likely than men to report having suffered intimate vio-
lence since the age of 16. The likelihood ratio is greater than two to one for 
partner abuse and for stalking, and is greater than five to one for sexual assault. 
These are very large differences in such an important item of wellbeing.
 The Blight of Child Poverty
The major focus of this chapter is the development of embodied cultural capital in 
children through the investment of time and financial resources by their families. 
This is critical for current and lifelong wellbeing of each child and for the wellbe-
ing of the child’s parents. Successful child development also produces benefits for 
wider society. Consequently, if a large number of children grow up in households 
without adequate economic resources, the ramifications persist through time and 
go well beyond the immediate families. This reflected in Proposition 9.
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Fig. 3.3 Prevalence of intimate violence since the age of 16 among adults aged 16 to 59, by 
category, England and Wales, year ending March 2016. (Source: ONS (2017, Appendix 
Table 4.01), reporting data from the Crime Survey for England and Wales)
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Proposition 9 Present and future wellbeing can be enhanced if children grow 
up in households that are able to access adequate economic resources.
There are important policy debates about what are adequate economic 
resources (Ravallion 2016, Chap. 4). It is useful to begin in the United States, 
where official measures of child poverty are based on 1964 research by the Social 
Security Administration that set minimum adequate income thresholds for fam-
ilies of different size and composition (United States Census Bureau 2016). 
These thresholds were calculated using the cost of the cheapest nutritionally 
adequate food plan designed by the Department of Agriculture, multiplied by a 
factor based on survey data to cover other necessary expenditures such as accom-
modation, clothing and transport (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1982, p. 185). The 
thresholds are adjusted annually to compensate for inflation, but not for increases 
in the country’s average living standards. Because the thresholds do not change 
with economic growth, these data are termed absolute poverty indicators.
Figure 3.4 presents data for the last 50 years on the percentage of people liv-
ing in households with income below the absolute poverty thresholds for two 
demographic groups: people aged under 18 years (children) and people aged 18 
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to 64 years (the working-age population). The shaded bars show the level of real 
per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in each year. GDP has shortcomings 
as discussed in Chap. 1, but continues to indicate a country’s average material 
living standards. Over the five decades, real per capita GDP increased from just 
over $12,000 in 1966 to just under $52,000 in 2015, an increase of 140 per 
cent.
Two observations stand out from Fig. 3.4. First, child poverty in the United 
States is more extensive than adult poverty; the proportion of young people liv-
ing in households with inadequate income is well above the proportion of work-
ing-age adults in this situation. Second, despite a 140 per cent increase in real 
per capita GDP, there has been no sustained improvement in the country’s level 
of child poverty, using absolute standards set in the 1960s. There have been 
oscillations, but child poverty has remained above 15 per cent since 1974, and 
has been 20 per cent or higher since 2009, damaging the care and development 
of large numbers of children. Economic growth has failed to improve this 
important aspect of a country’s wellbeing.
The UK approach to measuring child poverty is different. Children need 
access to sufficient economic resources for their cultural development; hence, 
official poverty thresholds are defined relative to the country’s living standards. 
The Family Resources Survey samples more than 19,000 private households in 
the United Kingdom (Department for Work and Pensions 2017a, p.  18). 
Adjustments to each household’s income are made to reflect its size and compo-
sition, which results in household equivalised income. Ranking these data from 
poorest to richest, the result for the middle household is the median equivalised 
income. The poverty threshold is set at 60 per cent of this median equivalised 
income.4 When the median equivalised income changes, so does the threshold; 
hence, it is a measure of socially determined relative poverty.
Figure 3.5 presents three poverty measures for the United Kingdom between 
1994–1995 and 2015–2016, against a background showing the country’s real 
per capita GDP. The GDP data show steady growth before the impact of the 
global financial crisis in 2007–2008 and 2008–2009.
The bottom measure in the graph is the poverty rate of working-age adults, 
calculated before housing costs (BHC) are considered. This sits at 14–16 per 
cent throughout the 22 years. The lighter shaded line in the graph is the pov-
erty rate of children, again before housing costs. Like in the United States, 
child poverty in the United Kingdom is more extensive than adult poverty. 
Unlike America, there is a downward trend in the child poverty data (at least 
until the last two years), to the extent that the gap with working-age adult 
poverty almost closed in 2012–2013.
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Finally, the top line depicts child poverty after housing costs (AHC); that is, 
after accounting for: rent (gross of housing benefit); water rates, community and 
council water charges; mortgage interest payments (net of tax relief ); structural 
insurance premiums (for owner occupiers); and ground rent and service charges 
(Department for Work and Pensions 2017b, p. 45). This series is better for com-
paring living standards of  individuals whose housing costs are high relative to 
their quality of accommodation and where their Housing Benefit has risen to 
offset higher rents (idem, p. 27). On this definition, child relative poverty in 
2015–2016 was 30 per cent, back to its value a decade earlier.
This represents 4 million children recorded as living in households with inad-
equate economic resources. This has two consequences. First, it limits the capa-
bilities of parents and children to co-create the kinds of lives they value and have 
reason to value according to the country’s social norms of the day. Second, the 
lack of access to adequate economic resources hampers the children’s educational 
and cultural development, which is creating long-term costs. Such high child 
poverty is a blight on the country’s wellbeing.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
0
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
Real Per Capita GDP (Right Axis)
Pe
r C
en
t o
f P
op
ul
a
on
Financial Years
Children AHC (Left Axis)
Children BHC (Left Axis)
Working Age BHC (Left Axis)
Co
ns
ta
nt
 2
01
0 
U
S$
 (0
00
s)
Fig. 3.5 Real per capita gross domestic product and relative poverty status of children, 
United Kingdom, 1994–1995 to 2015–2016. (Notes: Data are for Great Britain prior to 
2002–2003. AHC is After Housing Costs. BHC is Before Housing Costs. Source: World Bank 
(2017, Indicator NY.GDP.PCAP.KD) and Department for Work and Pensions (2017a, Table 4.1tr 
and 5.1tr))
 Households, Families and Cultural Capital 
58 
 Conclusion
The central idea of this chapter is expressed in Proposition 7: Investment in cul-
tural capital can enhance the wellbeing of households and families by expanding 
opportunities to express, develop, transform and pass on to the next generation 
their cultural inheritance. Although a clumsy term for the richness and dyna-
mism of the experiences it signifies, the metaphor of cultural capital emphasises 
that cultural inheritance is an important asset for persons co-creating the kinds 
of lives they value, and have reason to value, in their households and families.
There is robust evidence of serious wellbeing challenges experienced by UK 
households and families. Parental sacrifices of time and financial costs are carried 
disproportionately by mothers, and large numbers of women do not have the 
same capability for wellbeing as most men, reflected in far greater vulnerability 
to intimate violence. After accounting for housing costs, nearly one in three 
children in the United Kingdom are growing up in households with income 
below 60 per cent of median equivalised income. These children are likely to be 
missing opportunities for cultural and educational development, with long-term 
adverse consequences for their personal wellbeing, for the wellbeing of their 
parents and for the wellbeing of wider society.
The urgency of integrated action to address child care arrangements, intimate 
violence, affordable housing and child poverty is lost when the primary focus is 
on economic growth as “the essential foundation of all our aspirations” (Cameron 
2010, par. 4). In contrast, the lived experiences of families and households 
reflected in the data presented in this chapter must challenge the dominant cul-
tural values in our society. How can it be culturally acceptable for such high 
levels of parental inequality, intimate violence, poor housing and child poverty 
to be allowed to persist?
This chapter has focused on households and families. The next step in the 
wellbeing economics framework is to analyse how people can collaborate out-
side their homes to pursue greater wellbeing for themselves and for their com-
munities. This analysis begins in Chap. 4.
Notes
1. See also Belzil (2007, p. 1076).
2. More recently, Miles and Sullivan (2012, p. 321) draw on UK data to “confirm the 
powerful role of the family in transmitting tastes and participation [in culture] dur-
ing childhood, and of community cultures in maintaining and reinforcing them”. 
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The term is now part of the economics lexicon; see, for example, Berkes and Folke 
(1992), Johnson et  al. (1995), de Bruin (1998, 1999), Klamer (2002), Cheng 
(2006), Cochrane (2006), Dalziel et al. (2009) and Throsby (1999, 2011, 2014).
3. Consistent with the way we use “cultural capital” in this chapter, Article 1 of the 
UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2001) describes cultural 
diversity as “the common heritage of humanity [that] should be recognized and 
affirmed for the benefit of present and future generations”.
4. Other proportions of median equivalised income can be used; the OECD, for 
example, uses 50 per cent of median household income for its international com-
parisons (see https://data.oecd.org/inequality/poverty-rate.htm). A child is a per-
son aged under 16 years or a person between 16 and 19 years who is: not married 
nor in a civil partnership nor living with a partner; living with parents or a respon-
sible adult; and in full-time non-advanced education or in unwaged government 
training (Department for Work and Pensions 2017b, p. 39).
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Civil Society and Social Capital
Abstract This chapter explores how humans collaborate with others outside their 
families and households to expand capabilities for wellbeing, particularly by cre-
ating and participating in civil society institutions. The chapter also analyses 
social capital and how it can be increased through mechanisms that include: 
learning in schools; participation in networks; enforcement of norms; develop-
ment of societal aspirations; and efforts for social inclusion. There are tensions 
between cultural capital (discussed in the previous chapter) and social capital (this 
chapter) since access to the services of social capital—especially to bridging social 
capital—is much easier for people who share the cultural capital of the commu-
nity’s dominant social group. Policy can enhance capabilities for wellbeing by 
ensuring persons are not disadvantaged as a result of ethnicity or other personal 
characteristic in their equitable access to services from all forms of capital.
Keywords Social capital • Wellbeing • Civil society • Structural racism • 
Interculturalism
We humans are social beings. Consistent with that observation, Chap. 3 has 
described how most of us cohabit with other people for long periods of our 
lives. This book now turns to how we humans collaborate outside our families 
and households to expand capabilities for wellbeing. This chapter focuses on 
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collaboration in what is termed the third sector (Etzioni 1973; Corry 2010) or 
civil society (Seligman 1992; Dekker and van den Broek 1998; Fukuyama 
2001; Office for Civil Society 2010).
Despite nuanced differences in definitions offered for this aspect of social life, 
there is general agreement that the institutional core of civil society is “consti-
tuted by voluntary associations outside the sphere of the state and the economy” 
(Flyvbjerg 1998, p. 210; see also Kumar 1993, and Seligman 2002). Persons sup-
port these associations by donating time and finance to pursue common interests 
and shared values. In the UK Community Life Survey of 2015–2016, for exam-
ple, 47 per cent of respondents reported providing unpaid service to a volunteer 
organisation at least once a month (70 per cent reported doing so at least once a 
year), and 73 per cent reported making a financial donation to charity during an 
average four-week period (Cabinet Office 2016). The first section of this chapter 
discusses these civil society institutions and their contribution to wellbeing.
A closely related idea, which is adopted in many wellbeing frameworks, is 
social capital (see the survey in Scrivens and Smith 2013, part 3). This conveys 
the idea that social collaboration is easier when people are strongly connected to 
each other through established relationships in diverse social networks and by 
sharing accepted social norms (such as trust and civic co-operation; see Knack 
and Keefer 1997). This concept is explored in the second section, with a discus-
sion of how social capital can be strengthened through learning in schools, par-
ticipation in networks, enforcement of norms, development of societal 
aspirations and efforts for social inclusion.
The chapter’s third section focuses on social capital and ethnicity, observing 
that there are tensions between the concept of cultural capital discussed in the 
previous chapter and the concept of social capital discussed in this chapter. 
These tensions exist because access to services from social capital—especially 
from what is termed bridging social capital—is much easier for people who 
share the cultural capital of a community’s dominant cultural group. This creates 
and maintains privilege for the dominant group, to the disadvantage of outsid-
ers’ wellbeing, so that reflective action is required to redress the balance. The 
chapter finishes with a brief conclusion.
 The Institutions of Civil Society
In an open society, people create diverse social institutions to pursue common 
goals and shared values.1 The National Council for Voluntary Organisations, for 
example, publishes data on UK institutions that inhabit the civil society space 
P. Dalziel et al.
 69
between state, businesses and individuals (NCVO 2017). Table 4.1 presents a 
count of the 390,000 formally incorporated organisations fitting that descrip-
tion. This sizeable number is not the full extent of voluntary collaboration by 
British citizens; the NCVO suggests 600,000 to 900,000 unincorporated asso-
ciations could also be included in a broader definition of civil society (idem). 
The scale of activity that takes place in these incorporated and unincorporated 
institutions gives rise to our tenth proposition.
Proposition 10 Persons can access enhanced capabilities for wellbeing by par-
ticipating in institutions of civil society to collaborate with others in the pursuit 
of common interests and shared values.
Civil society collaborations can be motivated by a desire to exclude outsiders 
(this is discussed below), but there are also strong elements of altruism and phi-
lanthropy. The largest category in Table  4.1 is comprised of general charities, 
which covers institutions that satisfy six criteria:
Table 4.1 Number of civil society incorporated organisations by organisation type, United 
Kingdom, 2013–2014
Organisation Type Number of Organisations
General charities (2014–2015 data) 165,801
Sports clubs 135,900
Companies limited by guarantee 46,238
Religious bodies 38,383
Community interest companies 9177
Co-operatives 5568
Trade associations and professional bodies 3900
Independent schools 2598
Housing associations 1862
Benevolent societies 1681
Credit unions 521
Political parties 447
Employee owned businesses 250
Football/rugby supporter trusts 185
Trade unions 163
Universities 163
Leisure trusts 125
Friendly societies and mutual insurers 100
Common investment funds 55
Building societies 44
LESS: Duplicates in the above list (23,510)
Total 389,651
Source: NCVO (2017, Civil Society Data)
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• Registration as a general charity (including a public benefit test)
• Formality (institutionalised to some extent)
• Independence (separate from the state)
• Non-profit distributing (profits not returned to owners or directors)
• Self-governance
• Voluntarism (some meaningful degree of voluntary participation)
Table 4.2 gives further details of this category, grouping the general charities 
in a list of primary activities adapted from Salamon and Anheier (1996). The 
largest group has social services as the primary purpose. Members in this group 
volunteer time and money to provide assistance to people in their communities 
who are experiencing difficulties. Thus, the common interests and values in 
these institutions centre on philanthropy and altruism, which can be recognised 
as important elements in civil society.
A good example is the network of Citizens Advice Bureaux operating in about 
3000 locations throughout the United Kingdom. In 2015–2016, the Bureaux 
provided help to 3.1 million people directly, as well as many more who accessed 
Citizens Advice web pages. That assistance was offered by professional staff and 
Table 4.2 Number of voluntary organisations registered as charities by area of activity, 
United Kingdom, 2014–2015
Number of Organisations
Social services 30,265
Culture and recreation 23,586
Religion 14,357
Grant-making foundations 12,753
Parent-teacher associations 12,252
Development 10,286
Education 7914
Village halls 7662
Playgroups and nurseries 6960
Health 6710
Scout groups and youth clubs 6462
International 6055
Environment 5922
Law and advocacy 4270
Housing 3662
Research 3504
Employment and training 1985
Umbrella bodies 1156
Not classified 40
Total 165,801
Source: NCVO (2017, Scope Data)
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more than 24,200 volunteers. The volunteered time was a substantial commit-
ment, shown by calculating how much it would have cost for the same services 
to be provided by the professional staff (Citizens Advice 2014, fn. 2, p. 4). In 
2015–2016, this was estimated to be £114 million in England and Wales, and 
£10 million in Scotland.2
Moving beyond this example, the Office of National Statistics uses survey 
data to estimate the value of volunteer time across all UK civil society institu-
tions (ONS 2016; 2017). It focuses on people engaged in frequent formal vol-
unteering; that is, residents who donate time at least once a month to a recognised 
institution. Figure 4.1 shows estimates for the decade 2005–2014. The impact 
of inflation has been removed from the series. Despite population growth over 
the same period, there is a downward trend. This is because the average time 
volunteered per person declined significantly over the decade, by 19.3 per cent 
(ONS 2016, pp. 40–41).
The estimates in Fig. 4.1 indicate the income volunteers might have earned 
if they had offered the same services in paid employment. Recall that Chap. 2 
used this conceptualisation to estimate the opportunity cost of time spent by 
people in any valued activity (see the discussion around Fig. 2.1). The same 
understanding can be applied here, with some caveats. Volunteers participate in 
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Fig. 4.1 Gross value added of frequent formal volunteering measured in 2014 prices, United 
Kingdom, 2005–2014. (Note: The impact of inflation has been removed using the GDP 
Deflator at Market Prices. Source: ONS (2016, Fig. 8.2, p. 41) and HM Treasury (2017))
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training and gain experience; hence, some of the time represents investment in 
developing human capital. Similarly, volunteering introduces persons to new 
social networks, opening up access to the community’s social capital (see the 
following section). Even allowing for these caveats, however, the high opportu-
nity cost of  volunteered time recorded in Fig. 4.1 suggests that, at least for some 
persons, living a valued kind of life includes helping other people (see Fujiwara 
et al. 2013; Jenkinson et al. 2013).
 Social Capital
In 2008, the UK Government’s Foresight Project on mental capital and wellbe-
ing commissioned the New Economics Foundation to develop a set of evidence-
based actions that people can take to improve personal wellbeing. The resulting 
review of the science literature identified five actions that can be good for mental 
wellbeing if built into daily life. They are worth citing in full (Aked et al. 2008, 
p. iii; Aked and Thompson 2011, p. 8):
Connect…
With the people around you. With family, friends, colleagues and neighbours. At 
home, work, school or in your local community. Think of these as the cornerstones 
of your life and invest time in developing them. Building these connections will 
support and enrich you every day.
Be active…
Go for a walk or run. Step outside. Cycle. Play a game. Garden. Dance. Exercising 
makes you feel good. Most importantly, discover a physical activity you enjoy and 
that suits your level of mobility and fitness.
Take notice…
Be curious. Catch sight of the beautiful. Remark on the unusual. Notice the chang-
ing seasons. Savour the moment, whether you are walking to work, eating lunch or 
talking to friends. Be aware of the world around you and what you are feeling. 
Reflecting on your experiences will help you appreciate what matters to you.
Keep learning…
Try something new. Rediscover an old interest. Sign up for that course. Take on a 
different responsibility at work. Fix a bike. Learn to play an instrument or how to 
cook your favourite food. Set a challenge you will enjoy achieving. Learning new 
things will make you more confident as well as being fun.
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Give…
Do something nice for a friend, or a stranger. Thank someone. Smile. Volunteer 
your time. Join a community group. Look out, as well as in. Seeing yourself, and 
your happiness, linked to the wider community can be incredibly rewarding and 
creates connections with the people around you.
These five ways to wellbeing involve going outside a person’s immediate fam-
ily and household. Moving beyond the relative safety of kith and kin, however, 
is also associated with risks to wellbeing, including potential harm arising from 
public shame and humiliation (Sen 1983, p. 159; Zavaleta Reyles 2007). This 
was recognised in a famous passage of The Wealth of Nations (Smith 1776, Vol. 
2, pp. 399–400):
But in the present times, through a greater part of Europe, a creditable day- labourer 
would be ashamed to appear in public without a linen shirt, the want of which 
would be supposed to denote that disgraceful degree of poverty which, it is pre-
sumed, nobody can well fall into without extreme bad conduct.
More recently, Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) have drawn on research by 
Scheff (1988) and Dickerson and Kemeny (2004) to argue that residents who 
live in countries with more inequality are vulnerable to greater anxiety about 
potential shame for low or falling social status. Anxiety leads to poorer national 
outcomes across multiple indicators of wellbeing. On this theme, Walker and 
Chase (2013) and Kent (2016) have documented how poverty debates in the 
United Kingdom have become dominated by private and public sector efforts to 
shame citizens judged as undeserving of welfare assistance.
Further social barriers exist when it is not always safe to trust others in day-
to-day social relations (Fukuyama 1995), particularly if social and political insti-
tutions are not trustworthy (O’Neill 2002). In some countries, this can be 
because the State actively suppresses civil society  institutions (Bernhard 1993; 
Chamberlain 1993). In some societies, it can be socially accepted for a person to 
promote interests of family and friends over the civil rights of a stranger, even 
when acting as a public official (Fukuyama 2001, p. 9). Indeed, a country’s legal 
system can include laws and regulations designed to prevent members of speci-
fied social groups from participating in high status occupations or engaging in 
important public activities (Dasgupta 2005; Clark and Worger 2016).
Observations such as these lead to the idea that social collaboration is easier 
in some communities than in others. Expressing this idea using the capital stock 
metaphor, communities in which people find it easier to co- operate are said to 
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have higher levels of social capital than communities where collaboration is more 
difficult (Knack and Keefer 1997; Woolcock 1998). This metaphor is not easily 
explained (Scrivens and Smith 2013, p. 11), to the extent that Manski (2000, 
p. 123) suggests “economists should use ‘social capital’ only as a lesson in the 
ambiguity of words”. Nevertheless, the following definitions capture different 
aspects of the term:
… “social capital” refers to features of social organization such as networks, norms, 
and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit. 
(Putnam 1995a, p. 67)
The social capital of a society includes the institutions, the relationships, the atti-
tudes and values that govern interactions among people and contribute to eco-
nomic and social development. (World Bank 1998, p. 1)
Social capital is the shared knowledge, understandings, norms, rules, and expecta-
tions about patterns of interactions that groups of individuals bring to a recurrent 
activity. (Ostrom 2000, p. 176)
… the definition of social capital is: networks together with shared norms, values 
and understandings that facilitate co-operation within or among groups. (OECD 
2001, p. 41)
Social capital generally refers to trust, concern for one’s associates, a willingness to 
live by the norms of one’s community and to punish those who do not. (Bowles 
and Gintis 2002, p. F419)
A widely adopted classification recognises three forms of social capital (Szreter 
and Woolcock 2004; Keeley 2007, p. 103; Poortinga 2012). Bonding social capi-
tal draws together groups of relatively homogenous people bound by consider-
ations such as family, ethnicity, gender or social class. Bridging social capital 
supports collaboration among diverse social groups in a region or country. Linking 
social capital makes it easier for people to connect with the country’s major insti-
tutions exercising power, including local, regional and national government.
Bonding capital may be strong within each community of a country at the 
same time that bridging capital between different communities is weak. Sectarian 
conflict in Northern Ireland has been cited as an example (Leonard 2004; 
Campbell et al. 2010). Similarly, access to linking social capital may be far easier 
for members of some communities than for others, to the extent that some 
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groups of citizens can be systematically disadvantaged in interactions with the 
country’s education, health, police and justice systems (Eddo-Lodge 2017, 
Chap. 2; see also the following section).
The capital metaphor recognises that social capital can deteriorate with 
neglect, just as physical capital depreciates without maintenance, but can 
also be increased with suitable investment.3 The first of these characteristics 
motivated Robert Putnam (1995a, 2000) to lament what he saw as the 
decline of social capital in the United States over the previous three decades, 
reflected in his symbol of an individual “bowling alone” rather than partici-
pating with others in organised competitions.
Putnam’s diagnosis has been criticised for overstating the extent of the prob-
lem and for failing to distinguish causes and effects of changes in the stock of 
social capital (Portes 1998, pp.  18–21). Hall (1999), for example, found no 
evidence of an equivalent erosion of social capital in the United Kingdom 
(although this may be changing this century; see Richards and Heath 2015, and 
Fig.  4.1 above). Nevertheless, there has been progress in understanding how 
investment in social capital can take place, summarised in the following proposi-
tion and explained in the remainder of this section.
Proposition 11 Investment in social capital can occur through mechanisms 
that include: learning in schools; participation in networks; enforcement of 
norms; development of societal aspirations and efforts for social inclusion.
Learning in Schools Fukuyama (1999, p. 257) observes that “one of the most 
important sources of social capital in contemporary societies is the educational 
system”. At school, young people learn how to collaborate with others outside 
their immediate family circle, including through participation in well-structured 
programmes of physical education (Bailey et al. 2013). Citizenship programmes 
may be included in a national curriculum (Department for Education 2013).
Putnam (1995b, p. 667) observes the powerful effects of schooling on later 
social and political participation, concluding: “highly educated people are much 
more likely to be joiners and trusters, partly because they are better off economi-
cally, but mostly because of the skills, resources, and inclinations that were 
imparted to them at home and in school”. Hall (1999, pp. 435–437) similarly 
observes that radical transformation in the British education system between the 
1950s and 1990s reduced segregation by class and gender, and increased attain-
ment, which positively affected the country’s social capital.
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Participation in Networks A key idea in Coleman’s (1986) original essay is that 
social capital grows when persons participate in social networks, but this does 
not occur to the extent needed to maximise aggregate wellbeing because a large 
share of the benefits accrues to people other than the decision-maker. This is 
because the personal benefits of greater social capital are not restricted to a per-
son’s own individual contribution.
Thus, social capital has a “public good” element (see Chap. 6 for further dis-
cussion on economic public goods), which tends to limit the scope for collabo-
ration. To be successful, voluntary organisations must find ways to foster “a 
cooperative spirit, norms of reciprocity, and collective thinking beyond the 
boundaries of the group itself ” (Stolle and Rochon 1998, p. 49). The public 
good element of participation in social networks can justify supportive public 
policies (Hall 1999, pp. 440–443).4
Enforcement of Norms The social capital definition of Bowles and Gintis 
(2002) cited above includes willingness to punish violations of community 
norms (see also Paldam and Svendsen 2000, section 4, and Dasgupta 2005, pp. 
S6–S7). To illustrate, suppose a person travelling on a bus is subjected to sus-
tained verbal abuse; can the person rely on other passengers to intervene so that 
community norms of courtesy and respect are enforced? If the answer is no, then 
social capital is weak.
Similar to participation in networks, enforcement of norms has a public good 
element (benefits are enjoyed by a wider group than the enforcer), which is one 
of several reasons for funding judicial systems from the public purse. The devel-
opment of human rights legislation has been important for building social capi-
tal, by providing a mechanism to enforce fundamental rights such as freedom 
from unfair discrimination and protection of private property.
Development of Societal Aspirations There is a substantial literature on ten-
sions between individual freedoms and societal aspirations. Margaret Thatcher 
famously claimed while UK Prime Minister that “there is no such thing as soci-
ety”; instead “there is living tapestry of men and women and people” (Thatcher 
1987, pp. 30–31). That attitude reflects what Francis Fukuyama (1999, pp. 5–6) 
has labelled a Great Disruption in social values from the mid-1960s to the early 
1990s, which he suggests resulted in a culture of “intensive individualism” that 
“weakened the bonds holding families, neighborhoods, and nations together”.
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In contrast, social capital can be strengthened when countries develop soci-
etal aspirations or common goals. This involves, but is not limited to, the politi-
cal process. Societal aspirations must be supported by community rules that 
Fukuyama observes will always entail some limits to individual freedoms to 
facilitate new forms of collaboration and connectedness (idem, p. 15).
Efforts for Social Inclusion In his UK study, Peter Hall reported that access to 
social capital is unevenly distributed among the British population, to the extent 
that “the more accurate image is of a nation divided between a well-connected 
and highly-active group of citizens with generally prosperous lives and another 
set of citizens whose associational life and involvement in politics are very lim-
ited” (Hall 1999, p. 455). A later study similarly concluded that social capital in 
Britain operates to entrench privilege within and across generations, so that 
“encouraging greater formal civic engagement without tackling the root causes 
of socio- economic disadvantage may well aggravate rather than ameliorate social 
division” (Li et al. 2008, p. 407).
These observations suggest that efforts to promote social inclusion, initiated 
in both the private and public sectors, are required to strengthen access by all 
citizens to the services provided by the country’s social capital. This is discussed 
in the following section.
 Social Capital and Ethnicity
The social capital definitions listed in the previous section all refer to shared 
values or norms. Cultural values and accepted norms were discussed in Chap. 3, 
which observed that they are learned by young persons within families and 
households. This was labelled as cultural capital, which differs from social capital 
in two important respects.
First, cultural capital in its primary sense is embodied in persons, whereas 
social capital “exists in the relations among persons” (Coleman 1986, pp. S100–
S101).5 Second, while both types of capital are continuously transformed in a 
healthy society, cultural capital is conceptualised as connecting a person with 
previous and future generations (through the transmission of cultural heritage), 
whereas social capital connects a person with others in the current generation of 
living people.
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There are inevitable tensions between cultural and social capital, since history 
shows repeatedly that access to services from a community’s social capital (as 
well as access to other private and public resources) is much easier for people 
who share the cultural capital of the community’s dominant social group. 
Indeed, this was a central message of Pierre Bourdieu’s (1973, 1983) research, 
which developed the concept of cultural capital to explain why children from 
wealthy households achieve better results at school than children from lower 
socioeconomic groups.
Recall the example in the previous section of a bus passenger subjected to 
sustained verbal abuse. The answer to whether the passenger can rely on others 
to intervene may depend on the abused person’s ethnicity (see, for example, 
Qureshi 2017). If so, this is a community where access to services from social 
capital—especially from bridging social capital—is limited for people outside 
the dominant cultural group.
Further, shared norms held by the dominant group may include general 
acceptance, perhaps unvoiced, that it is legitimate for its members to treat peo-
ple from other ethnic groups in a hostile manner that would be sanctioned if 
applied to anyone from the dominant group. This can include using humiliating 
language, acting with dishonest intent, providing discriminatory standards of 
service, denying entry to certain networks or clubs, or tolerating an ever-present 
threat of physical assault that generally goes unpunished (Coates 2015).
These possibilities represent “the dark side of social capital” (Portes 1998, 
pp.  15–18; Gargiulo and Benassi 1999; Putnam 2000, Chap. 22; Dasgupta 
2005, p. S17; van Deth and Zmerli 2010; Scrivens and Smith 2013, p. 23). An 
often-cited study by Waldinger (1995) gave an example of how insiders of white 
ethnicity in the New York construction sector effectively mobilised social capital 
to sustain economic advantage at the expense of African-American, Caribbean 
and Korean outsiders.6
Reni Eddo-Lodge (2017, Chap. 3) has called this phenomenon “white privi-
lege”, which a black person can only watch “as an outsider to the insularity of 
whiteness” (idem, p. 86). She goes on to say (idem, p. 87):
When I talk about white privilege, I don’t mean that white people have it easy, that 
they’ve never struggled, or that they’ve never lived in poverty. But white privilege is 
the fact that if you’re white, your race will almost certainly positively impact your 
life’s trajectory in some way. And you probably won’t even notice it.
The tendency for members of the dominant culture to be advantaged over 
outsiders is not restricted to individual behaviour. It can occur in the country’s 
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state and civil society organisations, where it is labelled institutional or cultural 
discrimination (Dovidio et al. 2010, pp. 10–11), or structural racism (Eddo-
Lodge 2017, p. 64). The Stephen Lawrence inquiry, for example, acknowledged 
institutional racism in the Metropolitan Police Service, which it defined as 
(Macpherson 1999, section 6.34):
The collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and profes-
sional service to people because of their colour, culture, or ethnic origin. It can 
be seen or detected in processes, attitudes and behaviour which amount to dis-
crimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and racist 
stereotyping which disadvantage minority ethnic people.
Eddo-Lodge observes that the dominant group tend not to notice their 
advantage, while Macpherson speaks of prejudice that is unwitting. This is 
often how social capital operates. It is a resource that insiders find they can 
draw upon easily, or without conscious thought, while outsiders find they must 
collectively organise sustained social action to obtain some degree of equitable 
access to its services. Using terms introduced in Chap. 2, the result of this 
social structure is that persons with similar personal abilities find they have 
unequal social capabilities depending on their ethnicity or some other personal 
characteristic.
Such an outcome is a fundamental challenge to policy. In the language of this 
book, equitable access to services from all forms of capital is necessary for citi-
zens to have reasoned capabilities for leading valued lives. When large numbers 
of citizens, because of ethnicity or some other characteristic, face systematic 
limitations on their access to services from the country’s shared social capital, the 
capabilities of those citizens for leading valued lives are reduced and wellbeing is 
stunted. This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 12 Policy can enhance capabilities for wellbeing by ensuring per-
sons are not disadvantaged in their equitable access to services from the coun-
try’s capital stocks because of ethnicity or other personal characteristics.
Note that Proposition 12 goes well beyond the Pareto efficiency criterion for 
policy advice discussed in the opening chapter. This criterion supports economic 
policies if at least one person’s wellbeing is improved and no one is made worse 
off. In contrast, Proposition 12 sanctions proposals in which members of the 
dominant cultural group sacrifice historical privilege in order to improve equi-
table access of other people to the country’s social capital. It is possible that 
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increasing the capabilities of people from minority groups would raise aggregate 
economic productivity to everyone’s potential benefit (see Arrow et al. 2000), 
but this is not presumed in Proposition 12.
One way to address Proposition 12 is through efforts by individuals, private 
businesses, public officials and civil society institutions to foster interaction and 
dialogue among different cultural traditions. A term that has emerged for these 
efforts is interculturalism (Cantle 2012; Meer and Modood 2012; Taylor 2012; 
Zapata-Barrero 2015; Meer et al. 2016). The Council of Europe, for example, 
funds an Intercultural Cities Programme (Wood and Landry 2008; ICC 2016) 
that builds capacity, offers strategies and initiates projects to strengthen inclusive 
approaches that support diversity in cities.
 Conclusion
Collaborations with people outside a person’s immediate family and household 
can greatly expand personal and social capabilities for wellbeing. In a free soci-
ety, there is scope for a large number of diverse organisations to bring persons 
together to collaborate in the pursuit of common interests and shared values, 
supported by financial donations and volunteered time. These institutions make 
up the core of civil society.
Social capital is a metaphor reflecting the idea that interconnections among 
people contribute to wellbeing in a number of important ways. Social capital 
can be strengthened by conscious efforts in the private and public spheres, 
including through: learning in schools; participation in networks; enforcement 
of norms; development of societal aspirations; and efforts for social inclusion.
This chapter discussed social capital and ethnicity. This drew on Eddo- Lodge’s 
(2017) recent book, supporting its insistence that members of the dominant 
social group take active measures to sacrifice historical privilege in order to 
improve equitable access of other people to the country’s social capital. This 
finished by highlighting efforts by individuals, private businesses, public officials 
and civil society institutions to foster interculturalism.
Having considered choices made at the levels of individual persons, of house-
holds and families, and of communities, the stage is now set for the middle 
chapter of this book. It examines how participation in the market economy can 
contribute to expanded wellbeing, especially as a result of firms maintaining 
specialised capabilities for supplying goods and services needed by persons to 
live the kinds of lives they value.
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Notes
1. The key philosophical text on open societies is Karl Popper’s The Open Society and 
Its Enemies, first published in two volumes in 1945, republished as one volume by 
Princeton University Press in Popper (2013).
2. These and other data in this paragraph are drawn from Citizens Advice (2016), 
Citizens Advice Northern Island (2015) and Citizens Advice Scotland (2016).
3. Bowles and Gintis (2002, pp. F420–F421) object to this metaphor on the grounds 
that “capital refers to something that can be owned”. They therefore propose an 
alternative conceptualisation of “community governance”.
4. The value of participation in social networks leads Layard (2006, p. C32) to warn 
economists not to advocate greater worker mobility (to generate higher incomes) 
without considering the associated effects on the quality of relationships in the 
community and in families.
5. Glaeser et al. (2002, p. F438) object to the view of social capital as a community-
level attribute “because economists find it difficult to think of communities as 
decision-makers” (ibid). They therefore define individual social capital to be 
embodied in a person, and aggregate social capital is calculated as a function of 
these individual social characteristics. We do think that approach is fruitful; the key 
issue in our view is access to services provided by social capital.
6. Insider-outside behaviour is well understood by economists, especially in a labour 
market context; see, for example, Solow (1985) and Lindbeck and Snower (1988, 
2001).
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Market Participation and Economic Capital
Abstract The market economy supports human wellbeing. This chapter offers 
evidence for this observation, while recognising that markets need rules, cus-
toms and institutions to work well. A key market institution is the firm, which 
combines different types of capital to maintain specialist capabilities for sup-
plying goods and services valued by their customers. This expands the potential 
for wellbeing, but a large number of jobs pay less than the real living wage, 
with a strong gender bias, which diminishes wellbeing. The chapter analyses 
economic capital, comprised of physical capital and financial capital. Growth 
in economic capital has increased material living standards for billions of peo-
ple, but recent economic development is also associated with cumulative envi-
ronmental damage, episodes of financial instability and greater concentration 
of wealth.
Keywords Economic capital • Market strength • Capability theory of the firm 
• Unemployment • Living wage
To lead valued lives, people must access goods and services for meeting basic 
needs, and then for pursuing other goals (Maslow 1943, 1954). There are moral 
limits to the use of markets for this purpose (Sandel 2012), and the following 
two chapters will analyse other important cases of market failure. Nevertheless, 
goods and services necessary for wellbeing are often supplied by firms that 
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operate in markets for inputs and outputs. Participation in the market econ-
omy therefore enhances capabilities for wellbeing beyond what persons could 
achieve through social networks alone.
The chapter begins by analysing four features of competitive markets that 
make this possible: specialised production, rewards for creating new value, 
decentralised decision-making and Pareto efficient outcomes. The potential is 
not always realised, however, and so the chapter also pays attention to how mar-
kets need well-designed rules, customs and institutions to work well.
The chapter then analyses a key institution in every market economy: the 
firm. Firms develop specialised capabilities for supplying valued goods and ser-
vices, and provide access to the market economy by offering people opportuni-
ties for paid employment. Both roles support wellbeing.
Economic capital is a term used to cover physical capital (such as buildings 
and machinery) and financial capital (such as shares and bonds). Growth in 
these assets can promote wellbeing, but with important policy issues analysed in 
the third section of the chapter. The Global Financial Crisis in 2007–2008, for 
example, had a sharp impact on physical capital investment and exposed vulner-
abilities in the global architecture for financial capital (Crotty 2009). Piketty 
(2013) has documented how capital accumulation can concentrate financial 
wealth and increase economic inequality.
The chapter finishes with a brief summary. It accepts the potential of the 
market economy and of economic capital for expanding the capabilities of per-
sons to lead valued lives, but argues there is more to understand about how to 
harness the benefits of these institutions for wellbeing.
 Markets and Wellbeing
John McMillan (2002) showed how markets have emerged in human history 
wherever there were enough people for their operation and no political or 
military forces acting to suppress them. This is itself evidence that markets can 
be useful for wellbeing, but McMillan recognises a crucial caveat (idem, 
pp. 13–14):
Markets, then, are the most potent antipoverty engine there is – but only where 
they work well. The caveat is crucial. … Left to themselves, markets can fail. To 
deliver their full benefits, they need support from a set of rules, customs, and insti-
tutions. They cannot operate efficiently in a vacuum.
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Based on that insight, Proposition 13 recognises the potential of markets for 
contributing to enhanced wellbeing, while acknowledging that achievement of 
this potential requires a well-designed institutional structure.
Proposition 13 Persons can enhance wellbeing by participating as sellers and as 
buyers in the market economy; but markets need rules, customs and institutions 
to work well.
This does not mean all possible market transactions are morally or socially 
acceptable. Human trafficking and exploitative child labour, for example, are 
universally rejected, as codified in international agreements such as the 2003 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially 
Women and Children and the 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
There is also a strong public consensus that access to life-changing services such 
as housing, education and health should not be restricted by a person’s low mar-
ket income.
Within limits such as these, four features help explain the potential of mar-
kets for contributing to enhanced wellbeing. First, a key insight in Smith’s 
(1776) Wealth of Nations was its recognition that a market economy allows pro-
ducers to specialise in their range of outputs and in their production. This is 
feasible because producers can rely on markets to buy inputs and sell outputs. 
Smith’s opening chapter introduced this feature using the example of pins man-
ufacture (Smith 1776, Volume 1, p. 8):
One man draws out the wire, another straightens it, a third cuts it, a fourth points 
it, a fifth grinds it at the top for receiving the head; to make the head requires two 
or three distinct operations; to put it on is a peculiar business, to whiten the pins is 
another; it is even a trade by itself to put them into the paper; and the important 
business of making a pin is, in this manner, divided into about eighteen distinct 
operations…
Smith estimated that in his time, ten workers could make upwards of 48,000 
pins a day, whereas not more than 200 were possible without this division of 
labour. Thus, specialisation can greatly increase the productivity of workers 
(measured as the value of their output per hour of work), which is an important 
driver of higher material living standards.1
Second, the market economy rewards successful developments of new ways 
to deliver value to consumers. This was explained by Joseph Schumpeter (1943) 
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in his influential book Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. Emphasising ben-
efits from the “creative destruction” of capitalism, Schumpeter explained how 
market dynamism is driven by the innovation of entrepreneurs (idem, p. 83):
The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes 
from the new consumers’ goods, the new methods of production or transportation, 
the new markets, the new forms of industrial organization that capitalist enterprise 
creates.
Third, the market supports decentralised decision-making that is able to 
respond to economic shocks such as discoveries of new technologies or changes 
in consumer preferences. In competitive markets, these shocks result in relative 
price adjustments, which cause producers and consumers to shift resources to 
where they have become more highly valued, in a way that no central planner 
could hope to achieve. This feature was emphasised by Friedrich Hayek (1945, 
p. 520):
The marvel is that in a case like that of a scarcity of one raw material, without an 
order being issued, without more than perhaps a handful of people knowing the 
cause, tens of thousands of people whose identity could not be ascertained by 
months of investigation, are made to use the material or its products more spar-
ingly; i.e., they move in the right direction.
Fourth, the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics, introduced 
by economists including Nobel Laureates Ken Arrow (1951) and Gérard Debreu 
(1959), demonstrates that a system of perfectly competitive markets, involving 
private goods with no externalities (so that private costs equal social costs), pro-
duces an outcome where no one’s preference satisfaction can be increased with-
out reducing the satisfaction of someone else. This property is termed Pareto 
efficiency (Pareto 1906; Hicks 1939). It prevails because the price in a competi-
tive market equals the cost to society of producing one more unit of the traded 
item (its marginal cost) and equals the amount consumers are willing to pay for 
that extra unit (its marginal benefit).
Thus, a consumer choosing to pay the market price of an item is forced to 
recognise the marginal benefit of that item to other consumers and the marginal 
cost of supplying a replacement. Similarly, producers are forced to recognise in 
their decision-making the marginal costs of other producers and the marginal 
benefits to all consumers.
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These features make competitive markets a potentially powerful mechanism 
for supplying goods and services needed to enhance wellbeing. Specialisation 
allows greater value to be delivered to diverse customers. Firms pay the marginal 
cost of each input and create outputs for which consumers are willing to pay more 
than the total cost of their production. There are incentives for successful innova-
tion. The economic outcome is efficient in the sense that no one’s preferences can 
be further satisfied without diminishing the satisfaction of someone else.
This potential is not always realised for all consumers. Market outcomes 
depend on the distribution of resources among households. This is because 
purchasing power is the principal factor determining access to market goods 
and services, and so resources flow towards high-wealth households, while 
low-wealth persons are vulnerable to exploitation by those holding greater 
market power. Consequently, it is reasonable for citizens to be concerned 
about poverty and income inequality in the market economy (Rawls 1971; 
Sen 2009) and for public policy to be designed so that all persons can access 
housing, health and education services independently of their household 
income (see Chap. 7).
Further, markets often fail to meet the strict requirements for the theories of 
perfect competition to apply. Market transactions may involve externalities or 
the traded item may be an economic public good (see Chaps. 6 and 7). There 
may be only one seller (monopoly) or one buyer (monopsony). If there are few 
buyers or sellers, the market may produce outcomes considered unjust without 
countervailing power on the other side (Galbraith 1952). Sellers may use cus-
tomer loyalty to take advantage of an inefficient market structure known as 
monopolistic competition (Robinson 1933; Chamberlin 1933). Consumers 
may be unable to judge the quality of a potential purchase, unsure whether to 
trust supplier claims about product safety or professional expertise (Darby and 
Karni 1973; Caswell and Mojduszka 1996).
Hence, there is room for good public policy to restrict anti- competitive 
behaviour in established markets. The UK regulatory regime for promoting 
competition, for example, has four main elements (Seely 2016, p. 12): investi-
gating markets that might be working poorly for consumers; controlling mergers 
that might be anti-competitive; enforcing prohibitions against anti-competitive 
business agreements, price fixing and other abuses of market strength; and gener-
ally advocating for the benefits of competition. The emergence of new technolo-
gies supporting on-line markets has created new challenges for competition 
policy (see the analysis of Google, Facebook, Amazon and eBay by Haucap and 
Heimeshoff 2013).
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 Firms and Capabilities
Firms are a key institution in any market economy. At the beginning of 2016, 
there were 5.5 million private sector businesses in the United Kingdom (Rhodes 
2016, p. 5). Of these, 4.2 million were operated by sole proprietors with no 
employees. This section focuses on the other 1.3 million private sector busi-
nesses with at least one employee, which we call firms. The vast majority of firms 
employed fewer than ten people, but 40 per cent of total employment in all 
firms was accounted for by 7000 large businesses with at least 250 employees 
(ibid).
An important question posed initially by Ronald Coase (1937, p.  390) is 
“why a firm emerges at all in a specialised exchange economy”. Given the 
strengths of market transactions discussed in the previous section, why are any 
economic activities managed within firms, rather than all persons being self-
employed and all transactions being organised through markets?
Coase’s insight was that market trades have their own transaction costs, includ-
ing the cost of time needed to discover relevant market prices, negotiate separate 
contracts, and make allowances for contingencies and risks. Under some cir-
cumstances, these transaction costs are avoided “when the direction of resources 
is dependent on an entrepreneur” within a firm (idem, p. 393).
Coase’s explanation has been developed further, including by Nobel Laureates 
Oliver Williamson (2010) and Oliver Hart (2017). This research has highlighted 
other factors giving rise to firms. A firm is better able to invest in assets specifi-
cally designed for its chosen outputs, for example, and a firm might reduce the 
unit costs of production as the scale of its activity increases.
Building on that tradition, David Teece (1982) has created a capability the-
ory of the firm.2 This conceptualises a firm as an ongoing institution that sus-
tains two types of capabilities: operational capabilities, necessary for supplying to 
market the firm’s chosen outputs; and dynamic capabilities, driving entrepre-
neurial innovation within the firm (see also Teece et al. 1997). Dynamic capa-
bilities are the more important, reflecting the crucial function of senior 
management to identify and exploit opportunities (Teece 2017a, p. 698):
For applied purposes, dynamic capabilities can usefully be broken down into three 
primary clusters of activities: (1) identification, development, co-development and 
assessment of technological opportunities in relationship to customer needs (sens-
ing); (2) mobilization of resources to address needs and opportunities, and to cap-
ture value from doing so (seizing); and (3) continued renewal (transforming).
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The emphasis on technology opportunities in relationship to customer needs 
is consistent with this book’s understanding of knowledge capital as an essential 
input into production systems (see Chap. 7). Knowledge capital includes intel-
lectual property, customer relationship management systems and other intangi-
ble assets based on specialised knowledge. This form of capital is particularly 
valuable because “knowledge, capabilities and other intangibles are not only 
scarce; they are often difficult to imitate” (Teece 2017a, p. 699).
All capital types considered in this book are important for a market firm. 
Consider a high street retail business. It leases a fitted-out store (economic capi-
tal) and employs skilled staff (human capital). It develops internal norms for 
daily operations (cultural capital) and maintains good relations with other busi-
nesses and people (social capital). It operates a sophisticated customer relation-
ship management system and protects a distinctive brand (knowledge capital). 
Its logistics, energy and waste disposal systems use environmental resources 
(natural capital). Its supply chain relies on contracts and trusted relationships 
with partners around the globe (diplomatic capital).
Combining these capitals allows a firm to build its capability for quality 
goods and services that customers come to understand and trust. Proposition 14 
therefore draws on the capability theory of the firm to provide a definition that 
fits the wellbeing economics framework.
Proposition 14 Firms operating in the market economy can combine different 
types of capital to maintain specialist capabilities for supplying goods and ser-
vices valued by their customers.
Throughout history, some firms have damaged wellbeing, including through 
large-scale dispossession of indigenous peoples during the global expansion of 
the market system in the nineteenth century (Polanyi 1944). As discussed earlier 
in this book, current activities of firms continue to cause environmental damage 
(Jackson 2017), although there are also consumer-led movements aiming to 
reward firms that demonstrate social and environmental responsibility (PwC 
2013; GRI 2016).3 Proposition 14 also indicates why the market economy 
favours households with high wealth. Customer values are expressed in the mar-
ket economy by willingness- to-pay, so that low-wealth households have weak 
purchasing power to access goods and services produced by firms, even if those 
goods and services would greatly increase their wellbeing.
Nevertheless, the capability theory also explains how firms can improve 
human wellbeing. Proposition 2 states that wellbeing can be enhanced by 
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expanding the capabilities of persons to lead the kinds of lives they value. 
Proposition 14 states that firms operating in the market economy maintain spe-
cialist capabilities. Thus, firms can expand opportunities for wellbeing by increas-
ing capabilities, at least for those who can find employment in firms or otherwise 
have the financial means to purchase the goods and services that firms provide.
Drawing on this discussion, Fig.  5.1 presents a model of Proposition 14, 
depicting a firm’s capabilities as the result of integrating different types of capi-
tal. This is designed to complement the skills model in Fig. 2.2 of Chap. 2 (both 
diagrams feature in the final chapter). Knowledge capital is highlighted because 
of its centrality in the dynamic capabilities of a firm. Human capital is high-
lighted because it is embodied in the firm’s staff and so is central to the employ-
ment opportunities offered in the enterprise.
Employment is the primary means by which persons earn market income to 
purchase goods and services that contribute to the kind of life they value. It also 
offers social connections and may contribute to a person’s social identity. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that one of the strongest findings in the wellbeing literature 
is that unemployed people generally report lower values for happiness and life 
satisfaction than do employed people, influenced by a range of personal and 
social factors.4
Knowledge
Capital
Other
Capitals
Human
Capital
Firm
Capabilities
Fig. 5.1 Firm capabilities as the integration of human, knowledge and other capitals
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Winkelmann (2014) observes that reduced life satisfaction upon becoming 
unemployed is associated with a sense of departing from accepted social norms 
towards paid work. Hence, the impact tends to be smaller when a greater num-
ber of local people also have no job (Clark 2003). The loss of subjective wellbe-
ing is more than can be explained by lost earnings. Psychological damage comes 
from factors such as lost economic identity, a sense of personal failure, feelings 
of insecurity, and reduced self-confidence in the ability to determine personal 
outcomes (Winkelmann 2014, p. 8).
Further, the need to focus on urgent problems caused by unemployment 
“captures the mind”, which can lead to poor decision-making that neglects other 
sources of wellbeing (Shah et  al. 2012; Mullainathan and Shafir 2013). 
Unemployment leaves scarring effects such as lower future wages (Gregory and 
Jukes 2001; Arulampalam 2001), higher risks of further spells of unemployment 
(Gregg 2001) and lower subjective wellbeing even when re-employed (Clark 
et al. 2001). Wellbeing reported by those who are not unemployed is also lower 
when there is higher unemployment among peers (Clark 2003; De Neve and 
Ward 2017, p. 154).
Employment is therefore important for wellbeing, but quality of employ-
ment should not be overlooked since “insecure and poor quality employment is 
also associated with increased risks of poor physical and mental health” (Marmot 
2010, p. 26). De Neve and Ward (2017) report that blue-collar jobs and low-
income jobs are associated with lower levels of subjective wellbeing, while other 
evidence shows strong connections between job quality and wellbeing (idem, 
p. 145)5:
Work-life balance emerges as a particularly strong predictor of people’s happiness. 
Further factors include job variety and the need to learn new things, as well the 
level of individual autonomy enjoyed by the employee. Moreover, job security and 
social capital (as measured through the support one receives from fellow workers) 
are also positively correlated with  happiness, while jobs that involve risks to health 
and safety are generally associated with lower levels of subjective wellbeing.
A critical consideration is income earned in a job. It may be reasonable for 
entry-level jobs employing school-leavers to offer lower wages while a young 
person builds relevant experience, but older people who may have family respon-
sibilities require decent wages (taking into account income support through 
social security policies; see Chap. 7) to lead lives they have reason to value by the 
standards of their peers.
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In the United Kingdom, this difference is recognised in a distinction between 
minimum wages and living wages. Table 5.1 shows the statutory national mini-
mum wage and the statutory national living wage, plus a third category that is 
referenced as either the voluntary living wage (IHS Markit 2017) or the real liv-
ing wage (Living Wage Foundation 2017).
The principle behind the voluntary or real living wage is “that work should 
bring dignity and should pay enough to provide families the essentials of life” 
(Hirsch and Moore 2011, p. 4). Its calculation is  therefore based on actual living 
costs, which are higher in London than elsewhere in the United Kingdom, tak-
ing into account income support received through social security. In April 2017, 
the voluntary real living wage was estimated to be £9.75 per hour in London 
and £8.45 in the rest of the country.
Table 5.1 shows that the statutory rates in the United Kingdom increase with 
the employee’s age, reaching £7.50 per hour at 25 years. Even this highest rate is 
well below the voluntary or real living wage, however, so that the minimum 
wage that employers must pay by statute is less than the rate considered suffi-
cient to provide families with the essentials of life.
IHS Markit is commissioned annually by KPMG to analyse jobs paying less 
than the voluntary living wage. The analysis for 2017 estimated that 5.5 million 
people aged 18 or older were employed on these terms. Where the employee was 
aged between 18 and 21, two-thirds of the jobs paid below the voluntary living 
wage (see Fig.  5.2). One-quarter of jobs did not meet the threshold where 
employees were aged 22 to 29. Even for employees in their 30s, 40s and 50s, the 
percentage of jobs not paying the voluntary living wage was 15–16 per cent 
(IHS Markit 2017, p. 11).
Table 5.1 Statutory national minimum wage, statutory national living wage, and voluntary 
or real living wage, United Kingdom, April 2017
Age Band Rate Per Hour
Statutory National Minimum Wage
Under 18 £4.05
18–20 £5.60
20–24 £7.05
Statutory National Living Wage
25 and over £7.50
Voluntary or real living wage
18 and over £9.75 in London
£8.45 in rest of United Kingdom
Note: These figures exclude Apprentice Rates
Sources: https://www.gov.uk/national-minimum-wage-rates and https://www.livingwage.
org.uk/what-real-living-wage
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These data indicate a major policy challenge within a wellbeing economics 
framework. Even with social security support, more than one in seven employed 
people aged between 30 and 59 are in jobs that do not pay a wage deemed high 
enough to provide families with the essentials of life. The proportion is higher for 
younger and older age groups. In other words, employment is not sufficient to 
guarantee that a person can afford to purchase the market goods and services 
needed to create a level of wellbeing judged reasonable by the standards of the day.
Further, there is a strong gender disparity in this experience: 26 per cent of 
employed females are paid less than the voluntary living wage, compared to 16 
per cent of employed males (idem, p. 9). This difference is contrary to Proposition 
8 that men and women can have equal capabilities for wellbeing. More than one 
in four women in paid work are not earning the real living wage; this must 
restrict capabilities for creating wellbeing for themselves and their families.
 Economic Capital
Economic capital encompasses physical capital and financial capital. Physical 
capital refers to long-lasting human-made material assets such as buildings, fac-
tories, roads, vehicles, machinery, equipment and the like. Financial capital 
Fig. 5.2 Estimated percentage of jobs paying less than the voluntary living wage, by employee 
age, England, Scotland and Wales, 2017. (Source: IHS Markit (2017, Table 3.6.1, p. 11))
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refers to nominal assets such as equities, shares, securities, bonds, debentures, 
bank deposits and cash.
Physical and financial capitals are closely connected. A firm includes physical 
capital on the assets side of its balance sheet, funded by financial capital on the 
liabilities side. A household with savings distributes its wealth between physical 
capital (such as home ownership) and a portfolio of financial capital. The finan-
cial assets are backed by physical and other types of capital, whose profit streams 
underpin the portfolio’s economic value.
Economic policy pays close attention to investment in new physical capital 
(OECD 2015). This is justified by its importance in the national economy. In the 
United Kingdom, for example, this expenditure was valued in 2016 at £260 bil-
lion, which was 13.5 per cent of that year’s gross domestic product.6 As Keynes 
(1936) first explained, the amount of investment expenditure influences a nation’s 
level of economic activity, so that a large drop in investment can push the economy 
into recession. In the medium term, the neoclassical growth model shows that a 
country tends to have a higher value of output produced per hour of work if a 
greater share of its output is devoted to physical capital investment (see Chap. 1).
A further reason for close attention to physical capital investment is that firms 
and households rely on the public sector to maintain and expand core infra-
structure such as transport networks and essential utilities such as water and 
sewer networks (Aschauer 1989; Munnell 1992; Gramlich 1994; Pereira and 
Andraz 2013). These networks and utilities are essential for promoting wellbe-
ing, to the extent that the UK Government has created the Infrastructure and 
Projects Authority whose purpose is “to continuously improve the way infra-
structure and major projects are delivered in order to support government pri-
orities and improve people’s lives” (IPA 2017, p. 1).
Experiences over the last two decades indicate some deep-seated problems in 
the role of economic capital in promoting wellbeing. First, and arguably the 
most pressing issue, current patterns of physical capital investment and techno-
logical development are having cumulative and potentially irreversible impacts 
on the environment (OECD 2011, p. 10).
Recognising this challenge, the OECD recommends strategies to foster 
green growth, including: carbon emission pricing to reflect its full environmen-
tal and economic costs, temporary support for new technologies with lower 
environmental impacts, reduced barriers to the development and diffusion of 
green technologies globally, and investment in public network infrastructure 
that supports next-generation technologies (idem, p. 12). The UK Government’s 
Clean Growth Strategy (HM Government 2017) is an example of an integrated 
public strategy that aims to support investment in innovation for clean growth.
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A second issue from recent experience can be seen in Fig.  5.3, which 
depicts the United Kingdom’s physical capital investment from 2001 to 2016. 
The sharp fall in physical capital investment during the Global Financial Crisis 
of 2007–2008 is clearly visible. Investment fell from £250 billion in 2007 to 
£196 billion in 2009, a reduction of 21.6 per cent. It returned to its 2007 value 
only in 2015. Fluctuations of this size are a serious challenge to policy goals of 
maintaining stable and full employment.
That episode also illustrates the close connection between physical and finan-
cial capital, since it is universally agreed that the origins of the crisis lay in finan-
cial markets. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission was appointed by the US 
Government to examine what led to the greatest financial crisis since the Great 
Depression. It reported as follows (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011, 
p. xvi):
While the vulnerabilities that created the potential for crisis were years in the mak-
ing, it was the collapse of the housing bubble – fuelled by low interest rates, easy 
and available credit, scant regulation, and toxic mortgages – that was the spark that 
ignited a string of events, which led to a full-blown crisis in the fall of 2008. … 
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When the bubble burst, hundreds of billions of dollars in losses in mortgages and 
mortgage-related securities shook markets as well as financial institutions that had 
significant exposures to those mortgages and had borrowed heavily against them.
Thomas Piketty (2013) has published long-term data from different countries 
to demonstrate that income inequality has generally been increasing in recent 
decades. He hypothesises that this trend is amplified by financial returns to the 
ownership of capital exceeding the rate of economic growth.7 This means income 
from capital ownership typically grows faster than income from wages, with 
straightforward consequences for concentration of wealth and power (idem, p. 26):
Under such conditions, it is almost inevitable that inherited wealth will dominate 
wealth amassed from a lifetime’s labor by a wide margin, and the concentration of 
capital will attain extremely high levels – levels potentially incompatible with the 
meritocratic values and principles of social justice fundamental to modern demo-
cratic societies.
Thus, economic capital is important for wellbeing, but there are issues that 
must be addressed for it to contribute to its full potential. This is summarised in 
Proposition 15.
Proposition 15 Investment in physical capital and the growth of financial capi-
tal can contribute to enhanced wellbeing, but recent patterns of economic devel-
opment are also associated with cumulative environmental damage, episodes of 
financial instability and greater concentration of wealth.
 Conclusion
The market economy supports substantial expansion of human wellbeing, yet 
markets do not always work well. Firms maintain specialist capabilities for sup-
plying market goods and services that enhance wellbeing; yet firms also offer a 
large number of jobs paying less than the real living wage. Growth in economic 
capital has increased material living standards for billions of people; yet recent 
economic development is also associated with cumulative environmental dam-
age, episodes of financial instability and greater concentration of wealth.
Chapter 3 concluded with the question: How can it be culturally acceptable 
for such high levels of parental inequality, intimate violence, poor housing and 
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child poverty to be allowed to persist? This chapter has highlighted a key causal 
mechanism of these outcomes. More than one in seven employed persons aged 
between 30 and 59 are in employment that does not pay a living wage suffi-
cient to support family life, with a strong gender bias. This must limit capa-
bilities for wellbeing. It is a glaring example of how economic policies that do 
not pay attention to how the economy is growing (in this case, through the 
creation of large numbers of low-wage jobs) can harm personal and social 
wellbeing.
The book now turns to how local and central governments can contribute to 
enhanced wellbeing.
Notes
1. Specialisation may also contribute to workers’ experience of powerlessness, mean-
inglessness, normlessness, isolation and self-estrangement, expressed in the concept 
of “alienation” (Seeman 1959; Neal and Rettig 1963).
2. See Teece (2017a, b) for recent overviews. Kay (1993) also emphasises the impor-
tance of a firm’s distinctive capabilities, especially its architecture, reputation, inno-
vation and strategic assets.
3. There are also social enterprises operating in the market economy with explicit 
commitments to social purposes (Besley and Ghatak 2017; Social Enterprise UK 
2017).
4. See Feather (1990), Clark and Oswald (1994), Winkelmann and Winkelmann 
(1998), Clark (2003), Dockery (2005), Winkelmann (2009, 2014), Grün et al. 
(2010), Knabe et al. (2010), Brown et al. (2012), Gielen and van Ours (2014), 
Helliwell and Huang (2014), Hetschko et al. (2014), Wulfgramm (2014) and De 
Neve and Ward (2017).
5. Oswald et al. (2015) provide experimental evidence of a possible connection in the 
reverse direction, suggesting worker happiness might contribute to labour 
productivity.
6. This is gross fixed capital formation, excluding investment in intellectual property 
products and in cultivated assets, taken from ONS (2017a). Intellectual property 
products are part of knowledge capital, and cultivated assets (livestock for breed-
ing) are part of natural capital; see ONS (2017b).
7. Piketty’s empirical findings are generally accepted by economists, but not his theo-
retical explanation; see, for example, Summers (2014), Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2015), Auerbach and Hassett (2015), Blume and Durlauf (2015), Krusell and 
Smith (2015) and Mankiw (2015). Piketty (2015) addresses some of these 
criticisms.
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Local Government and Natural Capital
Abstract This chapter marks a significant change in the book’s narrative, as the 
analysis moves from private citizens to the public sphere. Its starting point is that 
good government can develop distinctive capabilities to ensure that certain types 
of goods and services, especially those involving externalities and economic pub-
lic goods, are provided for persons to use to enhance wellbeing. For some poli-
cies, particularly where local residents can improve outcomes by participating in 
policy design or implementation, local government can do this better than cen-
tral government. In this context, the chapter explains Ostrom’s theory of co-
production of local government services and applies it to regional economic 
development. The chapter also discusses natural capital. Since ecosystem services 
provided by the natural environment can be diminished by human activity, 
investment in natural capital is required to maintain wellbeing.
Keywords Natural capital • Externalities • Economic public goods • 
Co-production • Regional economic development
Previous chapters have examined how private citizens can enhance wellbeing 
through personal time-use choices, through co-creating culturally valued lives 
within households and families, through collaboration in institutions of civil 
society, and through participation as producers and consumers in the market 
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economy. This chapter marks a significant change, as the analysis turns to activi-
ties in the public sphere, introducing terms such as public sector, public services, 
public works, public economics, public goods, public policy and the public 
interest.
Discussion of the public sphere touches on strongly contested debates about 
the role of government in promoting wellbeing. These debates reflect diverse 
perspectives between views that favour a more expansive public sector and 
views that advocate smaller government. The wellbeing economics framework 
does not address this question directly, but emphasises that the public sector 
offers distinctive opportunities for private citizens to expand their capabilities 
for enhanced wellbeing, beyond what they could achieve through voluntary 
associations and market transactions.
A founding contribution to this insight was made by Mancur Olson (1965). 
Recall from Chap. 4 that persons can enhance wellbeing by participating in 
institutions of civil society to collaborate with others in the pursuit of common 
interests and shared values. Olson’s analysis supported that proposition, but also 
explained that voluntary organisations tend to be limited in what they can 
achieve. This is because the personal reward to any member offering additional 
effort to advance the group’s mission is reduced as the scale of its activities 
increases. Olsen therefore concluded, “the larger the group, the less it will fur-
ther its common interests” (idem, p. 36).
Turning to the market economy, Chap. 5 began by acknowledging two 
important types of goods and services not well supplied by market firms: trans-
actions involving externalities affecting people not directly involved, and items 
with the characteristics of an economic public good. Both examples are analysed 
in this chapter, demonstrating that market firms tend to supply too little or too 
much of an item with externalities (depending on whether the externalities cre-
ate additional benefits or cause harm) and tend to supply too little of an eco-
nomic public good (or perhaps none at all).
Thus, voluntary groups and market firms are unable to provide certain goods 
and services that enhance wellbeing. This creates room for local and central 
government to support greater wellbeing by ensuring these gaps are filled. As the 
following sections explain, this distinctive capability is due to the unique author-
ity of governments to collect taxes and to promulgate legally enforced 
regulations.
There is no guarantee, of course, that this capability will always be exercised 
well. Throughout history, there have been oppressive governments acting tyran-
nically to cause great harm to wellbeing (Locke 1690, Chap. 18). Even in well-
functioning democracies, just as markets can fail to provide optimal quantities 
P. Dalziel et al.
 111
of certain goods and services, so too can governments fail to deliver all they 
could to enhance wellbeing (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Wolf 1979, 1989; Le 
Grand 1991). These limitations are an important part of the discussion that fol-
lows, but Proposition 16 expresses the core idea that good government can make 
distinctive contributions to the promotion of wellbeing.
Proposition 16 Good government can develop distinctive capabilities for man-
aging the provision of certain types of goods and services, especially those with 
externalities or the characteristics of an economic public good.
This chapter focuses on local government (including the governance of large 
cities), leaving the analysis of central government to Chap. 7. It begins with two 
sections examining externalities and economic public goods. This lays founda-
tions for the chapter’s main section, which analyses the distinctive contribution 
of local government to promoting wellbeing. This draws on the research of 
Nobel laureate, Elinor Ostrom, who emphasised the importance of co-produc-
tion of services by local government and resident communities. It also draws on 
research exploring how local government can collaborate to strengthen place-
based capabilities for wellbeing through regional economic development 
(Sotarauta 2005; Barca 2009; OECD 2009a, b; Barca et al. 2012; Foray 2015; 
McCann and Ortega-Argilés 2015).
An important example of a public good is a locality’s natural environment. 
The wellbeing of residents in any given place is affected by items such as air and 
water quality, green spaces in liveable cities, facilities for outdoor recreation and 
the management of regional parks. The chapter’s fourth section therefore intro-
duces the next use of the capital metaphor in the wellbeing economics frame-
work—natural capital. The chapter finishes with a brief conclusion.
 Externalities
Consider a household that regularly hosts parties involving loud music into the 
early hours of the morning. The parties are presumably part of the kind of life 
valued by the household’s residents, and the partygoers are there by choice, free 
to leave if they find the hour too late or the music disagreeable. Thus, the direct 
participants in this activity—the hosts and their guests—can be presumed to 
value the experience, but the same may not be true for the neighbours. The noise 
may interfere with their own enjoyment of an evening at home, or it may inter-
rupt the sleep of children and adults.
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In the language of economics, activities like this create an externality by 
impacting on others not directly involved (Pigou 1932; Coase 1960; Baumol 
1972). The loud music example is a negative externality, since the impacts are 
harmful, but externalities can be positive. Consider a property developer who 
purchases a row of derelict warehouses and converts them into quality residen-
tial housing. The developer and the buyers of the new homes can be presumed 
to have greater wellbeing, but the development may improve the quality of life 
for others in the neighbourhood—a positive externality.
The presence of a market externality is not sufficient reason for government 
intervention. Coase (1960) pointed out that if property rights concerning the 
externality are clearly defined, then those affected can negotiate a market trans-
action to reach some mutually accepted solution, as long as the transaction costs 
of negotiating and enforcing the agreement are not too high. This is known as 
the Coase Theorem and is a further illustration of how private persons can use 
the market economy to advance wellbeing.
The caveat in the Coase Theorem is crucial. The market option is not feasible 
if the costs of negotiating and enforcing agreements are too high, which is likely 
to be the case when the number of persons involved is large. Thus, an externality 
involving many people is typically an example of market failure, meaning that 
the market economy cannot be relied upon to produce a Pareto efficient 
outcome.
Under these circumstances, local government might use statutory powers to 
improve outcomes. In the United Kingdom, for example, local councils are 
responsible for investigating complaints about excessive noise from 11 pm to 
7 am, and can impose fines or prosecute if the noise is not kept below fixed 
limits (DEFRA 2017). In the property development example, a council might 
fund a local development agency to negotiate incentives for developers to create 
neighbourhood regeneration projects that generate positive externalities.
 Economic Public Goods
A good or service is an economic public good if it has two characteristics 
(Samuelson 1954). First, using the good or service must not prevent other per-
sons from benefiting from the same item simultaneously. This is termed non-
rivalry in consumption. Second, if an economic public good is provided to any 
person, then it must not be possible to prevent others from enjoying its benefits; 
the good or service is said to be non-excludable.1
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A good example is street lighting installed by a local council to increase safety 
at night. One person using the street lighting does not prevent others from 
doing likewise at the same time (non-rivalry in consumption). When the lights 
are operating, it is not possible to prevent anyone in the streets from using them 
(non-excludable).
The first characteristic means that a small financial sacrifice by each person in 
a community can produce large wellbeing benefits for all residents. Consider a 
city with a population of 400,000 adults. If each adult agrees to contribute £20 a 
year for street lighting, the result is £8 million available to fund an annual service 
whose benefits can be enjoyed by all, because the street lighting is non-rival in 
consumption. Thus, each resident can access services costing £8 million to oper-
ate, while paying only £20.
However, because the services are non-excludable, economic public goods are 
unlikely to be funded by voluntary collaboration, at least not beyond a small 
scale. Suppose a resident is asked to volunteer £20 for the street lighting. The 
person might decline, judging that an extra £20 for operating an £8 million 
system would not be as beneficial as an extra £20 of personal spending. Other 
residents might reason in the same way and so the lighting project would be 
underfunded. A market firm trying to sell the service to individual residents 
would face the same issue.
This is the free-rider problem: “Not all people can be expected to contrib-
ute voluntarily to a good cause, and any voluntary system is likely to produce 
too little of the public good” (Dawes and Thaler 1988, p. 196).2 It provides 
a rationale for government, which can resolve the problem by its authority to 
collect compulsory taxes and rates. As the street lighting example illustrates, 
economic public goods have the potential to deliver large benefits to resi-
dents in return for a relatively small tax levied on each property owner or 
income-earner.
This reasoning does not require a local government to collect its own reve-
nue. In England, for example, Parishes and Charter Trustees charge a precept 
collected on their behalf by larger billing authorities (DCLG 2017, pp. 4–5). 
Also, local authorities receive funds through central government. Some funds 
are from general taxation (including grants tied to specific purposes such as 
education or policing) and some are from the rates on non-domestic proper-
ties (also known as business rates) that are collected and distributed according 
to rules set by central government.
Figure 6.1 shows the transfers from central to local government in England 
from 1997–1998 to 2016–2017. The data are measured using 2016–2017 prices 
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to remove the impact of inflation, and are shown in per capita terms to account for 
increased demand on services due to population growth. Comparisons between 
years must still be made cautiously because policy changes can affect the need for 
local government finance (such as the increase in academy schools, which are 
funded by central rather than local government). Nevertheless, three distinctive 
periods are clear in the graph.
First, per capita transfers grew strongly between 1997–1998 and 2003–2004, 
from just under £1100 to nearly £1500, as central government sought to 
address longstanding problems of social exclusion in some parts of the United 
Kingdom. Second, transfers then rose at a slower rate, peaking at £1658 per 
person in 2009–2010. Third, as part of the central government’s austerity mea-
sures after the Global Financial Crisis, a sharp fall resulted in per capita trans-
fers reducing to £1186 in 2016–2017. This was 28.5 per cent lower than in 
2009–2010.
The scale of these cuts has put pressure on the ability of local governments 
to fund public goods and services for residents (Kennett et al. 2015, p. 640; 
Hastings et al. 2015). Further, this burden has not been distributed evenly; 
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instead, there was a marked association with  deprivation: “Between 2010/11 
and 2013/14, authorities in the least deprived quintile lost 16% of their 
spending power compared with 21% for those in the most deprived three 
quintiles” (Bailey et al. 2015, pp. 574–575; see also Keep and Berman 2013, 
p. 10; Meegan et al. 2014, pp. 141–142).
The changes were designed to support the government’s prioritisation of 
economic growth, discussed in Chap. 1. This can be illustrated with the policy 
change for non-domestic rates collected from businesses. These were previ-
ously distributed to local governments using a formula based on each author-
ity’s relative needs and ability to raise income locally (Keep and Berman 2011, 
pp. 5–8). The Local Government Finance Act 2012 introduced a new scheme, 
under which each local authority receives a greater or lesser share depending 
on whether the real value of its local business rates is increasing or falling 
(Keep and Berman 2013, section 6).
The new scheme aims to stimulate economic growth by creating incentives 
for an authority to support local economic development, since the authority 
now retains a share of any increase in local business rates (idem, p. 31). At the 
same time, however, the scheme creates greater financial risks for local authori-
ties (National Audit Office 2013, par. 3.17). Further, some local authorities face 
higher risks than others, because they have fewer opportunities for fostering 
local economic growth.
Paul Krugman, for example, introduced the theory of agglomeration econom-
ics to show how modern technologies can result in situations where “manufac-
tures production will tend to concentrate where there is a large market, but the 
market will be large where manufactures production is concentrated” (Krugman 
1991, p. 486).3 This means that patterns of strong economic growth in large 
cities, accompanied by relative deprivation in other regions, tend to persist 
(McCann 2008).
Several authors have argued that the financial cutbacks imposed on local gov-
ernments are part of “the great risk shift” in recent years from social security to 
individual responsibility.4 Hastings et al. (2015, p. 618), for example, place the 
cuts within a wider objective for local government “to behave more entrepre-
neurially; to take on more responsibility for economic growth and the distribu-
tion of benefits; and to take on new risks in relation both to the demands placed 
on services such as social care and for balancing budgets”. They conclude that 
England’s local government “will have to change to a very substantial extent” 
(ibid), which provides a context for the following analysis on distinctive contri-
butions local government can make to wellbeing.
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 Local Government, Co-production and Capabilities
As noted earlier, there is no guarantee that local and national governments will 
always promote wellbeing effectively, even in well-functioning democracies. As 
Downs (1957, p. 149) was one of the first to analyse, “apathy among citizens 
towards elections, ignorance of the issues, the tendency of parties in a two-party 
system to resemble each other, and the anti-consumer bias of government action 
can all be explained logically as efficient reactions to imperfect information in a 
large democracy”.
Buchanan and Tullock (1962) have proposed constitutional democracy as a 
system for mitigating some of these tendencies by allowing majority decision-
making for ordinary issues of the day, while requiring all decisions to satisfy rules 
that have been codified in a higher-level document that is hard to change. For 
local government, this system is achieved through State legislation defining its 
duties and powers. In England, for example, Section 2 of the Local Government 
Act 2000 used language for this purpose that resonates with major themes of 
this book:
Every local authority are to have power to do anything which they consider is likely 
to achieve any one or more of the following objects—
 (a) the promotion or improvement of the economic well-being of their area,
 (b) the promotion or improvement of the social well-being of their area, and
 (c) the promotion or improvement of the environmental well-being of their area.
Authorities made limited use of that wellbeing power, however, tending to 
rely on other powers that were more specific and so less open to legal challenge 
(DCLG 2008a, b). The Localism Act 2011 therefore replaced the wellbeing 
power with a general power of competence: “A local authority has power to do 
anything that individuals generally may do.” This phrase gives local authorities 
scope for a wide range of initiatives on behalf of communities (Sandford 2016), 
but obscures the key idea in Proposition 16 that governments have distinctive 
capabilities for contributing to enhanced wellbeing, beyond “anything that indi-
viduals generally may do”.
There remains the question of the division of responsibility between local and 
central governments. The principle of subsidiarity holds that “decisions should 
be made at the lowest possible spatial scale – being closest to the people affected” 
(Wills 2016, p. 11). This principle helps guide the allocation of responsibilities 
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at different levels of government, as enshrined, for example, in the Treaty on 
European Union, signed at Maastricht on 7 February 1992 (Article 5, Clause 3):
Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive 
competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the pro-
posed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central 
level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of 
the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.
The policy of having decision-making closest to the people affected is termed 
localism. It has a long history in the United Kingdom (Lyons 2007, pp. 45–49; 
Wilson and Game 2011; Wills 2016). An implication is that if a public initiative 
can be greatly improved by local residents actively participating in its design or 
implementation, then this is a  reason for the initiative to be overseen by local 
rather than central government (Lyons 2007, par. 2.8).
This insight was explored in the research of Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom 
(1990, 2005, 2010), who demonstrated how co-production of public services by 
local residents and local government officials, respecting different levels and nodes 
of decision-making in local communities, can result in positive outcomes for well-
being. A good summary is the following statement (Ostrom 1996, p. 1073):
By coproduction, I mean the process through which inputs used to produce a good 
or service are contributed by individuals who are not “in” the same organization. 
… All public goods and services are potentially produced by the regular producer 
and by those who are frequently referred to as the client. The term “client” is a pas-
sive term. Clients are acted upon. Coproduction implies that citizens can play an 
active role in producing public goods and services of consequence to them.
Note that Ostrom placed persons at the centre of their own lives in a way that 
resonates strongly with Sen’s capabilities approach (Tully 2013). Indeed, her 
Nobel Prize lecture criticised policies imposed on communities as if “the 
momentum for change must come from outside the situation rather than from 
the self-reflection and creativity of those within a situation to restructure their 
own patterns of interaction” (Ostrom 2010, p. 648).
An important application is place-based regional economic development. 
Barca et  al. (2012, p. 149) observe: “The place-based argument suggests that 
development strategies should thus focus on mechanisms which build on local 
capabilities and promote innovative ideas through the interaction of local and 
general knowledge and of endogenous and exogenous actors in the design and 
 Local Government and Natural Capital 
118 
delivery of public policies”. This accepts the importance of insiders and outsiders 
interacting in policy design and delivery, and emphasises local capabilities (see 
also Barca 2009; OECD 2009a, b).
Recall that the previous chapter explained how market firms combine differ-
ent types of capital to maintain specialist capabilities for supplying goods and 
services (Proposition 14). Similarly, although at a higher level of generality, 
regions can develop capabilities for wellbeing as a result of integrated investment 
in the seven capitals analysed in this book.5 This observation is expressed in 
Proposition 17.
Proposition 17 Local government, sharing leadership with other actors in their 
communities, can develop and sustain regional capabilities for wellbeing through 
integrated investment in different types of capital.
Thus, public sector investments in large-scale physical capital projects typi-
cally involve regional infrastructure strategies (see, e.g., Solé-Ollé et al. 2012). 
Similarly, regional skills ecosystems aim to connect human capital investment 
with demands for labour skills by local industries (Finegold 1999; Hall and 
Lansbury 2006; Buchanan and Jakubauskas 2010; Dalziel 2015, 2017). Further, 
regional innovation systems are designed to support the expansion and utilisa-
tion of knowledge capital to strengthen regional competitive advantage (Cooke 
1992; de la Mothe and Paquet 1998; Asheim and Gertler 2005; Corrocher and 
Cusmano 2014).
Recent scholarship recognises the value of integrating these types of strate-
gies. Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose (2012), for example, found that isolated 
investments by the European Union in transport infrastructure projects had 
shown little evidence of improved regional growth. They therefore concluded 
that transport infrastructure should be linked to “more integrated and inclusive 
development policies based on human capital and innovation” (idem, p. 508). 
This echoes similar recommendations by the OECD (2009a, pp. 17–18).
Strategies for investment in other types of capital can also be beneficial. 
Considering social capital, Malecki (2012, p. 1028) cites Rutten and Boekema 
(2007) to suggest that “regional social capital is what transforms technology into 
regional economic development through regional innovation networks”. Warner 
(1999, 2001) explains how local government can foster social capital, but con-
cludes both papers with the  observation that deeper structural issues—economic 
and political, as well as social issues—impact on local wellbeing, so that a focus 
on social capital development is only one aspect of a broader transformation 
required in local government institutions.
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Similarly, investment in cultural capital is important for place-shaping, defined 
as “the creative use of powers and influence to promote the general well-being of 
a community and its citizens” (Lyons 2007, par. 2.43). This includes local gov-
ernment initiatives that support creative lives and the vibrancy of creative 
endeavours (Florida 2002, p.  232).6 Local governments pay attention to the 
ongoing renewal of heritage in public spaces (Graham 2002; Carmona 2014), as 
well as creating spaces for communities to engage with each other through pro-
grammes such as intercultural cities (Wood and Landry 2008; Cantle 2012; 
Zapata- Barrero 2015; ICC 2016).
A strong theme in regional policy is the importance of connections beyond a 
region, including with other regions, with central government and with the 
global market economy (Harrison 2013; McCann 2016, pp. 10–13). An impor-
tant driver of European Union cohesion policy, for example, is the smart spe-
cialisation concept (Foray 2006; Foray et al. 2009; OECD 2013; Foray 2015; 
McCann and Ortega-Argilés 2015). This concept proposes that regions can be 
helped to identify areas of research and development where they have strengths 
and opportunities based on their existing capabilities and connections to the 
global market economy. Chap. 8 of this book will discuss connections of this 
nature under the heading of diplomatic capital.
Finally, all local governments operate in particular places with specific envi-
ronmental characteristics requiring management. The following section 
addresses this important feature under the heading of natural capital.
 Natural Capital
The term natural capital is widely used (Schumacher 1973, p. 2; Jansson et al. 
1994; Helm 2015), but not always accepted. The metaphor of “capital” is associ-
ated with four key elements of an item:
 1. The item is an asset, which may be owned privately (e.g., human capital, 
embodied cultural capital and private physical capital) or collectively (e.g., 
material cultural capital, social capital and public physical capital).
 2. The item provides ongoing services that can be used by persons, organisa-
tions and communities to enhance wellbeing.
 3. The item has a tendency to deteriorate in quantity or quality over time.
 4. The stock of the item can grow through well-designed investment, which 
always has an opportunity cost.
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The natural environment clearly meets items 2, 3 and 4 in this list. Nature 
provides essential services for human wellbeing. These are sometimes called eco-
system services (Costanza et al. 1997; Boyd and Banzhaf 2007; Fisher et al. 2009), 
although there is disagreement about how their economic value should be calcu-
lated, if at all (Boehnert 2016, pp. 404–40). Human activity is having detrimen-
tal impacts on environmental quality. These impacts can be mitigated through 
costly investment.
The first item in the list is open to challenge. The suggestion that nature is an 
asset owned by humans seems to overlook that we humans are a subset of nature 
(Schumacher 1973, p. 2). Professor Brian Cox, Fellow of the Royal Society and 
recipient of the 2010 Kelvin Medal and Prize awarded by the Institute of Physics, 
has expressed this reality on a cosmic scale (Cox and Cohen 2011, p. 135):
When we look out into space, we are looking into our own origins, because we are 
truly children of the stars. Written into every atom and every molecule of our bod-
ies is the entire history of the Universe.
Hence, to treat nature as a type of capital can be “a procedure by which the 
higher is reduced to the level of the lower and the priceless is given a price” 
(Schumacher 1973, p. 46). Boehnert (2016, p. 404) similarly argues that there 
are deep philosophical objections to the idea that nature might be considered a 
subsystem of the economy.
The global ecological commons are the source of life and the basis for all activi-
ties—economic and noneconomic. Economics is a construct made possible by 
ecological processes. Ecological processes are simply too complex to be captured 
absolutely through financial valuation processes because they are the context of 
economics, not a subsystem of economics…
Some scholars therefore argue that nature has an intrinsic value, independent 
of the instrumental value to human wellbeing resulting from the provision of 
ecosystem services (Batavia and Nelson 2017; Piccolo 2017).
These points can be accepted while still retaining a place for the metaphor of 
natural capital. It would be folly to suggest that all nature, reaching out to the 
edges of the Universe, is encapsulated within this metaphor. Rather, the meta-
phor refers only to the interaction of nature with human activities, which is what 
makes nature subject to items 2, 3 and 4 in the above list. Since these items are 
profoundly important for the natural environment and for human wellbeing, 
natural capital should not be excluded from a wellbeing economics framework.
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This is well discussed by Dieter Helm (2015). Helm makes the point that 
natural damage from human activity is accelerating. This will continue, since 
current trends suggest that the global economy could multiply perhaps 16 times 
by the end of the century. Consequently, an unavoidable issue for economic 
policy is how much effort should be spent preserving and enhancing the environ-
ment: “Not much will be left on a business-as-usual basis, and current policies are 
utterly feeble when confronted with this scale of destruction coming down the 
track” (idem, p. 5). This is expressed in the final proposition for this chapter.
Proposition 18 Human activity can diminish ecosystem services provided by 
the natural environment, and so investment in natural capital is required to 
maintain and enhance wellbeing.
The question arises: Who owns this problem? This is the sense in which arrange-
ments must be made for the ownership of natural capital (the first key element 
of the capital metaphor listed above). It is not ownership in the sense of assign-
ing exclusive property rights, but ownership in the sense of exercising steward-
ship by managing investment in natural capital required to maintain and 
enhance its quality.
Who owns this problem depends on the scale of a particular investment deci-
sion. Issues such as climate change affect the whole global community; hence, it 
is the major focus of Chap. 8. At the local level, all communities have their own 
natural capital investment decisions to make. These are typically made through 
co-production with local government services to invest in amenities such as 
open spaces, community parks, the countryside, natural waterways, protected 
coastlines, green spaces in cities and good air quality.
 Conclusion
Local government has distinctive capabilities for improving wellbeing, primarily 
through its ability to address the free-rider problem in the provision of economic 
public goods and externalities in voluntary transactions. Local authorities pro-
vide a range of facilities and services that would otherwise be under-provided.
Best outcomes are achieved through co-production of public services by 
local residents and local government officials, respecting different levels and 
nodes of decision-making in local communities. An important application is 
that a local government, sharing leadership with other actors in their commu-
nities, can develop and sustain regional capabilities for wellbeing (including, 
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but not restricted to, regional economic development) through integrated 
investment in different types of capital. This includes investment in natural 
capital, since ecosystem services provided by the environment are being dimin-
ished by human activity.
Local governments are most effective where public decision-making needs to 
be close to the people affected. In other cases of public goods and services, a 
larger scale at the national level is more sensible. Chap. 7 therefore turns to the 
Nation State and wellbeing.
Notes
1. If an item is rival in consumption but is non-excludable, this gives rise to “The 
Tragedy of the Commons” (Hardin 1968). This possibility will be discussed in 
Chap. 8 as part of the analysis of climate change.
2. McMillan (1979) provides an overview of mechanisms proposed by economists for 
mitigating the free-rider problem.
3. This theory is the starting point for modern economic geography (Krugman 2008, 
p. 344). The feature that gives rise to this effect is termed increasing returns to scale, 
meaning that if all inputs into production double, then the volume of output 
increases by more than double.
4. The cutbacks in funding mean that local authorities are forced to reduce their ser-
vices, shifting risks to residents. See Meegan et  al. (2014); Bailey et  al. (2015), 
Hastings et  al. (2015), Kennett et  al. (2015) and Scott (2015). Hacker (2008) 
introduced the term in a US context.
5. Sotarauta (2005) used the theory of the dynamic capabilities of firms to discuss the 
development of a region’s leadership capabilities. Note that place-based policies are 
not universally supported. Two high-profile critiques were provided by Glaeser and 
Gottlieb (2008) and World Bank (2009).
6. An impact of austerity measures in the United Kingdom has been significant with-
drawals of local government subsidies from arts and culture activities (Hastings 
et al. 2015, p. 611).
References
Asheim, Bjørn T., and Meric S. Gertler. 2005. The Geography of Innovation: Regional 
Innovation Systems. In The Oxford Handbook of Innovation, ed. Jan Fagerberg and 
David C. Mowery, 291–317. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bailey, Nick, Glen Bramley, and Annette Hastings. 2015. Symposium Introduction: 
Local Responses to ‘Austerity’. Local Government Studies 41 (4): 571–581.
P. Dalziel et al.
 123
Barca, Fabrizio. 2009. An Agenda for a Reformed Cohesion Policy: A Place-Based Approach 
to Meeting European Union Challenges and Expectations. Independent report prepared 
for the Commissioner for Regional Policy, European Commission. http://ec.europa.
eu/regional_policy/archive/policy/future/barca_en.htm. Accessed 29 Dec 2017.
Barca, Fabrizio, Philip McCann, and Andrés Rodríguez-Pose. 2012. The Case for 
Regional Development Intervention: Place-based versus Place-neutral Approaches. 
Journal of Regional Science 52 (1): 134–152.
Batavia, Chelsea, and Michael Paul Nelson. 2017. For Goodness Sake! What is Intrinsic 
Value and Why Should We Care? Biological Conservation 209: 366–376.
Baumol, William J.  1972. On Taxation and the Control of Externalities. American 
Economic Review 62 (3): 307–322.
Boehnert, Joanna. 2016. The Green Economy: Reconceptualizing the Natural Commons 
as Natural Capital. Environmental Communication 10 (4): 395–417.
Boyd, James, and Spencer Banzhaf. 2007. What are Ecosystem Services? The Need for 
Standardized Environmental Accounting Units. Ecological Economics 63 (2–3): 
616–6126.
Buchanan, James, and Gordon Tullock. 1962. The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations 
of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Buchanan, John, and Michelle Jakubauskas. 2010. The Political Economy of Work and 
Skill in Australia: Insights from Recent Applied Research. In Beyond Skill: Institutions, 
Organisations and Human Capability, ed. Jane Bryson, 32–57. London: Palgrave 
Macmillan.
Cantle, Ted. 2012. Interculturalism: The New Era of Cohesion and Diversity. Houndmills: 
Palgrave Macmillan.
Carmona, Matthew. 2014. The Place-shaping Continuum: A Theory of Urban Design 
Process. Journal of Urban Design 19 (1): 2–36.
Coase, Ronald H. 1960. The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics 3 (1): 
1–44.
Cooke, Philip. 1992. Regional Innovation Systems: Competitive Regulation in the New 
Europe. Geoforum 23 (3): 365–382.
Corrocher, Nicoletta, and Lucia Cusmano. 2014. The ‘KIBS Engine’ of Regional 
Innovation Systems: Empirical Evidence from European Regions. Regional Studies 48 
(7): 1212–1226.
Costanza, Robert, Ralph d’Arge, Rudolf de Groot, Stephen Farberk, Monica Grasso, 
Bruce Hannon, Karin Limburg, Shahid Naeem, Robert V.  O’Neill, Jose Paruelo, 
Robert G. Raskin, Paul Sutton, and Marjan van den Belt. 1997. The Value of the 
World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital. Nature 387: 253–260.
Cox, Brian, and Andrew Cohen. 2011. Wonders of the Universe. Glasgow: Collins.
Crescenzi, Riccardo, and Andrés Rodríguez-Pose. 2012. Infrastructure and Regional 
Growth. Papers in Regional Science 91 (3): 487–513.
Dalziel, Paul. 2015. Regional Skill Ecosystems to Assist Young People Making Education 
Employment Linkages in Transition from School to Work. Local Economy 30 (1): 
53–66.
 Local Government and Natural Capital 
124 
———. 2017. Education and Qualifications as Skills. In The Oxford Handbook of Skills 
and Training, ed. John Buchanan, David Finegold, Ken Mayhew, and Chris Warhurst, 
143–160. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dawes, Robyn M., and Richard H. Thaler. 1988. Anomalies: Cooperation. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 2 (3): 187–197.
DCLG. 2008a. Evaluation of the Take-up and Use of the Well-Being Power: Research 
Summary. London: Department for Communities and Local Government.
———. 2008b. Practical Use of the Well-Being Power. London: Department for 
Communities and Local Government.
———. 2014. Local Government Financial Statistics England, No. 24 2014. London: 
Department for Communities and Local Government.
———. 2017. Local Government Financial Statistics England, No. 27 2017. London: 
Department for Communities and Local Government.
de la Mothe, John, and Gilles Paquet, eds. 1998. Local and Regional Systems of Innovation. 
New York: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
DEFRA. 2017. Noise Nuisances: How Councils Deal with Complaints Department for 
Environment, Food & Rural Affairs webpage accessed 30 December 2017 at https://
www.gov.uk/guidance/noise-nuisances-how-councils-deal-with-complaints.
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy. 
Journal of Political Economy 65 (2): 135–150.
Finegold, David. 1999. Creating Self-sustaining, High-skill Ecosystems. Oxford Review 
of Economic Policy 15 (1): 60–81.
Fisher, Brendan, R. Kerry Turner, and Paul Morling. 2009. Defining and Classifying 
Ecosystem Services for Decision Making. Ecological Economics 68 (3): 643–653.
Florida, Richard. 2002. The Rise of the Creative Class: And How It’s Transforming Work, 
Leisure, Community and Everyday Life. New York: Perseus Book Group.
Foray Dominique. 2006. Globalization of R&D: Linking Better the European Economy 
to “Foreign” Sources of Knowledge and Making EU a More Attractive Place for 
R&D Investment. Knowledge Economists Policy Brief No. 1. http://ec.europa.eu/
invest-in-research/monitoring/knowledge_en.htm. Accessed 10 Jan 2018.
———. 2015. Smart Specialisation: Opportunities and Challenges for Innovation Policy. 
London: Routledge.
Foray Dominique, Paul A. David and Bronwyn Hall. 2009. Smart Specialisation – The 
Concept. Knowledge Economists Policy Brief No. 9. http://ec.europa.eu/invest-in-
research/monitoring/knowledge_en.htm. Accessed 10 Jan 2018.
Glaeser, Edward L., and Joshua D.  Gottlieb. 2008. The Economics of Place- making 
Policies. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (1): 155–239.
Graham, Brian. 2002. Heritage as Knowledge: Capital or Culture? Urban Studies 39 
(5–6): 1003–1017.
Hacker, Jacob S. 2008. The Great Risk Shift: The New Economic Insecurity and the Decline 
of the American Dream. Revised and expanded edition. New York: Oxford University 
Press.
P. Dalziel et al.
 125
Hall, Richard, and Russell D. Lansbury. 2006. Skills in Australia: Towards Workforce 
Development and Sustainable Skill Ecosystems. Journal of Industrial Relations 48 (5): 
575–592.
Hardin, Garrett. 1968. The Tragedy of the Commons. Science 162 (3859): 1243–1248.
Harrison, John. 2013. Configuring the New ‘Regional World’: On being Caught 
between Territory and Networks. Regional Studies 47 (1): 55–74.
Hastings, Annette, Nick Bailey, Maria Gannon, Kirsten Besemer, and Glen Bramley. 
2015. Coping with the Cuts? The Management of the Worst Financial Settlement in 
Living Memory. Local Government Studies 41 (4): 601–621.
Helm, Dieter. 2015. Natural Capital: Valuing the Planet. New Haven/London: Yale 
University Press.
ICC. 2016. Intercultural Cities Annual Report 2016: Sharing Our Cities Sharing the 
Future. Council of Europe Intercultural Cities Programme. https://rm.coe.
int/16806c9674. Accessed 6 Oct 2017.
Jansson, AnnMari, Monica Hammer, Carl Folke, and Robert Costanza, eds. 1994. 
Investing in Natural Capital: The Ecological Economics Approach to Sustainability. 
Washington, DC: Island Press.
Keep, Matthew and Gavin Berman. 2011. The Local Government Finance Settlement 
2011–2013. Research Paper 11/16. London: House of Commons Library.
———. 2013. The Local Government Finance Settlement 2013/14 and 2014/15. 
Research Paper 13/10. London: House of Commons Library.
Kennett, Patricia, Gerwyn Jones, Richard Meegan, and Jaccqui Croft. 2015. Recession, 
Austerity and the ‘Great Risk Shift’: Local Government and Household Impacts and 
Responses in Bristol and Liverpool. Local Government Studies 41 (4): 622–644.
Krugman, Paul. 1991. Increasing Returns and Economic Geography. Journal of Political 
Economy 99 (3): 483–499.
———. 2008. The Increasing Returns Revolution in Trade and Geography. Nobel Prize 
speech, republished in Karl Grandin, Ed. The Nobel Prizes 2008. Stockholm: Nobel 
Foundation, 2009, pp. 335–348.
Le Grand, Julian. 1991. The Theory of Government Failure. British Journal of Political 
Science 21 (4): 423–442.
Locke, John. 1690. Two Treatises of Government, Book II. Available at www.gutenberg.
org/ebooks/7370.
Lyons, Sir Michael. 2007. Place-shaping: A Shared Ambition for the Future of Local 
Government. London: The Stationery Office.
Malecki, Edward J. 2012. Regional Social Capital: Why it Matters. Regional Studies 46 
(8): 1023–1039.
McCann, Philip. 2008. Globalization and Economic Geography: The World Is Curved, 
Not Flat. Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society 1 (3): 351–370.
———. 2016. The UK Regional-National Economic Problem: Geography, Globalisation 
and Governance. Abingdon: Routledge.
 Local Government and Natural Capital 
126 
McCann, Philip, and Raquel Ortega-Argilés. 2015. Smart Specialization, Regional 
Growth and Applications to European Union Cohesion Policy. Regional Studies 49 
(8): 1291–1302.
McMillan, John. 1979. The Free-Rider Problem: A Survey. Economic Record 55 (2): 95–107.
Meegan, Richard, Patricia Kennett, Gerwyn Jones, and Jacqui Croft. 2014. Global 
Economic Crisis, Austerity and Neoliberal Urban Governance in England. Cambridge 
Journal of Regions, Economy and Society 7 (1): 137–153.
National Audit Office. 2013. Financial Sustainability of Local Authorities. Report by the 
Comptroller and Auditor General, HC 888. London: The Stationery Office.
OECD. 2009a. How Regions Grow: Trends and Analysis. Paris: Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development.
———. 2009b. Regions Matter: Economic Recovery, Innovation and Sustainable Growth. 
Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.
———. 2013. Innovation-driven Growth in Regions: The Role of Smart Specialisation. 
Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.
Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of 
Groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective 
Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 1996. Crossing the Great Divide: Coproduction, Synergy, and Development. 
World Development 24 (6): 1073–1087.
———. 2005. Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press.
———. 2010. Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex 
Economic Systems. American Economic Review 100 (3): 641–672.
Piccolo, John J. 2017. Intrinsic Values in Nature: Objective Good or Simply Half of an 
Unhelpful Dichotomy? Journal for Nature Conservation 37: 8–11.
Pigou, Arthur Cecil. 1932. The Economics of Welfare. 4th ed. London: Macmillan.
Rutten, Roel, and Frans Boekama. 2007. Regional Social Capital: Embeddedness, 
Innovation Networks and Regional Economic Development. Technological Forecasting 
and Social Change 74 (9): 1834–1846.
Samuelson, Paul A. 1954. The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure. Review of Economics 
and Statistics 36 (4): 387–389.
Sandford, Mark. 2016. The General Power of Competence. Briefing Paper Number 
05687. London: House of Commons Library.
Schumacher, Ernst F. 1973. Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered. New York: 
Harper and Row.
Scott, Karen. 2015. Happiness on Your Doorstep: Disputing the Boundaries of Wellbeing 
and Localism. The Geographical Journal 181 (2): 129–137.
Solé-Ollé, Albert, Andreas Stephan, and Timo Valilä. 2012. Introduction: Productivity 
and Financing of Regional Transport Infrastructure. Papers in Regional Science 91 (3): 
481–485.
P. Dalziel et al.
 127
Sotarauta, Markku. 2005. Shared Leadership and Dynamic Capabilities in Regional 
Development. In Regionalism Contested: Institution, Society and Governance, ed. 
Iwona Sagan and Henrik Halkier, 53–72. Farnham: Ashgate.
Tully, James. 2013. Two Ways of Realizing Justice and Democracy: Linking Amartya Sen 
and Elinor Ostrom. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 16 
(2): 220–232.
Warner, Mildred. 1999. Social Capital Construction and the Role of the Local State. 
Rural Sociology 64 (3): 373–393.
———. 2001. Building Social Capital: The Role of Local Government. Journal of Socio-
Economics 30 (2): 187–192.
Wills, Jane. 2016. Locating Localism: Statecraft, Citizenship and Democracy. Bristol: 
Policy Press.
Wilson, David, and Chris Game. 2011. Local Government in the United Kingdom. 5th 
ed. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
Wolf, Charles, Jr. 1979. A Theory of Nonmarket Failure: Framework for Implementation 
Analysis. Journal of Law and Economics 22 (11): 107–139.
———. 1989. Markets or Governments: Choosing Between Imperfect Alternatives. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Wood, Phil, and Charles Landry. 2008. The Intercultural City: Planning for Diversity 
Advantage. London: Earthscan.
World Bank. 2009. Reshaping Economic Geography: Economic Development Report 2009. 
Washington, DC: World Bank.
Zapata-Barrero, Ricard. 2015. Interculturalism in Cities: Concept, Policy, and Implementation. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), 
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or 
format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, 
provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s 
Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If 
material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended 
use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need 
to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.
 Local Government and Natural Capital 
129© The Author(s) 2018
P. Dalziel et al., Wellbeing Economics, Wellbeing in Politics and Policy, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93194-4_7
7
The Nation State and Knowledge Capital
Abstract This chapter analyses how a Nation State can contribute to enhanced 
wellbeing. It begins with its responsibility to act on behalf of citizens as wise 
custodian of the market economy and welfare state within its borders. This 
requires central government to adopt an integrated and balanced approach to all 
its economic and welfare policies. The second half of the chapter focuses on the 
concept of knowledge capital as a driver of wellbeing. Knowledge creation can 
be an economic public good, which creates a distinctive opportunity for a well-
functioning state to contribute to expanded capabilities for wellbeing through 
policies that foster the growth and use of knowledge. Knowledge is essential to 
the operations of the Nation State, whose civil service can offer a specialist capa-
bility for creating, collating, synthesising, utilising and disseminating knowledge 
capital for the common good.
Keywords Knowledge capital • Public policy • Welfare state • Endogenous 
growth • Civil service
Readers may be surprised that this book has not turned to the Nation State, and 
hence to central government policy, until Chap. 7. The delay is due to the core 
presumption in wellbeing economics that persons are able to exercise initiative 
in promoting personal wellbeing and the wellbeing of others through individual 
effort, co-creation in households and families, collaboration in community 
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institutions, co-operation in the market economy and co-production of local 
government services. It has been important to analyse these diverse capabilities 
before analysing distinctive contributions of central government to enhanced 
wellbeing.
A useful introduction to this chapter’s major themes is the theory of the 
Nation State presented by Max Weber (1919) just after World War I. Weber 
argued that the defining characteristic of a State is its monopoly on the legiti-
mate use of physical force within a given territory, so that individuals or organ-
isations may exercise force only to the extent permitted by the State. As persons 
seek to lead valued lives, conflicts arise. Nevertheless, all should be able to pre-
sume that it is illegitimate for these conflicts to result in violence.1 Hence, the 
State accepts responsibility for maintaining law and order, and so provides trust-
worthy institutions for dispute resolution such as the armed forces, the police, 
the judiciary, the prisons and arbitration tribunals.
This theory of the Nation State is an application of Proposition 16: Good 
government can develop distinctive capabilities for managing the provision of 
certain types of goods and services, especially those with externalities or the 
characteristics of an economic public good. In this case, the economic public 
good being provided by the government is the maintenance of the rule of law 
(Heckman et al. 2010; Xu 2011).
Another application of Proposition 16 concerns the market economy. The 
previous chapter observed that markets need rules to work well. The London 
Stock Exchange, for example, maintains a Rulebook for the operation of that 
sophisticated market that runs to 98 pages (London Stock Exchange 2018). 
More generally, one of the key responsibilities of the Nation State is to define 
rules for the operation of markets under its jurisdiction.
A further application concerns the welfare state. Chapter 5 commented that 
it is reasonable for public policy to be designed so that all persons can access 
life-changing services such as housing, education and health independently of 
their household income. Public policy is also designed to provide a measure of 
social security to all citizens. The Nation State is responsible for designing and 
implementing these public policies. The chapter begins by considering these 
responsibilities, arguing that the Nation State acts as custodian of the market 
economy and the welfare state, taken together.
To fulfil its diverse roles, a well-functioning state must create, collate, syn-
thesise, utilise and disseminate considerable amounts of knowledge. Further, 
existing knowledge and the discovery of new knowledge can have the charac-
teristics of an economic public good. Central government therefore has a dis-
tinctive role in managing knowledge provision. Consequently, this chapter 
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discusses the contribution of knowledge capital in the wellbeing economics 
framework. It explains its importance in economic models of growth and how 
governments address the issues raised by its economic public good character-
istics. The chapter then ends with a discussion of the civil service’s specialist 
capability for working with knowledge for the common good, before a brief 
conclusion.
 Custodian of the Market Economy and Welfare 
State
For most of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the general disposition 
in public policy towards the wellbeing of citizens was based on “individualism 
and laissez-faire” (Keynes 1926, p. 272). This held that a Nation State might 
offer some limited remedies for addressing deserving cases of extreme poverty 
(the English Poor Laws, e.g.; see Boyer 1990), but otherwise outcomes were best 
left to individual enterprise and civil society operating within the market 
economy.
That disposition changed in the 1930s and 1940s. The Great Depression 
demonstrated that individual effort under laissez-faire policies is not always able 
to achieve reasonable standards of living, while World War II led to new under-
standings of how government action might enhance citizen wellbeing. 
International consensus in support of this change became sufficiently strong for 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly on 10 December 1948, to record social security as a 
universal right (Article 22):
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to 
realization, through national effort and international co- operation and in accor-
dance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social 
and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his 
personality.
In the United Kingdom, this transition from individualism and laissez- faire 
to what might be termed liberal collectivism (Cutler et al. 1986, Chap. 1) is 
evident in two landmark publications: Keynes (1936) and Beveridge (1942). 
The former was written in response to the Great Depression. Triggered by the 
New York stock market crash in August 1929, the Depression was transmitted 
to other countries as a result of substantial falls in world trade (Hamilton 
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1988; Eichengreen and Temin 2000). The volume of UK exports, for example, 
fell by more than a third between 1929 and 1931 (Maddison 1962, Table 25, 
p. 186).
The impact on the UK economy was not as severe as in the United States, but 
unemployment was already high in 1929 at 1.5 million, which was 7.3 per cent 
of the labour force. Unemployment peaked at 3.4 million in 1932, and remained 
above 1.8 million until 1937 (Middleton 2010, p. 417, citing Feinstein 1972). 
Of those unemployed in 1929, 10.7 per cent had been without a job for more 
than a year, but this figure had reached 27.1 per cent in 1937 (Crafts 1989, 
p. 247).
The laissez-faire policy response was to wait for wages to fall in order to restore 
full employment. Average annual earnings in the United Kingdom did indeed 
decline, by 8.7 per cent between 1929 and 1933 (Clark 2018). The retail price 
index, however, fell by a greater amount (14.4 per cent), so that the real wage 
rate (i.e., the real purchasing power of wages, defined as money wages divided by 
the price level) actually increased; see also Beenstock and Warburton (1986) and 
Hart (2001).
John Maynard Keynes wrote The General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money against that background (Skidelsky 1992). He developed two objections 
to the classical theory that high unemployment could always be addressed by 
lower wages. The first was that workers might reasonably resist a reduction in 
their individual wages, even if willing to accept a fall in real spending power 
imposed on all workers through an increase in consumer prices. That behav-
ioural assumption was of its time and place and need not detain us any further. 
Keynes described his second objection as more fundamental and the subject of 
his new theory (Keynes 1936, p. 13):
There may exist no expedient by which labour as a whole can reduce its real wage 
to a given figure by making revised money bargains with the entrepreneurs. We 
shall endeavour to show that primarily it is certain other forces which determine 
the general level of real wages. The attempt to elucidate this problem will be one of 
our main themes.
Keynes called his theory the principle of effective demand. Under certain 
circumstances, the level of employment becomes constrained by inadequate 
demand for the purchase of goods and services (Davidson 1998). During such a 
period, reduced money wages cannot achieve full employment, because lower 
wages do not stimulate demand.2 Individuals are powerless, but the Nation State 
can restore balance by managing effective demand. Keynes (1936, p. 380) rec-
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ognised such a responsibility meant enlarging the functions of central govern-
ment, which he defended as necessary to protect the market economy and to 
support individual initiative within its system.
The second landmark publication was commissioned during World War II 
from a committee of civil servants headed by Sir William Beveridge as the inde-
pendent chair (Abel-Smith 1992). Beveridge took for granted that the State had 
major responsibility for keeping unemployment to a minimum (Beveridge 
1942, par. 22 and par. 440). He drew on surveys that had been made of British 
poverty to argue that full employment is insufficient for the abolition of want in 
the community. Instead, a plan for social security was required with two ele-
ments: (1) “provision against interruption and loss of earning power”; and (2) 
“adjustment of incomes, in periods of earning as well as in interruption of earn-
ing, to family needs” (idem, par. 12 and par. 13).
Beveridge adopted the principle that “social security must be achieved by co-
operation between the State and the individual” and “should not stifle incentive, 
opportunity, responsibility” (idem, par. 9). In that partnership, the State’s specific 
contribution is to use its authority to collect compulsory levies so that a system of 
social insurance could be implemented. This expansion in the role of government 
was justified in Beveridge’s view by “the general tendency of public opinion” 
(idem, par. 26):
After a trial of a different principle, it has be found to accord best with the senti-
ments of the British people that in insurance organised by the community by use 
of compulsory powers each individual should stand on the same terms; none 
should claim to pay less because he is healthier or has more regular employment. 
In accord with that view, the proposals of the Report mark another step forward to 
the development of State insurance as a new type of human institution…
The Beveridge Report became a cornerstone of the British welfare state (Hill 
1993; Lowe 2004; Glennerster 2007; Fraser 2017, Chap. 9; Renwick 2017). The 
Education Act 1944 provided for free secondary education and set the school-
leaving age at 15. The Family Allowances Act 1945, the National Insurance Act 
1946 and the National Assistance Act 1948 created a comprehensive system of 
social security. The National Health Service Act 1946, with similar legislation for 
Scotland and Northern Ireland in 1947 and 1948, provided a system of medical 
care without user charges. The New Towns Act 1946 and the Town and Country 
Planning Act 1947 supported major post-war programmes of new housing.
It is beyond the scope of this book to trace further developments in the UK 
welfare state since the 1940s, or to discuss welfare policies in other countries.3 
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The key point is that it became generally accepted that wise management of the 
market economy and welfare state by central government has the potential to 
improve wellbeing beyond what individuals and civil society can achieve. This 
observation is expressed in the following proposition.
Proposition 19 The Nation State can contribute to expanded capabilities for 
wellbeing by acting on behalf of citizens as wise custodian of the market econ-
omy and welfare state within its borders.
There are intense debates in every country about what “wise custodian” might 
mean in this proposition, or even whether central government can perform such 
a role adequately. These debates can be an indicator of a democracy’s good 
health, since they address important questions about the kinds of lives that com-
munities have reason to value, reflecting different histories and aspirations in 
each country. Proposition 19 does not address those debates, but conveys a key 
idea in the wellbeing economics framework, which is that this function of gov-
ernment is a single role. The Nation State is custodian of the market economy 
and the welfare state, taken together.
This insistence on an integrated approach is necessary because the market 
economy and the welfare state are not isolated from each other. To illustrate, 
recall the strong tendency identified in Chap. 5 for resources in the market 
economy to flow towards high-wealth households. If housing, education and 
health services were provided on a laissez-faire basis within the market economy, 
then this tendency would result in low-wealth households having restricted 
access to these services. This would reduce capabilities for wellbeing. It would 
also restrict the ability of low-wealth households to invest in human capital, 
which would limit labour productivity and so damage economic performance. 
Policies of the welfare state seek to prevent this by aiming to making certain 
standards of housing, education and healthcare (determined by social expecta-
tions and budget constraints) available to the whole population.
Similarly, economic performance impacts on the wellbeing functions of the 
welfare state. Cutler et al. (1986, p. 18) point out, for example, that the Beveridge 
Report assumed that jobs would pay decent wages, so that a person in employ-
ment could be presumed capable of achieving a satisfactory standard of living. 
As discussed in Chap. 5, this presumption is untenable given that more than one 
in seven jobs in the UK pay below the voluntary living wage. The failure of the 
market economy to create decent jobs puts pressure on the housing, education, 
health and social security systems of the welfare state.
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Proposition 19 therefore requires a unified stance in public policies affecting 
the market economy and welfare state. In particular, it rejects the view, already 
criticised in Chap. 1, that “growth is the essential foundation of all our aspira-
tions” (Cameron 2010, par. 4). Instead, an integrated and balanced approach is 
required across all policy areas.
 Knowledge Capital
It has long been recognised that a Nation State must adopt a sophisticated 
approach to how it obtains and uses knowledge. Consider the Haldane 
Report, for example, which was commissioned as a guide for reform of the 
civil service after World War I. It identified four main principles for reform, 
the first of which emphasised knowledge (Ministry of Reconstruction 1918, 
par. 56):
Further provision is needed in the sphere of civil government for the continuous 
acquisition of knowledge and the prosecution of research, in order to furnish a 
proper basis for policy.
In the private sector, knowledge is recognised as a fundamental factor driving 
growth in material living standards. Recall that Solow’s (1956) neoclassical 
growth model explains how growth in a country’s average standard of living 
depends on technological progress. The contributions to technological progress 
were not explored, which was a weakness. Paul Romer (1986, 1990) therefore 
initiated a research programme to fill the gap. He accepted Solow’s insights that 
the best measure of technological progress is labour productivity (i.e., the aver-
age value of output produced per hour of work) and that this depends on the 
stock of physical capital. He then added the idea that labour productivity also 
depends on the stock of knowledge, which increases through the dedicated activi-
ties of specialist workers engaged in research and development.
Romer’s insight created endogenous growth theory, so-called because it 
explains  technological progress within the model (Romer 1994; Aghion and 
Howitt 1998). The theory analyses a trade-off, since workers engaged in research 
and development are not available for other production. Thus, the creation of 
new knowledge has an opportunity cost in the form of foregone benefits that 
could have been realised from shifting the knowledge workers to the production 
of other goods and services. Balancing the costs and benefits of this trade-off 
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allows the model to analyse an economy’s equilibrium rate of technological 
progress, which determines its rate of economic growth.
Romer assumed that new knowledge created at any time is proportional to 
the amount of existing knowledge, depending on how many workers are engaged 
in research and development (see also Aghion and Howitt 1992). This produced 
the result that economic growth is higher with more knowledge workers, but 
Jones (1995a, 1995b) pointed out that this result is incompatible with experi-
ence. Large increases in the number of researchers over decades have not resulted 
in anything like comparable increases in economic growth rates. Consequently, 
as Ang and Madsen (2011, p. 1360) observe:
Following Jones’s (1995b) critique of the predictions of the first-generation endog-
enous growth models of Romer (1990) and Aghion and Howitt (1992), a positive 
relationship between the levels of R&D and productivity growth is generally no 
longer accepted as an empirical regularity in the growth literature.
Jones (1995a) suggested instead that the theory should recognise that research 
involves some wasted effort. He assumed that researchers find it increasingly 
hard to create new knowledge (implying more and more wasted effort) as the 
stock of knowledge expands. This assumption reproduced many features of the 
neoclassical growth model. Neither efforts to reduce wasted research or policies 
to increase the number of research workers could increase a country’s rate of 
economic growth (Jones and Vollrath 2013, p. 106).
A second generation of endogenous growth theory was then introduced by 
scholars such as Young (1998), Howitt (1999), Ha and Howitt (2007) and Ang 
and Madsen (2011). They agreed there is some wasted effort in creating knowl-
edge, but did not accept that this waste increases as knowledge expands. Instead, 
the new model assumed that the effectiveness of research effort diminishes with 
scale, since the effort must be spread over a greater variety of products. This 
restored Romer’s hypothesis that knowledge increases in proportion to its cur-
rent level, but the relationship now depended on the proportion of the labour 
force (not the absolute number) devoted to the task of research and 
development.
In all these models, knowledge acts as a capital stock that enhances labour 
productivity in providing market goods and services.4 Unlike physical or natural 
capital, however, knowledge capital does not depend on material resources. It 
can also have the characteristics of an economic public good (World Bank 1998, 
pp. 131–133; Stiglitz 1999), which gives rise to important implications for 
wellbeing.
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 Knowledge as an Economic Public Good
Consider two passenger flights crossing the Atlantic at the same hour. The flights 
require two planes, each of which represents a separate investment in physical 
capital. They also require separate flight crews, each with skilled human capital 
acquired through training and experience. In contrast, the two flights use the 
same knowledge capital. Both planes were designed using the same laws of aero-
dynamics, and the actions of pilots and cabin crew in both planes are guided by 
the same knowledge about flight safety.
Economists have long studied how advancing knowledge is embedded in 
physical capital (Solow 1962) and how access to global knowledge depends on 
human capital (Nelson and Phelps 1966). A feature of  knowledge capital is that 
the same knowledge can be incorporated into any number of items of physical 
capital, and can be used simultaneously by any number of persons with the 
necessary human capital. In the language of economics, knowledge is non-rival 
in consumption (Stiglitz 1999).
This property means that the discovery and use of knowledge can be hugely 
beneficial to wellbeing. Discoveries can be used simultaneously by millions, even 
billions, of people to enhance wellbeing. “In short, knowledge gives people 
greater control over their destinies” (World Bank 1998, p.  2). Nor are there 
physical limits on the accumulation of a non-rival, non-material good like 
knowledge (Romer 1990, p. S74).
Further, production systems that use knowledge capital as an input exhibit 
the property of increasing returns to scale (Romer 1990, pp. S75–S76). This 
means that if all inputs into the production system double, including non-rival 
knowledge, then the level of output more than doubles. This is the property that 
gives rise to the result in endogenous growth theory that a higher rate of knowl-
edge creation can lead to a higher rate of economic growth.
These observations offer a potential path for addressing the crucial question 
of how it might be feasible for humanity to raise the wellbeing of people in pov-
erty across the globe, while respecting the planet’s absolute limits to material 
consumption. Conceptually, this might be achieved, at least in part, by techno-
logical progress that substitutes (immaterial) knowledge capital for (material) 
physical and natural capital in economic production systems. If this path is to be 
followed, however, there is a critical problem to be addressed.
Once new knowledge is put to use, it is often impossible to prevent others 
from putting the same idea into practice for themselves. There are exceptions. A 
firm may be able to keep new knowledge secret until market dominance has 
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been achieved. A new technology might require such large physical capital 
investment, or such specialist human capital, that only a few firms can take 
advantage of the discovery. Nevertheless,  without public policies to address this 
issue, new knowledge often has the second characteristic of an economic public 
good—it is non-excludable.5
This characteristic severely weakens the incentive for efforts to discover new 
knowledge. A firm might spend large sums to undertake original research. It 
might then devote more human and financial resources to develop a discovery 
into a commercial product. These investments would not be recouped, however, 
if other firms are able simply to copy the idea without incurring the same 
research and development costs.
Consequently, investment in creating new knowledge may be valuable for 
wellbeing, but impossible for market firms to finance. This creates a distinctive 
opportunity for good government to contribute to wellbeing by addressing this 
conundrum, as recorded in Proposition 20.
Proposition 20 Knowledge capital has the properties of an economic public 
good, so that Nation States can contribute to enhanced wellbeing by fostering 
the growth and use of knowledge.
A straightforward example is to create laws that protect intellectual property 
through copyright, patents and other legal instruments (World Bank 1998, pp. 
16–17). These laws typically require details of a discovery to be placed on public 
record in return for the right to exclude others from using the new knowledge 
for a fixed period of time. The length of the exclusion period aims to balance the 
incentive benefits of rewarding successful efforts to create new knowledge with 
the wellbeing benefits of discoveries being made widely available.
To be effective, domestic laws must be reinforced by international agreements 
for the protection of intellectual property, taking into account different capabili-
ties of developed and developing countries (Schneider 2005). The ability to 
make such agreements is an example of what this book terms diplomatic capital, 
which will be discussed in the following chapter.
Another example of Proposition 20 is the smart specialisation concept for 
regional development, mentioned in the previous chapter (Foray 2006, 
2015, Foray et al. 2009; OECD 2013; McCann and Ortega- Argilés 2015). 
Creation of new knowledge is a global enterprise (Stiglitz 1999). Hence, it is 
sensible for regions to focus their research and development efforts on niches 
in the global innovation system where they have particular strengths and 
opportunities. Central government can assist by funding the design of generic 
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institutional processes and analytical tools for regions to use for determining 
their own capabilities for smart specialisation.
 The Civil Service, Knowledge and Capabilities
The public sector is a significant part of a national economy. In September 2017, 
there were 5.5 million people employed in the UK public sector, which repre-
sented 17.1 per cent of all employed people in the country (ONS 2017). Figure 
Fig. 7.1 shows how the distribution of this employment by industry, with the 
three largest concentrations being in the National Health Service, in education 
and in public administration.
The civil service is a small but important subset of the public sector. It has 
been significantly reduced in the United Kingdom; see Fig. Fig. 7.2. At the 
beginning of the global financial crisis in September 2007, the seasonally 
adjusted full-time equivalent number in the civil service was 495,000. This 
number was reduced to its lowest level since World War II by the end of 2011 
(HM Government 2012b, p. 9). In September 2017, it had been further reduced 
to 392,000, which was 20.8 per cent lower than a decade earlier.
The civil service offers a specialist service within the public sector (NAO 2017). 
Its primary responsibility is to help the government of the day, which it has been 
doing on a professional basis in the United Kingdom since the middle of the 
nineteenth century (Northcote and Trevelyan 1854, p. 3):
It may safely be asserted that, as matters now stand, the Government of the coun-
try could not be carried on without the aid of an efficient body of permanent 
officers, occupying a position duly subordinate to that of the Ministers who are 
directly responsible to the Crown and to Parliament, yet possessing sufficient inde-
pendence, character, ability, and experience to be able to advise, assist, and, to some 
extent, influence, those who are from time to time set over them.
Organised into departments, agencies and non-departmental government 
bodies, the civil service has three specific roles: operational delivery, advising on 
policy and supporting Ministers, and implementing programmes and projects 
(HM Government 2012a, pp. 8–9). The first is the largest duty; more than 70 
per cent of all civil servants are employed in the delivery departments and their 
agencies of Work and Pensions, HM Revenue and Customs, Justice, Defence 
and the Home Office (ONS 2017, Table 9).
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The distinctive contribution of the civil service is its capability for working 
with knowledge as a public service on behalf of the Nation State. This is reflected 
in the final proposition of this chapter.
Proposition 21 The civil service can offer a specialist capability for creating, 
collating, synthesising, utilising and disseminating knowledge capital for the 
common good.
Undertaking knowledge work for the public good requires certain values to 
be observed. The Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 therefore 
requires civil servants to carry out their duties with  integrity and honesty, and 
with objectivity and impartiality, which are defined in the Civil Service Code:6
• “integrity” is putting the obligations of public service above your own per-
sonal interests
• “honesty” is being truthful and open
• “objectivity” is basing your advice and decisions on rigorous analysis of the 
evidence
• “impartiality” is acting solely according to the merits of the case and serving 
equally well governments of different political persuasions
As the Code observes, these core values support good government. They are 
essential if citizens are to trust knowledge work undertaken by civil servants for 
the common good. The importance of this feature of good government has led 
to recent recommendations that public sector departments and agencies should 
adopt transparent practices so that people outside government can understand 
how evidence is used in policy decision, implementation and evaluation (Rutter 
and Gold 2015; Brown 2016).
 Conclusion
This chapter has focussed on the Nation State, beginning with its contribution 
to expanded capabilities by acting as wise custodian of the market economy and 
welfare state within its borders. This requires an integrated and balanced 
approach to all economic and welfare policies. Policy cannot be satisfied with 
promoting economic growth for its own sake; it must pay attention to how the 
economy is growing and the impacts this is having on the wellbeing of different 
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parts of the national population. In particular, how is policy contributing to 
expanding the capabilities of persons to lead the kinds of lives they value, and 
have reason to value?
The second half of the chapter has been structured around the concept of 
knowledge capital. Discovery of new knowledge has long been recognised as a 
fundamental driver of economic and social wellbeing. Further, because existing 
knowledge does not depend on material resources and is non-rival in consump-
tion, knowledge accumulation has great potential for contributing to enhanced 
wellbeing while respecting the material limits of the planet.
Knowledge, however, is often non-excludable, so that knowledge creation is 
an economic public good. This creates a distinctive opportunity for Nation 
States to contribute to enhanced wellbeing through policies that foster the 
growth and use of knowledge. At the same time, knowledge is essential to the 
operations of the Nation State, whose civil service can offer a specialist capability 
for creating, collating, synthesising, utilising and disseminating knowledge capi-
tal for the common good.
Some critical problems facing humanity clearly require actions that go beyond 
state borders. Pressing examples include persistent poverty in some of the world’s 
regions and global climate change. Chap. 8 therefore analyses ways in which the 
global community can work together to enhance wellbeing on an international 
scale.
Notes
1. As Chap. 4 observed, one of the horrors of institutional racism is that some citizens 
are unable to make this presumption because of the colour of their skin (Coates 
2015; Eddo-Lodge 2017).
2. See Dalziel and Lavoie (2003) for a presentation of this theory in a labour market 
diagram. Note that Keynes does not imply that unemployment is always caused by 
inadequate demand; the classical theory has a place in explaining some episodes of 
high unemployment (Dalziel 1993). Boyer (2012) and Krugman (2012) are exam-
ples of analyses that drew on the theory of effective demand to critique the austerity 
policies implemented after the global financial crisis.
3. Pedersen (2018) observes that the welfare state was neither a British invention nor 
a British product.
4. Early uses of the phrase knowledge capital were by Griliches (1979) and Nelson 
(1982).
5. Recognising the exceptions, as well as the practice of creating legal mechanisms to 
make some forms of new knowledge a proprietary asset, economists observe that 
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knowledge is not necessarily a strict economic public good. Examples of alternative 
phrases to describe knowledge include “a partially excludable good” (Romer 1990, 
section II), having “spillover benefits” (World Bank 1998, p. 130) or “an impure 
public good” (Stiglitz 1999, p. 310). This does not affect this section’s argument.
6. Accessed 23 January 2018 at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/civil-ser-
vice-code/the-civil-service-code.
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The Global Community and Diplomatic 
Capital
Abstract This chapter examines how persons can collaborate for the common 
good of the global community through participation in international non-gov-
ernmental organisations, multinational corporations and intergovernmental 
organisations. It also explains the collaboration of researchers globally to develop 
knowledge by following well-established norms and protocols to build an inter-
connected corpus of publications that offer evidence for falsifiable propositions. 
An example of researchers contributing to global efforts for wellbeing is the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. The chapter introduces the meta-
phor of diplomatic capital to represent institutions and norms designed to foster 
cross-cultural collaborations in order to strengthen capabilities of the global 
community to act together for the common good.
Keywords Diplomatic capital • International non-governmental organisations • 
Intergovernmental organisations • Collaborative research • Climate change
Some of the most pressing issues threatening wellbeing can be addressed 
only with coordinated global action. Obvious examples include  promotion of 
sustainable development, regulation of international trade, protection of human 
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rights, resettlement of refugees, prevention of pandemics, resolution of inter-
country conflicts, global peacekeeping, counter-terrorism, emergency disaster 
relief and effective responses to the risks of climate change.
Nevertheless, there are domestic pressures for some nations to reduce their 
engagement with international collaborations. In June 2016, for example, a 
majority of voters in a UK referendum supported withdrawal from the European 
Union. Across the Atlantic one year later, President Trump gave notice that the 
United States will withdraw from the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change 
mitigation, which it had signed with 194 other countries in 2016–2017, on the 
grounds that he could “put no other consideration before the wellbeing of 
American citizens” (Trump 2017).
These examples reflect a tension that is common in collaborations among 
countries. Similar to the street lighting example in Chap. 6, citizens may calcu-
late that their country’s share of the costs of an international project is greater 
than the extra benefits they receive from making that sacrifice, and so vote to 
withdraw from the project. If a majority of citizens in enough countries reason 
the same way, the collaboration may collapse with all benefits lost, even if total 
benefits clearly outweigh total costs.1
This chapter therefore examines how persons are able to engage with collabo-
ration for the common good of the global community, focusing on climate 
change as a case study. It begins with a description of three avenues for collabo-
ration that echo, at the international level, the analysis in previous chapters of 
civil society institutions, market firms and government agencies. The second 
section then considers another significant collaboration on the world stage—the 
work of researchers engaged in creating and testing new knowledge. This human 
institution of  collaborative research provides foundations for fostering many 
other types of international co-operation.
The remainder of the chapter then explores these ideas further using the 
example of global climate change. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) illustrates how new organisations are being developed for the 
creation and communication of reliable knowledge. The consensus of the 
research community on climate change, for example, is very strong: “Warming 
of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the observed 
changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia” (IPCC 2014, p. 2). The 
final section of the chapter, before a brief conclusion, addresses the challenge of 
achieving effective responses to that scientific knowledge. It introduces the met-
aphor of diplomatic capital to represent institutions and norms that foster cross- 
cultural collaborations for the common good.
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 Collaboration in the Global Community
The world population in 2017 was 7.6 billion persons and might reach 11.2 bil-
lion by 2100 (United Nations 2017, Table 1, p. 1). Such large numbers mean 
that effective actions at a global level require international institutions. Previous 
chapters have analysed how persons within a Nation State can collaborate 
through civil society institutions, market firms and different levels of govern-
ment. Similarly, people can participate in three types of global institutions: inter-
national non-governmental organisations (INGOs), multinational corporations 
(MNCs)2 and intergovernmental organisations (IGOs). Based on that classifica-
tion, this section provides evidence in support of the following proposition.
Proposition 22 International non-governmental organisations, multinational 
corporations and intergovernmental organisations can increase opportunities for 
global collaboration.
The number of active international non-governmental organisations increased 
sharply after World War II.  Boli and Thomas (1997), for example, analysed 
INGOs going back to 1875. They found records for about 200 INGOs in 1900, 
rising to around 800  in 1930. This figure jumped to more than 2000 active 
INGOs in 1960, and to more than 4000 by 1980 (idem, p. 172; see also Clark 
1995).
Although 20 years old, the data analysed by Boli and Thomas (1997) illus-
trate a broad range of INGO activities (see Fig. 8.1). They include associations 
promoting business and economic development, organisations supporting sci-
entific knowledge and technique, international bodies managing sports, hobbies 
or other leisure activities, and groups advocating for protection of individual 
rights and other world causes such as environmental preservation (idem, 
pp. 182–184).
An example of an INGO that attracts support from millions of persons is the 
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (ICRC 2014). This is one 
of the oldest INGOs still in operation. It began after publication of a book in 
1862 by Swiss businessman Henry Dunant, in which he reported his witness of 
the suffering of combatants left to die after the Battle of Solferino. He appealed 
for organised humanitarian responses beyond ad hoc charity, which led to the 
creation of the International Committee of the Red Cross in October 1863 and 
the adoption of the first Geneva Convention concerning war conduct on 22 
August 1864 (Bernard 2012, pp. 1198–1199).
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More than 150 years later, there are 189 Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
around the world, united by seven fundamental principles: humanity, impartial-
ity, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity and universality (ICRC 
2014). Donors and volunteers support the Movement’s mission of alleviating 
human suffering, protecting life and health, and upholding human dignity, 
especially during armed conflicts, natural disasters and other emergencies. 
Similarly, the Geneva Convention, extended over the decades, is now supported 
by 196 state parties (ICRC 2018).
MNCs play dominant roles in the global economy (Narula and Dunning 
2000; Mudambi and Santangelo 2016; Forsgren 2017). Their number has also 
greatly increased in recent decades. Gabel and Henry (2003, p. 3) estimate that 
there were around 7000 MNCs in 1970, which jumped to around 30,000 in 
1990 and 63,000 in 2000. This growth was part of the deeper process of eco-
nomic globalisation that created an integrated global economy (IMF 2008, p. 2). 
In 2016, the 100 largest MNCs (excluding financial corporations) employed 
16.3 million persons and owned assets valued above US$13 trillion (UNCTAD 
2017, Table 1.5, p. 29).
Some MNCs are criticised for pursuing shareholder wealth at the expense of 
awful damage to the wellbeing of partners, workers and other stakeholders, espe-
Fig. 8.1 Percentage distribution of active international non-governmental organisations by 
sector, 1988. (Source: Boli and Thomas (1997, Fig. 2, using UIA (1988) data, p. 183))
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cially in developing countries (Banks et al. 2015; Omoteso and Yusuf 2017). As 
a counter to that behaviour, individuals are able to support corporate social 
responsibility by acting as ethical consumers (Chipulu et al. 2018) or as socially 
responsible investors (Riedl and Smeets 2017). The fundamental motivation for 
corporate social responsibility is ethical, but there is solid evidence that it can 
also contribute to better financial performance (Chernev and Blair 2015; Crifo 
and Forget 2015; Saeidi et al. 2015; Wang et al. 2016; Jamali and Karam 2018).
Some MNCs are responding to the ethical expectations of customers and 
shareholders by using ethical labels to communicate their performance stan-
dards (Hartlieb and Jones 2009; Bissinger and Leufkens 2017). The Sustainability 
Consortium is an example of a global business- led initiative that is using scien-
tific knowledge to help companies provide consumer products while respecting 
the environmental limits of the planet.3
The third category of global collaborations involves IGOs established for spe-
cific purposes by treaty or charter ratified by Nation States. These include prom-
inent agencies focused on aspects of the global economy, including the Bank for 
International Settlements (established in 1930), the World Bank (1944), the 
International Monetary Fund (1945) and the World Trade Organisation (1995). 
Like INGOs and MNCs, the number of IGOs grew strongly after World War 
II. Held and McGrew (2007, p. 22) note that just 36 were recorded at the begin-
ning of the twentieth century, but the number had reached 7350 by 2000, with 
most of that increase occurring after 1978 (see also UIA 2001).
The European Union is an IGO. The United Kingdom acceded to the 
European Economic Community (EEC) on 1 January 1973, and hence was a 
founding member of the European Union when it replaced the EEC in the 
Maastricht Treaty 20 years later. Article B of the Treaty records that the Union’s 
five objectives are based on economic and social progress, international identity, 
the rights and interests of citizens, co- operation on justice and home affairs, and 
building on the Union’s legal order. A majority of voters in the UK 2016 refer-
endum were in favour of leaving the Union, so that Britain gave notice of its 
withdrawal by 29 March 2019.
The United Nations is another prominent IGO, created after World War II 
by a Charter that is currently ratified by 193 Member States.4 The Charter sets 
out the organisation’s purposes, which translate into five areas of activity under-
taken with the global community:
• Maintain international peace and security
• Protect human rights
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• Deliver humanitarian aid
• Promote sustainable development
• Uphold international law
United Nations’ programmes for sustainable development are particularly 
relevant to the themes of this book. Indeed, the description of this aspect of its 
mission resonates strongly with the wellbeing economics framework (United 
Nations 2018):
Improving people’s well-being continues to be one of the main focuses of the 
UN. The global understanding of development has changed over the years, and 
countries now have agreed that sustainable development – development that pro-
motes prosperity and economic opportunity, greater social well-being, and protec-
tion of the environment – offers the best path forward for improving the lives of 
people everywhere.
To mark the beginning of third millennium, the United Nations General 
Assembly adopted eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), accompa-
nied by specific targets for progress by 2015 (United Nations 2001). That initia-
tive mobilised global efforts that “helped to lift more than one billion people out 
of extreme poverty, to make inroads against hunger, to enable more girls to 
attend school than ever before and to protect our planet” (United Nations 
2015a, p. 3). This illustrates the potential of global collaboration to enhance 
wellbeing, although there remain powerful interests working against global 
social justice. Following the achievements of the MDGs programme, the General 
Assembly adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which sets out 
17 Sustainable Development Goals and 169 targets (United Nations 2015b).
 The Global Community of Researchers
Chap. 7 highlighted the contribution that knowledge can make to wellbeing, 
also observing that the creation of new knowledge is a global activity. The scale 
of collaboration required for discovering and testing new knowledge is demand-
ing. It is made possible by developing norms and protocols that build confi-
dence in scientific knowledge, despite researchers working in diverse institutions, 
cultures and countries. Widespread trust that the global research community is 
producing reliable knowledge is necessary for other forms of international 
collaborations.
P. Dalziel et al.
 155
Like the three groups considered in the previous section, there was a large 
expansion in organisations contributing to new knowledge during the latter half 
of the twentieth century. This was the result of increasing access to tertiary edu-
cation, accompanied by the creation of a greater number and wider range of 
non-university research groups (Gibbons et al. 1994, p. 11):
The massification of higher education and the appropriation, after the Second 
World War, by the universities of a distinct research function have produced 
increasing numbers of people familiar with the methods of research, many of 
whom are equipped with specialised knowledge and skills of various kinds. … 
Scientific and technological knowledge production are now pursued not only in 
universities but also in industry and government laboratories, in think-tanks, 
research institutions and consultancies, etc.
Universities continue to be a key source of new knowledge. In the United 
Kingdom, 154 universities were included in the 2014 assessment of the Research 
Excellence Framework. That assessment covered 52,061 academic staff, 191,150 
research outputs published between 2008 and 2013, and 6975 case studies of 
impacts beyond academia (REF 2014). Another indicator of global scale comes 
from the QS World University Rankings in 2018, which featured 959 universi-
ties from 84 countries.5
An important issue is that researchers generally accept that there is no method 
for demonstrating with certainty that any scientific hypothesis is true (Nola and 
Sankey 2000). Progress in developing a body of scientific knowledge is neverthe-
less possible, achieved through the practice of publishing research results in jour-
nals and books. Karl Popper (1983, p. xxxv) famously suggested that this is a 
distinctive feature of human knowledge:
The special thing about human knowledge is that it may be formulated in lan-
guage, in propositions. This makes it possible for knowledge to become conscious 
and to be objectively criticisable by arguments and by tests. In this way we arrive at 
science.
Knowledge develops through the publication of results that are open to test-
ing, refutation and further development by any researcher (Popper 1959, p. 41). 
There are strong norms and protocols for research publications. The research 
question must be clearly stated, for example, and its importance explained. 
Relevant publications that previously addressed the issue must be cited. The 
research method used to test the new knowledge claim must be described, so 
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that the evidence is replicable by other researchers. Conclusions must not reach 
beyond what the evidence justifies.
The best research outputs are peer reviewed, meaning that manuscripts are 
assessed by qualified researchers before acceptance for publication. Further, the 
practice of citing relevant research means the corpus of scientific knowledge is 
strongly interconnected as it expands. Clarivate Analytics, for example, main-
tains an important citations database (the Web of Science Core Collection; see 
http://clarivate.libguides.com/home) as a curated collection of more than 
18,000 peer-reviewed, high- quality scholarly journals representing more than 
250 research disciplines. This database has tracked well over one billion cited 
references going back to 1900.
Proposition 23 The global research community can develop knowledge by fol-
lowing well-established norms and protocols to build an  interconnected corpus 
of publications that offer evidence for falsifiable propositions.
Popper (1959, p. 13) observed that researchers approach problems within “a 
structure of scientific doctrines [that] is already in existence; and with it, a gener-
ally accepted problem-situation”. Thomas Kuhn (1962) introduced the word 
paradigm to describe this feature of what he termed “normal science”. Researchers 
address problems within their adopted paradigm, recognising that occasionally 
a crisis may produce a scientific revolution. Imre Lakatos (1970) went further, 
arguing that normal science typically involves a hard core of theories accepted by 
adherents, defended by a “protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses” that is the 
focus of research effort.6
In this tradition, the economics discipline has a strong theoretical core. Its 
central paradigm has been fruitful in creating knowledge, but is also challenged 
by feminist scholars (among others) for being founded on gender-blind method-
ological individualism and for emphasising questions affecting the market econ-
omy at the expense of other important problems of wellbeing, such as those 
related to household economies.7 The economics community recognises femi-
nist economics as a valid field of research, but categorises it under the heading of 
“Current Heterodox Approaches” (American Economic Association 2017, cat-
egory B54). Thus, feminist economics is explicitly labelled as outside the disci-
pline’s orthodox paradigm. This example illustrates that a research community 
does not operate in a vacuum. Like other global collaborations, research is influ-
enced by the political, economic, social, cultural and technological forces of the 
times.
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 The Science of Global Climate Change
Researchers have recognised that knowledge production has been extending 
from its traditional context of individual research disciplines into a new mode 
where “knowledge is created in broader, transdisciplinary social and economic 
contexts” (Gibbons et al. 1994, p. 1; see also Ledford 2015). This is resulting in 
new institutions for creating, synthesising and communicating knowledge. An 
outstanding example concerns the science of global climate change, where the 
IPCC has been created to support collaboration across research disciplines and 
among researchers from different cultures and countries.
The World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations 
Environmental Programme jointly established the IPCC in 1988 (Agrawala 
1998a, p. 606). It followed the signing of the Montreal Protocol in 1987, in 
which countries had agreed to phase out the production of substances that sci-
entists had demonstrated were responsible for ozone depletion in the atmo-
sphere (see Murdoch and Sandler 1997; Douglass et  al. 2014). The IPCC is 
currently supported by 195 countries.8
The United Nations General Assembly of 1998 endorsed the IPCC initiative, 
and commissioned it to produce a comprehensive review on five matters which 
continue to frame its mission (IPCC 2010, p. 4):
 (a) The state of knowledge of the science of climate and climatic change;
 (b) Programmes and studies on the social and economic impact of climate 
change, including global warming;
 (c) Possible response strategies to delay, limit or mitigate the impact of adverse 
climate change;
 (d) The identification and possible strengthening of relevant existing interna-
tional legal instruments having a bearing on climate;
 (e) Elements for inclusion in a possible future international convention on 
climate.
The IPCC published five assessment reports between 1990 and 2014. It is 
working on a sixth, and also produces technical papers and special reports. These 
outputs rely on the co-operation of thousands of experts from all regions of the 
world (IPCC 2010, p. 1). Following accepted norms for research publications, 
peer review is an essential element of its work programme, as observed by 
Agrawala (1998b, p. 623–624, emphasis in the original):
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However, the IPCC peer review is more comprehensive, by many orders of magni-
tude, than that in an average journal. For example, draft chapters of the 1995 
Working Group II Second Assessment report went through two full scale reviews: 
the first involving anywhere from twenty to sixty expert reviewers per chapter (a total 
of 700 experts from 58 countries were involved), and the second involving all IPCC 
member governments and the experts who had sent their reviews in the first round.
The IPCC is bound by the standard principles of scientific integrity, objectiv-
ity, openness and transparency. Another key principle is “to be policy relevant, 
but not policy prescriptive” (IPCC 2010, p.  1). The IPCC therefore places 
strong emphasis on communication. Major reports begin with a summary for 
policymakers and include key graphics to illustrate the science.
The Fifth Assessment Report was based on a synthesis of physical science 
research relevant to climate change (IPCC 2013). It brought together ten indi-
cators of a changing global climate (idem, Fig. TS.1, p. 38), including five going 
back to the beginning of the nineteenth century: land surface air temperature; 
sea surface temperature; marine air temperature; sea level; and summer arctic 
sea-ice extent. The scientific conclusion was clear (idem, p. 4):
Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the 
observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia. The atmosphere 
and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, sea level 
has risen, and the concentrations of greenhouse gases have increased.
The higher concentration of greenhouse gases is significant because it is a 
major driver of surface warming and global climate change through radiative 
forcing (see IPCC 2013, pp.13–14). The largest contribution comes from car-
bon dioxide (CO2) emissions. The IPCC has therefore collated data on the 
increased concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere since 1958.9 Again, the sci-
entific conclusion is clear (idem, p. 11):
The atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide 
have increased to levels unprecedented in at least the last 800,000 years. Carbon 
dioxide concentrations have increased by 40% since pre- industrial times, primarily 
from fossil fuel emissions and secondarily from net land use change emissions. The 
ocean has absorbed about 30% of the emitted anthropogenic carbon dioxide, caus-
ing ocean acidification.
Five specific reasons for concern guide the IPCC’s risk analysis of climate 
change (IPCC 2014, Box 2.4, p. 72). A higher mean temperature of the globe 
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produces: (1) greater risks of severe consequence for certain ecosystems and cul-
tures; (2) a greater likelihood of extreme weather events such as droughts and 
storms; (3) greater risks of unevenly distributed impacts on disadvantaged peo-
ple and communities; (4) a greater likelihood of adverse aggregate impacts glob-
ally; and (5) a greater likelihood that some physical and ecological systems will 
experience abrupt or irreversible changes.
In one of its most important graphics (see IPCC 2014, Fig. 3.1, p. 78), the 
IPCC links each of these five risks to the range of plausible changes in the earth’s 
global mean temperature by 2050, relative to its value at the beginning of the 
industrial revolution. This is affected by cumulative anthropogenic CO2 emis-
sions, which depend in turn on annual greenhouse gas emissions over the next 
decades.
The analysis indicates that if greenhouse gas emissions are kept to their 2010 
level, the cumulative anthropogenic CO2 emissions in 2050 are likely to be in 
the order of 4000 to 5000 Gigatonnes of carbon dioxide, which is associated 
with a likely temperature rise of about 2.5 °C relative to pre-industrial levels. 
The first decade of this century saw an increase of between 0.5 °C and 1.0 °C, so 
the scientific analysis implies that human-induced climate change will create 
substantially increased risks for future generations of adverse impacts in all of 
the five reasons for concern.
This evidence provides compelling reasons for responses by actors in the 
global community, but the situation is more urgent than the previous paragraph 
might suggest. This is because greenhouse gas emissions are unlikely to remain 
at their 2010 level without deliberate action, since governments around the 
world are committed to economic growth. If nothing else changes, growth can 
be expected to increase greenhouse gas emissions.
Consequently, the baseline scenario in the IPPC risk analysis reveals that on 
current growth paths, the global mean temperature by 2050 may be 4 °C higher 
than pre-industrial levels. The IPCC (2014, p.  17) therefore concludes with 
high confidence:
Without additional mitigation efforts beyond those in place today, and even with 
adaptation, warming by the end of the 21st century will lead to high to very high 
risk of severe, widespread and irreversible impacts globally.
Philosophers have argued that it is unethical for humanity to change the cli-
mate of the planet to this extent (Palmer 2011). In any case, the risks identified 
by the IPCC represent a major threat to future human wellbeing on a global 
scale, which raises its own ethical challenges (Gardiner 2004; Nordhaus 2007; 
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Weitzman 2007; Stern 2008). What is clear is that effective responses to miti-
gate climate change will require coordinated action around the world. The final 
section of this chapter addresses how this might be achieved.
 Diplomatic Capital
A useful starting point for considering globally coordinated responses to the 
threats of climate change is the Paris Agreement that came into force on 4 
November 2016.10 The Agreement is comprised of a preamble and 29 articles. 
Building on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
adopted in 1992, its specific aim recorded in Article 2 is “to strengthen the 
global response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable 
development and efforts to eradicate poverty”, including by:
Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above 
pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C 
above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the 
risks and impacts of climate change.
Based on the IPCC analysis discussed above, these targets are necessary to 
keep the risks from a higher global temperature to moderate levels, but they also 
require greenhouse gas emissions to return below their 1990 levels. The 
Agreement does not state how this will be achieved, leaving this for Nation 
States to decide (Article 3, emphasis added):
As nationally determined contributions to the global response to climate change, 
all Parties are to undertake and communicate ambitious efforts as defined in Articles 
4, 7, 9, 10, 11 and 13 with the view to achieving the purpose of this Agreement as 
set out in Article 2.
Note the reference to ambitious efforts. The task of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions is indeed challenging, especially in the context of national aspirations 
for economic growth (Jackson 2017). A further challenge is that damage from 
emissions is an example of “the tragedy of the commons” (Hardin 1968; Ostrom 
1990; Paavola 2008). A commons is a resource where no effective mechanism 
had been created for preventing anyone from freely consuming the resource. A 
classic example of a  commons is an ocean fishery, where economic analysis and 
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numerous case studies demonstrate that the incentives in the market economy 
for conserving fish stocks are very weak (Gordon 1954; McWhinnie 2009).
The earth’s atmosphere is another example of a commons. Consequently, any 
nation agreeing to implement costly policies to reduce its share of damaging 
greenhouse gas emissions may reasonably worry about what will prevent other 
nations from taking advantage by increasing their own emissions. This is an 
example of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (see this chapter’s  footnote 1). A solution 
requires effective mechanisms for ensuring universal compliance to agreements 
made about management of the resource (Ostrom 1990). In the case of global 
climate change, this may require new systems of “earth system governance” 
(Biermann 2012 and 2018; Dryzek 2016; Galaz et al. 2012).
Effective collaboration will involve new IGOs, but civil society organisations 
will also have important roles (Iati 2008). This was reflected, for example, in the 
International NGO Forum on Climate Change hosted by UNESCO in 
December 2017, involving more than 300 representatives of civil society.11 
Similarly, as discussed above, at least some MNCs are recognising that they must 
reduce their environment impacts for economic activities to be sustainable.
Chap. 4 introduced the metaphor of social capital to represent the idea that 
social collaboration is easier when residents in a nation are connected to each 
other through social networks and sharing social norms. Similarly, global col-
laboration is easier when relevant institutions and norms strengthen capabilities 
for cross-cultural common action. Echoing previous uses of the term “environ-
mental diplomacy” in this context (see, e.g., Carroll 1988; Broadhurst and 
Ledgerwood 1998; Susskind and Ali 2015), Proposition 24 offers  the phrase 
diplomatic capital as a metaphor to describe this concept.
Proposition 24 Investment in diplomatic capital (i.e., in institutions and norms 
designed to foster cross-cultural collaborations) can strengthen the capabilities 
of the global community to act together for the common good.
Institutions and norms of state diplomacy have been developed over centuries 
to support co-operation between countries (Anderson 1993). This is an example 
of investment in diplomatic capital, but all international organisations must 
similarly develop norms and protocols to be effective. The seven fundamental 
principles accepted by members of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement, discussed earlier in this chapter, is an obvious example. Similarly, 
the difficulties and rewards of drawing on cultural differences business enter-
prises is well recognised (Shenkar 2001). In short, any initiative that brings 
 The Global Community and Diplomatic Capital 
162 
together diverse actors to address a global issue requires diplomatic capital to 
succeed.
 Conclusion
Persons engage with global issues through specialist institutions that aim to fos-
ter collaboration on the world stage. These institutions include INGOs, MNCs 
and IGOs. Some institutions have undertaken activities that damage wellbeing, 
particularly in developing countries. Nevertheless, it is clear that some issues 
affecting the common good of the global community cannot be solved without 
coordinated efforts from diverse countries, large corporations and representa-
tives of civil society.
The capability to foster global collaboration must not be taken for granted. In 
the language of this chapter, it requires conscious investment in diplomatic capi-
tal, defined as institutions and norms designed to foster cross-cultural collabora-
tions. This applies not only to diplomatic relations among countries but to all 
initiatives that bring together diverse actors to address global issues.
An important example is the work of the global research community. 
Researchers have developed norms and protocols that build confidence in the 
quality of the new knowledge created by research. New institutions are being 
created to engage in transdisciplinary research on issues  affecting the wellbeing 
of billions of people. The work of the IPCC is an outstanding example.
Nevertheless, there are stresses evident in global collaborations. This chapter 
began by noting the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European 
Union and the withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Agreement. These 
events suggest that the current stock of diplomatic capital has been inadequate 
for meeting some urgent global challenges connected to sustainable develop-
ment and climate change. Stronger institutions and norms will be needed in the 
future.
Notes
1. In the language of economists, this is the Prisoner’s Dilemma problem, in which 
isolated and self- interested individuals are unable to achieve a collaborative solu-
tion that would make each better off. Soroos (1994) warned that this could be a 
good representation of international negotiations to address climate change, and 
suggested reasons why the United States might not collaborate (idem, p. 329).
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2. There are subtle and contested differences in the usage of terms such as multina-
tional, transnational, stateless or global corporations (Hu 1992). This is not 
important for this chapter; the analysis could have used any of these terms.
3. See https://www.sustainabilityconsortium.org/, accessed 26 February 2018.
4. The material in these paragraphs is sourced from the United Nations website, 
www.un.org/, accessed 26 February 2018.
5. Data accessed from https://www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings-arti-
cles/world- university- rankings/out-now-qs-world-university-rankings-2018, 28 
February 2018.
6. Maxwell (1998, 2005) has argued that the insights of Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos 
can be synthesised into a theory of science he terms aim-oriented empiricism. 
This suggestion is noted but not pursued here.
7. See, for example, Boserup (1970), Folbre and Hartmann (1988), Waring 
(1988), Ferber and Nelson (1993, 2003), MacDonald (1995), Bjørnholt and 
McKay (2014), Gammage et al. (2016) and Saunders and Dalziel (2017). One 
woman has received the Nobel Prize in Economics (Elinor Ostrom 2010).
8. See www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml, accessed 25 February 2018.
9. It also publishes data on the increased partial pressure of dissolved CO2 at the 
ocean surface and increased acidity of ocean water (reduced pH levels) since 
1988 (see, e.g., IPCC 2014, Fig. SPM.4, p. 12).
10. See http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9444.php, accessed 25 February 
2018.
11. See https://en.unesco.org/news/unesco-hosts-international-ngo-forum-climate-
change, accessed 26 February 2018.
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The Wellbeing Economics Framework
Abstract This chapter summarises key points in the wellbeing economics 
framework and illustrates how it can be used to guide decision- making. The first 
section lists the 24 propositions that emerged as key points in the analysis of the 
preceding eight chapters. The second section introduces a diagram that inte-
grates inputs into wellbeing capabilities (7 types of capital stock) with outputs 
of wellbeing capabilities (11 wellbeing indicators developed by the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development). The diagram is called the well-
being fabric. The remainder of the chapter illustrates how the wellbeing fabric 
can be applied at different levels of human choices, before a brief conclusion.
Keywords Wellbeing economics • Wellbeing fabric • Economic  policy • 
Capabilities • Skills
Despite international initiatives “to shift emphasis from measuring economic 
production to measuring people’s well-being” (Stiglitz et al. 2009, p. 12), policy 
decisions in many nations continue to prioritise high economic growth over 
other objectives. In the United Kingdom, for example, this priority was empha-
sised by former Prime Minister David Cameron’s (2010), even as he launched 
the country’s Measuring National Wellbeing Programme, when he insisted that 
“growth is the essential foundation of all our aspirations”.
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That statement holds that growth is a necessary, although perhaps not suffi-
cient, condition for wellbeing. This understanding leaves policy advisors free to 
focus on growth in the first instance, while allowing for supplementary policies 
to address other aspects of wellbeing. A sharp distinction is made between eco-
nomic policy, which is required to focus primarily on growth, and social policy, 
which is permitted to have a wider focus on welfare. Where there is conflict, 
priority is always given to economic policy, as demonstrated in the United 
Kingdom’s austerity measures after the global financial crisis.
This book rejects that two-tier approach. It has argued that how econo-
mies grow can have large impacts on wellbeing, for better or for worse. 
Economic growth over decades, for example, has not solved major wellbeing 
problems such as affordable housing, living wages and the end of child pov-
erty. There is clear scientific evidence of severe risks to future wellbeing on a 
global scale as a result of climate change caused by greenhouse gas emissions 
that are “driven largely by economic and population growth” (IPCC 2015, 
p. 4; see also Jackson 2017). This book has argued that the current approach 
to the design of economic policy must change, to directly address the well-
being of persons.
The book has therefore developed a wellbeing economics framework built on 
the capabilities approach introduced by Amartya Sen (1983, 1999) and Martha 
Nussbaum (2000, 2011). Important foundations for the framework were set out 
in the first chapter, which explained that the objective is to contribute to 
enhanced wellbeing of persons by expanding the capabilities of persons to lead 
the kinds of lives they value, and have reason to value, through different types of 
capital investment at different levels of human choice.
Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 then addressed seven levels of human choices, 
reproduced in Fig.  9.1. The analysis began in Chap. 2 with persons making 
time-use choices about activities they anticipate will contribute to the kinds of 
life they value, and have reason to value. Successive chapters analysed how 
expanding levels of collaboration can increase capabilities for wellbeing.
This final chapter summarises key points in the wellbeing economics frame-
work and illustrates how the framework can be used to guide decision- making 
at the different levels shown in Fig. 9.1. The first section lists the 24 propositions 
that emerged as key points in the preceding eight chapters. The second section 
then brings together capabilities and capital stocks into a single diagram, which 
we call the wellbeing fabric. It is designed to assist decision-makers think about 
influences on wellbeing in an integrated manner.
The subsequent three sections illustrate how the wellbeing fabric can be 
applied at the different levels of human choice shown in Fig. 9.1. The first sec-
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tion discusses the wellbeing of individuals, households and families, taken 
together. The second section illustrates how institutions of civil society, firms in 
the market economy and initiatives of local government combine capital stocks 
in distinctive ways to create greater capabilities for wellbeing than households 
and families can achieve in isolation. This is followed by a section on the Nation 
State, discussing how the wellbeing fabric can be used to guide national and 
international collaborations to promote wellbeing. The chapter concludes with 
some final comments.
 The Propositions of Wellbeing Economics
Each chapter in this book has recorded three propositions that note key points 
in the analysis. The resulting 24 propositions offer a structured summary of the 
wellbeing economics framework, and are presented here in a single list for the 
convenience of the reader.
 Foundations of the Framework
Proposition 1 The primary purpose of economics is to contribute to enhanced 
wellbeing of persons.
Global
Community
Nation
State
Local
Government
Market 
Participation
Civil
Society
Households
and FamiliesPersons
Fig. 9.1 Levels of human choice in the wellbeing economics framework. (Source: Fig. 1.1 in 
Chap. 1)
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Proposition 2 Wellbeing can be enhanced by expanding the capabilities of per-
sons to lead the kinds of lives they value, and have reason to value.
Proposition 3 The capabilities of persons can be expanded by different types of 
capital investment at different levels of human choice.
 Persons and Human Capital
Proposition 4 Persons can make time-use choices they reason will promote 
wellbeing, influenced by their cultural values, personal abilities and social 
capabilities.
Proposition 5 Investment in human capital through education can provide 
persons, in all their diversity, with opportunities to discover, discipline and dis-
play skills that contribute to wellbeing.
Proposition 6 Personal wellbeing can be monitored using a set of indicators 
that include measures of subjective and objective wellbeing, supplemented by 
measured trends in different types of capital.
 Households, Families and Cultural Capital
Proposition 7 Investment in cultural capital can enhance the wellbeing of 
households and families by expanding opportunities to express, develop, trans-
form and pass on to the next generation their cultural inheritance.
Proposition 8 Men and women can have equal capabilities for wellbeing.
Proposition 9 Present and future wellbeing can be enhanced if children grow 
up in households that are able to access adequate economic resources.
 Civil Society and Social Capital
Proposition 10 Persons can access enhanced capabilities for wellbeing by par-
ticipating in institutions of civil society to collaborate with others in the pursuit 
of common interests and shared values.
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Proposition 11 Investment in social capital can occur through mechanisms 
that include: learning in schools; participation in networks; enforcement of 
norms; development of societal aspirations; and efforts for social inclusion.
Proposition 12 Policy can enhance capabilities for wellbeing by ensuring per-
sons are not disadvantaged in their equitable access to services from the coun-
try’s capital stocks because of ethnicity or other personal characteristics.
 Market Participation and Economic Capital
Proposition 13 Persons can enhance wellbeing by participating as sellers and as 
buyers in the market economy; but markets need rules, customs and institutions 
to work well.
Proposition 14 Firms operating in the market economy can combine different 
types of capital to maintain specialist capabilities for supplying goods and ser-
vices valued by their customers.
Proposition 15 Investment in physical capital and the growth of financial capi-
tal can contribute to enhanced wellbeing, but recent patterns of economic devel-
opment are also associated with cumulative environmental damage, episodes of 
financial instability and greater concentration of wealth.
 Local Government and Natural Capital
Proposition 16 Good government can develop distinctive capabilities for man-
aging the provision of certain types of goods and services, especially those with 
externalities or the characteristics of an economic public good.
Proposition 17 Local government, sharing leadership with other actors in their 
communities, can develop and sustain regional capabilities for wellbeing through 
integrated investment in different types of capital.
Proposition 18 Human activity can diminish ecosystem services provided by 
the natural environment, and so investment in natural capital is required to 
maintain and enhance wellbeing.
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 The Nation State and Knowledge Capital
Proposition 19 The Nation State can contribute to expanded capabilities for 
wellbeing by acting on behalf of citizens as wise custodian of the market econ-
omy and welfare state within its borders.
Proposition 20 Knowledge capital has the properties of an economic public 
good, so that Nation States can contribute to enhanced wellbeing by fostering 
the growth and use of knowledge.
Proposition 21 The civil service can offer a specialist capability for creating, 
collating, synthesising, utilising and disseminating knowledge capital for the 
common good.
 The Global Community and Diplomatic Capital
Proposition 22 International non-governmental organisations, multinational 
corporations and intergovernmental organisations can increase opportunities for 
global collaboration.
Proposition 23 The global research community can develop knowledge by fol-
lowing well-established norms and protocols to build an interconnected corpus 
of publications that offer evidence for falsifiable propositions.
Proposition 24 Investment in diplomatic capital (that is, in institutions and 
norms designed to foster cross-cultural collaborations) can strengthen the capa-
bilities of the global community to act together for the common good.
 The Wellbeing Fabric
Recall from the opening chapter that our approach to wellbeing capabilities is 
inspired by Solow’s (1956) neoclassical growth model. Solow demonstrated 
how increasing the share of production devoted to physical capital investment 
can increase material living standards. Physical capital is one type of capital 
contributing to capabilities, and average material living standards is one mea-
sure of wellbeing outcomes. The wellbeing economics framework covers a wider 
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range of capitals and wellbeing outcomes, but the fundamental insight is the 
same as Solow’s: capabilities for wellbeing are expanded by investment in capi-
tal stocks.
Chapter 2 discussed an important debate about how a list of capabilities 
should be determined. Sen (2004) argues this determination should be made by 
members of each community exercising their own agency. Nussbaum (2003) 
argues that a list of central human capabilities can be developed to reflect the 
fundamental dignity of the human person, while being sensitive to cultural dif-
ference and open to change. Our approach avoids determining capabilities 
directly, but recognises inputs into capabilities (the different types of capital 
stock) and outputs of capabilities (wellbeing outcomes). This creates a matrix 
diagram that we term the wellbeing fabric, depicted in Fig. 9.2.1
Measures of Capital Stocks
H
um
an
C
ul
tu
ra
l
So
ci
al
E
co
no
m
ic
N
at
ur
al
K
no
w
le
dg
e
D
ip
lo
m
at
ic
Income and Wealth
Jobs and Earnings
Housing
Health Status
Work-Life Balance
Education and Skills
Social Connections
Civic Engagement
and Governance
Environmental Quality
Personal Security
Subjective Wellbeing
M
ea
su
re
s 
of
 O
ut
co
m
es
 f
or
 W
el
lb
ei
ng
Capital stocks expand the
capabilities of persons
to increase outcomes for
wellbeing.
Fig. 9.2 Wellbeing fabric of capital stocks and outcomes for wellbeing. (Source: Constructed 
from OECD (2013, Fig. 1.2, p. 21, reproduced in Fig. 2.3 of this book) and from Table 1.1)
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The rows in the diagram contain measures of outcomes for wellbeing taken 
from the OECD’s (2013) wellbeing conceptual framework, which was designed 
to reflect elements of Sen’s capabilities approach (OECD 2017, p. 23). That list 
identifies 10 measures of objective wellbeing and adds subjective wellbeing as an 
11th measure (see Fig. 2.3 of Chap. 2). These measures provide a reasonable 
structure for monitoring the changes over time in wellbeing outcomes from 
capabilities. Capabilities are developed by drawing on capital investment. The 
columns of Fig. 9.2 therefore measure each of the seven types of capital stock 
identified in the framework, originally listed in Table 1.1.
The following three sections illustrate how this wellbeing fabric can be used.
 Individuals, Households and Families
The emphasis throughout this book has been on “persons leading the kinds of 
lives they value, and have reason to value” (Sen 1999, p. 18). Persons are mem-
bers of households and families, and critical choices at key moments are often 
made with wider family involvement, influenced by cultural norms that are 
transformed and passed down through the generations (see, e.g., Buunk et al. 
2010; Shockley et al. 2017). This section therefore considers individuals, house-
holds and families taken together.
The process of determining the kinds of lives we value, and have reason to 
value, is dynamic and conflicted. Values are continuously negotiated in a person’s 
relations with others (White 2017). This is experienced most intensely within 
households and families, although influenced by wider social and cultural con-
nections. The wellbeing economics framework has little to say about that process, 
but the wellbeing fabric is a tool for considering the range of inputs into, and 
outcomes from, the capabilities that people need to live their chosen lives.
The connection between the warp and weft of the wellbeing fabric is recorded 
in its first cell: capital stocks expand the capabilities of persons to increase out-
comes for wellbeing. To illustrate, consider Education and Skills, which is a well-
being outcome from capabilities that develop over a person’s lifetime from an 
early age. During the person’s school years, that development depends on the 
quality of seven types of capital that schools provide:
• Human capital, in the form of diversely skilled teachers and the school 
managers
• Cultural capital, in the form of education experiences that respect and sup-
port expression of cultural values and practices
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• Social capital, in the form of norms and networks within the school that sup-
port collaboration and develop skills for future collaborations in wider 
society
• Economic capital, in the form of purpose built buildings, classrooms and 
equipment that support effective learning
• Natural capital, in the form of sports grounds, field trips and a safe environ-
ment at school (e.g., clean air)
• Knowledge capital, in the form of world-class best-practices for learning that 
are embedded in the school’s teaching
• Diplomatic capital, in the form of opportunities to learn skills (including 
foreign languages) needed to engage in global initiatives to improve 
wellbeing
It is easy to write similar bullet points describing how each of the out-
comes in the wellbeing fabric depends on access to the seven types of capital 
stock. The result is a tool for understanding causes of low wellbeing and for 
identifying potential solutions.
Using the rows of Fig. 9.2, for example, it is possible to determine which 
of the measures reflect low levels of outcomes for wellbeing in a group relative 
to the rest of the population. There is likely to be more than one. Poor hous-
ing, for example, typically leads to poor health. Poor health typically leads to 
poor education and skills, which typically lead to poor jobs and earnings. 
Poor jobs and earnings typically lead back to poor housing, creating a nega-
tive spiral of reduced wellbeing.
Using the columns of Fig. 9.2, it is then possible to investigate both the 
extent and the quality of each type of the seven capital stocks made available 
to a group with low wellbeing. Poor outcomes for education and skills, for 
example, may be due to the low quality of one or more of the capital stocks. 
Similarly, a region might be struggling with high levels of unemployment 
compared to the national average. The analysis might conclude that a con-
tributing factor is reduced access to quality economic capital due to deindus-
trialisation (Tregenna 2009; van Neuss 2018).
To give another important illustration, recall the personal security data in 
Chap. 3. Figure 3.3 showed that UK women are much more likely than men 
to report intimate violence since the age of 16, with the likelihood being 
greater than two to one for partner abuse, and greater than five to one for 
sexual assault. The wellbeing fabric invites an analysis of how this female vul-
nerability might be affected by gender inequality in access to the seven capital 
stocks, resulting in women, on average, having fewer economic opportunities 
than male peers (Aizer 2010).
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To address this, action is required to ensure women have equal access to 
quality human capital from an early age through to adulthood, to be able to 
attain the same level of education and skills as men. Action is required to 
ensure women have equal access to social capital, and so can make social con-
nections with dominant networks. Action is required to ensure women have 
equal access to economic capital in firms, and so can access the same quality 
jobs and earnings. Action is required to ensure women have equal access to 
diplomatic capital, and so are able to participate equally with men in civic 
engagement and governance.
These examples illustrate that individuals or households acting in isolation 
may have little power for improving access to capital stocks in the face of 
powerful economic and social trends. Progress often requires collaboration 
on a wider and larger scale, as discussed in the following section.
 Civil Society, Market Firms and Local Government
Wellbeing is enhanced by bringing together different types of capital to create 
capabilities. An individual, household or family may be able to do this on a 
small scale, but capabilities are usually expanded by specialist organisations, 
including institutions of civil society (Proposition 10), firms in the market econ-
omy (Proposition 14) and initiatives of local and central government 
(Propositions 16, 17, 19 and 21). Persons and households then use the goods 
and services provided by these organisations to enhance wellbeing outcomes 
according to their own values.
Consider again the example of developing education and skills during a per-
son’s school years. Some families provide home schooling within their own 
households (Kraftl 2012), but more typically the work of bringing together 
human, cultural, social, economic, natural, knowledge and diplomatic capital 
for education is the responsibility of specialist institutions—that is, schools—
created for this purpose.
That example can be generalised into a description of how organisations con-
tribute to wellbeing. An organisation identifies goods or services it can provide 
to increase the capabilities for wellbeing of individuals, households and families. 
The organisation then brings together the different types of capital needed to 
create the capability to produce and deliver those goods or services. The nature 
of the organisation—whether it is an institution of civil society, a firm in the 
P. Dalziel et al.
 179
market economy or an initiative of local government—depends largely on the 
characteristics of the goods or services.
Civil society institutions thrive when goods or services rely on the time and 
financial donations of volunteers who are motivated by the pursuit of common 
interests and shared values (see Chap. 4). As stated in Proposition 10, members 
of these institutions access enhanced capabilities through participation. This 
includes collective action in solidarity with social peers. Throughout history, for 
example, women have come together in organised campaigns for equality with 
men in the private and public sphere.
Another example of collective action reliant on member participation is the 
trade union movement. This civil society institution has a long tradition in the 
United Kingdom (Thompson 1963; Oswald 1985; Aldcroft and Oliver 2017), 
but has declined over the last three decades. Figure 9.3 shows UK trade union 
membership as a percentage of employed and working-age populations since 
1960. These series peaked around 1980 and have fallen steadily since then. This 
is likely to have had consequences for pay and conditions in some industries, 
including rewards for skilled work and the protection of living wages.
Many goods and services are provided by firms in the market economy, at 
least to those who can afford to purchase them. As discussed in Chap. 5, there 
Fig. 9.3 Trade union membership, percentage of employed and working-age populations, 
United Kingdom, 1960–2014. (Source: Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, 
Trade Union Statistics, and OECD, Employment and Labour Market Statistics)
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is a well-established capability theory of firms in the economics literature (Teece 
2017a, b). Proposition 14 summarises the key insight: Firms operating in the 
market economy combine different types of capital to maintain specialist 
capabilities for supplying goods and services valued by their customers. As 
discussed in Chap. 2, the value of a good or service in the market economy is 
founded on the contribution it makes to the benefits from time-use choices of 
persons creating the kinds of lives they value. Hence, firms are rewarded for 
delivering value.
Some types of goods and services are not supplied efficiently in the market 
economy. Proposition 16 elaborates that good government has distinctive capa-
bilities to ensure goods and services that involve externalities, as well as eco-
nomic public goods, are provided for wellbeing. Discussion around that 
proposition explained that if a public sector initiative can be greatly improved by 
local residents actively participating in its design or implementation, then this is 
a reason for the initiative to be overseen by local rather than central government 
(Lyons 2007, par. 2.8).
A second way in which local government contributes to enhanced capabilities 
is through co-production of regional development. This is summarised in 
Proposition 17: local government, sharing leadership with other actors in their 
communities, can develop and sustain regional capabilities for wellbeing through 
integrated investment in different types of capital. This role is distinctive because 
it does not involve the local government supplying goods and services; rather, 
the aim is to co-produce integrated strategies with other actors (including cen-
tral government agencies) in which coordinated actions by various stakeholders 
can enhance capabilities for wellbeing (Ostrom 2010). Figure  9.4 presents a 
flowchart of how this can be achieved in practice. It comes from a diagram first 
presented in Saunders and Dalziel (2004), but developed further using the ideas 
behind the columns and rows of the wellbeing fabric in Fig. 9.2.
On the left-hand side of Fig. 9.4, an analysis is made of the available stocks of 
different forms of capital in the region and trends over time. On the right-hand 
side, processes are implemented to obtain the views of residents on what out-
comes are valued for wellbeing (including consultation with institutions of civil 
society), alongside a dialogue with the business sector for insights on how to 
relax key constraints on promoting wellbeing. A third stream of work reviews 
the provision of public services to identify gaps and opportunities for enhancing 
capabilities.
This allows gaps and opportunities in regional capabilities to be identified, 
which provides a foundation for co-produced strategies to fill the gaps and take 
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Continuously evaluate 
progress towards wellbeing 
of residents and local
communities.
Coproduce with other actors 
integrated strategies to 
enhance capabilities for 
wellbeing.
Determine gaps and 
opportunities in the region’s
capabilities for current 
and future wellbeing.
Review local and central 
government services to 
identify opportunities for 
enhancing capabilities.
Processes for obtaining 
residents’ views on 
current and future outcomes
valued for wellbeing.
Baseline statistical analysis
of regional resources to
assess available stocks of
different forms of capital.
Measured trends (positive
and negative) of changes in
capital stocks due to use,
depreciation or investment.
Processes to determine the
business sector’s insights on
relaxing key constraints on
promoting wellbeing.
Fig. 9.4 Framework for local government action. (Source: Developed from Saunders and 
Dalziel (2004, Fig. 1, p. 364))
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advantage of the opportunities. The final step is to evaluate progress towards the 
strategy’s goals.
 The Nation State
In many respects, the Nation State is simply a higher level of government oper-
ating at a larger scale than local government. Proposition 16 applies: the state 
has distinctive capabilities at the national level in ensuring access to goods and 
services that involve externalities, as well as economic public goods. Chap. 7 
emphasised the state’s role, including through its civil service, in contributing to 
enhanced wellbeing by fostering the growth and use of knowledge (Propositions 
20 and 21).
The role of the state in addressing market failures such as externalities, eco-
nomic public goods, monopolies and imperfect information is an important 
function. Another is to act as wise custodian of the market economy and welfare 
state within its borders (Proposition 19).
Recall from Chap. 7 that for most of the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies, public policy was disposed towards “individualism and laissez-faire” 
(Keynes 1926, p. 272). That disposition was overturned when Keynes (1936) 
demonstrated that an economy will move to an equilibrium level of production 
that, under certain circumstances, can be influenced by the level of government 
spending. More than 80 years later, it is perhaps difficult to appreciate the radi-
cal shift represented by this insight. It implies a world of multiple equilibria, 
creating the possibility that the Nation State, acting as custodian of the market 
economy and welfare state, can aim to coordinate actions that will move the 
country towards an equilibrium that supports better wellbeing outcomes.2
This possibility can be illustrated by combining analyses in Chaps. 2 and 5. 
Chap. 2 explained how personal skills are developed through a person discover-
ing individual abilities, disciplining those abilities through education and dis-
playing the disciplined abilities in contributions to wellbeing, including in 
employment (see Proposition 5). That model of personal skills is reproduced 
here in the upper diagram of Fig. 9.5.
In Chap. 5, Proposition 14 drew on the capability theory of the firm to state 
that firms combine different types of capital to maintain specialist capabilities 
for supplying goods and services valued by their customers. This was represented 
in Fig.  5.1, highlighting knowledge capital because of its centrality in the 
dynamic capabilities of an enterprise. That representation is reproduced in the 
lower diagram of Fig. 9.5.
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Displayed
Abilities
Discovered
Abilities
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Skills
Knowledge
Capital
Other
Capitals
Human
Capital
Firm
Capabilities
Fig. 9.5 Personal skills and firm capabilities. (Source: Figs. 2.2 and 5.1)
 The Wellbeing Economics Framework 
184 
Links between the upper and lower diagrams in Fig. 9.5 lead to two observa-
tions. First, the human capital drawn upon by a firm to contribute to its special-
ist capabilities (in the lower diagram) is the personal skills depicted at the centre 
of the upper diagram. Second, in this context of employment, the person’s dis-
played abilities (in the upper diagram) contribute to the firm’s capabilities at the 
centre of the lower diagram.
Figure 9.6 demonstrates these linkages, integrating the two parts of the previ-
ous figure into a single diagram.3 It shows pictorially that firms need skilled 
persons to sustain capabilities, and persons need to contribute to firm capabili-
Knowledge
Capital 
Other
Capitals 
Personal
Skills 
Firm
Capabilities 
Discovered
Abilities 
Disciplined
Abilities  
Fig. 9.6 Integration of personal skills and firm capabilities. (Source: Integration of the two 
diagrams in Fig. 9.5)
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ties to earn an economic reward for their investment in human capital. Personal 
skills and firm capabilities are reliant on each other. Thus, it is possible to imag-
ine scenarios in which an industry settles on an equilibrium that involves low 
skills with weak capabilities, and other scenarios in which the equilibrium 
involves high skills and strong capabilities.
Public policy might therefore aim to move industry towards the high skill and 
strong capabilities equilibrium. The coordination problem revealed in Fig. 9.6 is 
that there is no direct link between the knowledge capital contributing to firm 
capabilities and the disciplined abilities  contributing to personal skills. 
Consequently, to achieve an equilibrium characterised by firms with strong 
capabilities and employees with high skills, the state can construct a skill ecosys-
tem that aims to match the evolving knowledge capital of firms with the evolving 
human capital developed in education institutions.4 As stated by UKCES (2009, 
p. 8): “There is little that is more important than equipping ourselves with the 
skills we need, for the jobs we need, for the successful businesses of tomorrow.”
The above example considers just two types of capital (knowledge capital and 
human capital), but illustrates the difficulty of integrating policies to deliver bet-
ter outcomes for wellbeing. The wellbeing fabric in Fig. 9.2 includes 7 types of 
capital and lists 11 outcomes for wellbeing. The task of integrating public poli-
cies to support investment in each type of capital, and ensuring that residents are 
able to access quality capital stocks to produce enhanced wellbeing outcomes, is 
very challenging. Nevertheless, if the primary purpose of economics is to con-
tribute to enhanced wellbeing of persons (Proposition 1), then these challenges 
must be faced.
 Conclusion
Chapter 1 began by citing Adam Smith’s (1776) Wealth of Nations to argue that 
a focus on wellbeing has a long tradition in economics. This book is a contribu-
tion to that tradition. It has drawn on a wide literature to construct a wellbeing 
economics framework informed by the capabilities approach to prosperity.
The development of this framework has been motivated by the serious eco-
nomic issues faced by the global community. These include achieving the United 
Nations’ sustainable development goals, mitigating the urgent risks of climate 
change and addressing unequal access to economic resources within every coun-
try and between countries. It is no longer credible to presume that economic 
growth is the answer; indeed, current patterns of production growth have con-
tributed to all of these problems.
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The wellbeing economics framework is a tool not only for decision- makers 
in  local and national governments, but also for individuals, households and 
families, institutions of civil society and firms in the market economy. It pro-
vides an integrated approach for actions to expand the capabilities of persons to 
lead the kinds of lives they value, and have reason to value.
Notes
1. This term “wellbeing fabric” was first used in Dalziel et al. (2006, Table 2, p. 277) 
and Dalziel et al. (2009, Fig. 3, p. 15).
2. A recent discussion of the modelling difficulties created by multiple equilibria in a 
New Keynesian context is provided by Cochrane (2017).
3. Similar figures can be found in Dalziel (2015, 2017). The novel feature of this ver-
sion is that it incorporates the capability theory of the firm.
4. See, for example, Crouch et al. (1999), Finegold (1999), Buchanan and Jakubauskas 
(2010), Buchanan et al. (2017) and Dalziel (2017).
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